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Since its urban boom around the mid 1980s, the Cairene residential 
district of Nasr City has been the hub for a unique housing phenomenon. 
It has seen middle class professionals appropriating its apartment 
building typologies into households for their extended families. Over 
the past ten years, however, many of those families have been aiming 
to relocate their households to the emerging suburban developments 
on Cairo’s periphery. This desire seems to be driven by nothing more 
than their aspiration for the simulacrums of luxury and social status 
associated with suburban living. Apart from superficial stylistic variations 
in architectural expression, the housing typologies in these suburbs offer 
the same functional arrangements as those in Nasr City; and as per their 
building bylaws they accommodate the co-existence of fewer extended 
family generations. These facts, coupled with the increased financial 
hardships involved in acquiring a new suburban dwelling, highlight the 
absurdity of the middle class professionals’ desire for such relocation. 
Not only does it deplete their monetary standing in an Egyptian society 
that now recognizes size of income and wealth as the only measures 
of social status, but it also debases the solidarity inherent in their 
characteristic intergenerational living. That is to say, it compromises the 
basis of the very social status they are aiming to preserve.
This thesis tracks the history of 11 El-Insha Street, an apartment 
building–extended family household in Nasr City, as well as the history 
of the street it stands on, over the span of 30 years. That narrative serves 
as the basis for a discussion of the evolution of the Egyptian middle 
class, Nasr City, and the apartment building – extended family house 
typology. Through an extensive analytical framework of demographic 
and urban data, the discourse of this thesis tracks the link between 
middle class professionals and that particular housing typology; its 
particular prevalence in Nasr City once upon time; and the current 
trend of its extinction as its inhabitants relocate to the suburbs. Abstract
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A House of No Importance
The rise and fall of Nasr City’s middle class
extended family houses2
fig.1.a.1   [previous page] Entrance to 
11 El-Insha  Street;  the Arabic  on  the 
marble plaque reads: “El-Insha Street, 
Al-Nasr Building”.
There’s a certain box-like apartment building that stands on a street. It’s a building that is no different from twelve 
other box-like apartment buildings down the street upon which it stands. And for that matter, that certain street with its 
buildings isn’t any different from the two streets at its ends nor the two branching off of it. It is but a generic segment of an 
extensive orthogonal network of numerous similar streets weaving the urban fabric of a certain Cairene residential district. 
That certain building, on that certain street, within that certain district, is my home. It has been the household of two 
extended families for almost twenty years: my grandparents and the families of their son and daughter – my mother; and 
my grandfather’s life long friend and the families of his three sons and daughter. That certain building holds the number 11 
on El-Insha Street in the district of Nasr City.
Prologue
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At first glance, 11 El-Insha Street seems to be of no importance 
indeed; the generic quality and abundance of its architectural typology 
deems it insignificant. This in turn translates into a common notion 
among Cairenes that, within the context of Cairo, Nasr City exhibits a 
similar insignificance in terms of urban quality. The only significance 
this building, or any of the many buildings similar to it, might bear is 
that of a sentimental quality. It’s a significance specific to its inhabitants; 
one that derives from their family ties for which this building serves 
as a physical realm. However, the profound sense of belonging I have 
towards 11 El-Insha Street as the household of my extended family is 
not the only reason I’ve selected it to be the centerpiece of this thesis.
My main concern here is how Cairenes’ aspiration towards establishing 
or maintaining a relative position within the societal structure translates 
into the architecture and urban situation of their residential dwellings. 
This particular dynamic seems to have always been at play throughout the 
course of development of almost any given Cairene residential district. 
Its effect is most evident at the times of intense social mobility that 
paralleled key political, economic and cultural shifts throughout Egyptian 
history. And while I acknowledge – and aim to verify – this dynamic as 
an incidental aspect to the realization of social potential, I am certainly 
against the consequences of its escalating magnitude during the latter 
decades of the 20th century and the early decades of the 21st century.
The early 1970s saw a drastic ideological shift for Capitalism in Egypt 
gravitating the basis of Cairene social hierarchy towards wealth rather 
than genuine social achievement. This manifested in the emergence of 
a new elite class as well as the introduction of new social groups to the 
demography of the Cairene middle class. Simultaneously, residential 
architecture and its urban situation were brought forth as a rather 
convenient realm for validating a newly acquired social status. However, 
the contemporary zeitgeist reduced this validation to an ostentatious 
display of the monetary capacity to obtain a residence in districts that 
were previously exclusive to classes of a genuinely realized status. As a 
result, these districts were ushered into an urban transformation of a 
degrading quality as residential structures housing a new social breed 
were inflicted around and within their existing fabrics. The propagation 
of this pattern through the remainder of the century culminated in cuing 
an exodus of their original inhabitants towards emerging suburban 
settlements that are now the new synonym of social status within the 
Cairene domain.
Given the ongoing urban degradation and what original inhabitants 
perceive as the decline of the social demographic profile of their 
districts, the motives behind this urban relocation are quite excusable. 
Nevertheless, my contention is that, in the case of middle class 
professional families, it is rather unreasonable. The attempt to sustain 
their social status through establishing a relation to social elites by 
means of urban proximity and architectural reference quite ironically 
defies its own purpose. Other than their simulacrum of luxury, the 
architectural typologies offered in these districts and the economic 
pressures involved in acquiring them clearly compromise the social 
attributes and financial assets of Cairene middle class families; that is to 
say, the basis of the social status they originally set to maintain.
As I traced this phenomenon I kept being drawn back to 11 El-Insha 
Street and Nasr City. My personal experiences regarding my household, 
the street it stands on, and the district of Nasr city as a whole, identified 
seamlessly with its every aspect. The story of the insignificant building 
on the generic street was presenting itself as a microcosm for the social 
and urban evolution of Nasr City that in turn served as a paradigm for the 
dynamics of this phenomenon in action. Coupled with the contending 
suburbs of New Cairo growing to its east, it only seemed fitting that I 
would employ Nasr City, as the realm of the household on 11 El-Insha 
Street, to demonstrate my argument. Accordingly, the structure of this 
thesis revolves around a series of personal narratives of my household’s 
development history and my observations of certain happenings within 
its social and urban vicinity. Each of these narratives lays ground for an 
objective analysis of the aspect of the phenomenon implied within its 
events as it unfolds onto the larger scale of Nasr City’s development.
4
Using 11 El-Insha Street as a template, the discourse of this thesis 
identifies and explores the adaptable nature of a certain socio-spatial 
arrangement in which an extended family household is cloaked in 
a typical-floor-plan apartment building typology. It then goes on to 
highlight that this apartment building–extended family house typology 
is rather exclusive to the multi-generational families of middle class 
professionals; and that, more than anywhere else in Cairo, it constitutes 
a substantial portion of Nasr City’s core urban fabric. Pertaining to its 
highly adaptable character, the point is made that, in the particular 
case of Nasr City and its middle class professionals’ extended families, 
this typology holds a wealth of latent potential to counter Nasr City’s 
social and urban degradation that is now being imposed by the 
phenomenon around which this thesis revolves. Not only does this 
typology accommodate more family generations than the typologies 
being offered in the New Cairo suburbs, but it also has the capacity to 
adapt and change, like it always has, to have the same stylistic attributes 
of those suburban typologies with all their simulacrums of luxury and 
status. In other words, Nasr City’s apartment building–extended family 
houses have the potential to neutralize the need of their middle class 
inhabitants for an urban relocation since, and in turn, the capacity to 
hinder the propagation of Nasr City’s social and urban demise that 
prompted such relocation in the first place. 
However, there was yet another crucial factor involved in my choice 
of topic for this thesis, and that was what seemed to me as a collective 
neglect of Nasr City and the inherit potential of its apartment building–
extended family house typology. Throughout the course of my research, 
obtaining any kind of data specific to Nasr City was a rather difficult 
and, more often than not, unsuccessful task. On a governmental level, 
statistical censuses, building bylaws, and maps were either inaccessible, 
missing or altogether nonexistent. And even on an academic level, 
publications were rather scarce and quite generic. This lack of resources 
was personally provocative for it seemed to highlight a strong bias 
against Nasr City; and in many ways, it directed the methodology of 
this thesis towards empiricism and fieldwork. I essentially had to 
piece together the greater majority of the maps and documents that 
were used to demonstrate the argument of this thesis from various 
fragmented sources; raw, unprocessed data; or urban surveys that I 
conducted personally. In a sense, I believe that, if not for anything else, 
this thesis has its value in those mapping sets that I have produced in 
their capacity as an original record of Nasr City’s architectural and urban 
evolution, and more importantly, as a research tool for anybody who 
might be interested in the district as a whole and would come to face 
the same difficulties finding resources pertaining to it like I did.
This bias was also rather evident in the swift dismissal of any possible 
value to my work once I voiced my interest in Nasr City as a research 
focus to Cairene architects, urbanists, or any cultured Cairene individual 
for that matter. This dismissal, however, was never aimed towards 
the validity of my argument regarding the negative architectural and 
urban impacts of contemporary social transformations in Cairo. On the 
contrary, these impacts have been of major concern within the Cairene 
domain lately. Nevertheless, this concern has been primarily directed 
towards the older districts of the city for the historic and aesthetic 
value of their architectural typologies. On the other hand, given Nasr 
City’s relatively recent inception and the contemporary zeitgeist of its 
development that favored quantity to aesthetic quality, it seemed to 
me that, collectively, the architecture and urban disciplines in Egypt had 
deemed it devoid of any architectural or urban value worth preserving 
from the get-go. And that in itself was yet another reason for me to 
pursue highlighting the latent potential of Nasr City’s extended family 
house typology.
I believe that the cynical gist implied in the title of this thesis is now 
quite clear. However, this treatise is not based in sympathy for the 
underdog. I did not produce this work out of a pure interest in the 
understated architecture and urbanism of 11 El-Insha Street and Nasr 
city per se. My concern for the apartment building–extended family 
household typology and this district pertains to their nature being the 
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characteristic dwelling and the major urban hub for Cairene middle 
class professionals, whom I perceive as one of the very few, if not the 
only, social group in Egypt that still lives by a higher moral standard. 
I believe that the mutual preservation of Nasr City and its extended 
family house typology, in essence, preserves this middle class, and in 
turn the integrity of society as a whole. Having said that, the only two 
questions left here are: How so, and why bother? And to answer both 
those questions, I’ll leave you with this quote from a recently published 
dystopian novel that extrapolates Cairene society into a near future:
“In the beginnings of the 21st Century, the last statistical 
census that could be conducted showed […] the dissipation of 
the middle class, which plays in any given society the role of 
graphite rods in a nuclear reactor; it slows down the reaction 
and without it the reactor would explode. A society without a 
middle class is a society deemed for explosion.”
(Tawfik 2008, 137)
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Chapter One
7
1.A  The House
Aziz and Gerges Built
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fig.1.a.1   [previous page] Entrance to 
11 El-Insha  Street;  the Arabic  on  the 
marble plaque reads: “El-Insha Street, 
Al-Nasr Building”.
In late 1969, my grandfather’s best friend, Gerges Fahim, purchased a piece of land in Nasr City; a then new suburban 
development on the eastern outskirts of Cairo. Mr. Fahim, who was a mathematics teacher and a school principal, acquired 
the land through the Egyptian Teachers’ Syndicate which was offering its members facilitated payment arrangements for 
buying land lots in the new suburb. He purchased the 525 square meter land lot holding the number 11 on El-Insha Street 
in Nasr City’s First Zone at a convenient cost of 5 Egyptian Pounds per square meter which he paid in installments. However, 
and in spite of such facilitations, many of Mr. Fahim’s peers and family members disapproved of this purchase, contending 
that the desolate desert plains Nasr City was at the time would never be populated neither in the near nor far future. They 
perceived the purchase as a rather bad venture and repeatedly advised him to sell the land at the first chance he gets, 
although many doubted that such chance would ever come along.
Nevertheless, by the mid 70s Mr. Fahim was receiving offers to sell his land lot for four times its original price at 20 
Egyptian pounds per square meter. But just as he didn’t succumb to the grim expectations of Nasr City’s urban future, Mr. 
Fahim didn’t accept any of those generous offers either. He was determined to provide a household for the future families 
of his three sons and daughter on this land lot once he had the financial capacity to do so. Mr. Fahim saw this land lot as a 
future asset for his children rather than a mere investment opportunity.
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fig.1.a.2   [left] Mr. Gerges Fahim.
fig.1.a.3   [right] Dr. Abd-alAziz Abouzeid.
However, by the end of 1980, and as the price of a square meter of land in Nasr City quadrupled once more to 80 Egyptian 
pounds, Mr. Fahim was facing a pressing dilemma. The Teachers’ Syndicate notified him that if he didn’t start building a 
residential structure on his land lot right away, the syndicate would withdraw it and refund him the original price he paid 
minus a fine of 10% of that price. Lacking the financial assets needed for undertaking the building process, Mr. Fahim turned 
to his friend Abd-alAziz Abouzeid – my grandfather – for help. A doctor of Internal Medicine and the director of Abbasiya 
Hospital for Tropical Diseases at the time, my grandfather was also searching to purchase a piece of land in order to build a 
household for the future families of his son and daughter. So Mr. Fahim approached him with a proposal to use the assets 
he allocated for buying his own land lot to build an apartment building on Mr. Fahim’s instead, and consequently hold an 
equal share in the ownership of both the land lot and the building. Given the rising land and building costs at the time, Dr. 
Abouzeid agreed to his friend’s convenient proposal.
Mr. Fahim then commissioned both the design and construction of 11 El-Insha Street to an acquaintance of his by the 
name of Alfonse – an architect and an experienced construction site manager. His design approach was more of a technical 
exercise primarily aimed at achieving the maximum permissible floor area as per Nasr City’s building bylaws. It was well 
received by both Mr. Fahim and Dr. Abouzeid who were preoccupied with making the most out of their lot in terms of size 
and number of apartments rather than functional and stylistic preferences. Given his knowledge of how to manipulate those 
bylaws and the bureaucratic loopholes of the system, Alfonse suggested to his clients exceeding the stipulated maximum 
footprint for the building, which he argued would make its apartments considerably larger in area, and assured them that 
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even though such a violation would entail a fine after the building had been constructed, a building permit would still be 
issued. He explained that he would intentionally mislabel the setbacks on 11 El-Insha Street’s permit drawings so that its 
footprint would come out to the maximum percentage stipulated in the bylaw; and informed them that the officials who 
review the drawings submitted for obtaining building permits do not actually verify the measurements on those drawings, 
but rather they just use the dimensions written down on them to calculate weather or not the building adheres to the 
stipulated footprint percentage. Mr. Fahim and Dr. Abouzeid agreed to Alfonse’s proposition, and the mislabeled drawings 
of his “design” – which was hardly an outcome of an actual creative process – was then submitted to the Nasr City District 
Authority for obtaining a building permit. Shortly after it was issued, the construction of 11 El-Insha Street commenced in 
early 1981 and was completed three years later.
In 1984, the structure which then stood as 11 El-Insha Street was a three-storey high apartment building of a rather 
generic typical floor plan that reflected the simple grid of its post-and-beam concrete structure. With two apartments on 
each of its three floors, it was comprised of six apartments in total. Those on the first and second floors were symmetrical 
around the building’s central east-west axis with an area of 125 square meters each. On the ground floor however, due to 
a non-axial building entrance and in order to meet the stipulated building footprint, the apartments were asymmetrical 
and slightly smaller in area. The south apartment on the ground floor had an area of 100 square meters, while the north 
apartment had an area of 80 square meters rendering it the smallest in the building. Mr. Fahim and Dr. Abouzeid split the 
building’s ownership vertically right through its central axis; Mr. Fahim was allocated the three apartments on the building’s 
south side, while Dr. Abouzeid was allocated those on the north. 
Having more children than Dr. Abouzeid, it only seemed fair that Mr. Fahim would own the building half with the larger 
apartment on the ground floor so that he could entitle his three sons to equally sized apartments. Mr. Fahim, however, 
was still short of an apartment to entitle to his daughter. He was quite disappointed with this shortcoming even though, 
according to the norms of Egyptian society, it wasn’t the father’s obligation to provide the dwelling of his daughter’s future 
family. But then again, it wasn’t the norms of society that prompted his desire to endow her with a property in the building; 
it was rather a personal preference for the future family of his daughter to reside with those of her brothers’. Moreover, his 
wish to be just among his children also prompted such desire. Mr. Fahim wanted to equally provide to his daughter what 
he had to provide to her brothers regardless whether or not such property came to be her family’s residence. Be that as 
it may, Mr. Fahim had to reluctantly accept such shortcoming since there wasn’t much he could have done about it at the 
time. Although Nasr City’s building bylaws would have allowed for the addition of one more storey to 11 El-Insha Street, 
Mr. Fahim was out of options as how to finance it. He still lacked sufficient funds and Dr. Abouzeid had already fulfilled 
his commitment to him as per their agreement; paying for the construction of the building as it stood at a height of three 
storeys had fully compensated for Dr. Abouzeid’s share in the land lot.
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fig.1.a.4  11 El-Insha Street’s site plan c.1984; the front setback 
was  the  only  one  that  adhered  to Nasr City’s  building  bylaws 
at the time. The side setbacks exceeded the maximum allowable 
dimension  by  0.70 meters,  and  the  rear  setback  exceeded  the 
maximum  allowable  dimension  by  2.60  meters.  The  building 
footprint stood at 43% of the lot area; 10% over the maximum 
stipulated footprint at the time. Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim paid 
a fine of  2,800 Egyptian Pounds  for  this “commonplace” and 
“passable” bylaw violation.
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fig.1.a.5   Ground [opposite page] and typical floor plans of 11 
El-Insha  Street; Alfonse’s  original  design  that  hardly  involved 
any input from the building’s intended inhabitants.
2.
00
5.
00
2.
30
1.
25
2.
00
6.
30
1.
00
3.45 3.453.375 3.375
3.45 3.454.25 1.251.25
1.
00
6.
00
3.
67
5
3.
00
5.
30
1.
00
6.
87
5
1.
80
2.
00
5.
30
5.
00
2.
30
1.
25
2.
00
5.
30
3.45 3.453.375 3.375
3.45 3.454.25 1.251.25
5.
00
3.
67
5
3.
00
4.
30 bedroom
bathroom
kitchen
w.c.
reception
bedroom
dining room
bedroom
bathroom
kitchen
kitchen
reception
+
dining room
building
entrance
w.c.
reception
bedroom
dining room
14
fig.1.a.6    [right]  Ola  Abouzied  and 
Aly elBahrawy; they followed in 1987.
fig.1.a.7    [left]  Ahmed Abouzeid  and 
Azza elDinasoury; first residents of 11 
El-Insha street. 
On his north half of the building, Dr. Abouzeid entitled his son to the apartment on the second floor, and driven by the same 
inclinations as Mr. Fahim, he entitled his daughter to the apartment on the first floor. He reserved the smaller apartment 
on the ground floor for his wife and himself with the intention to spend the latter years of their lives residing among their 
children and grandchildren. In late 1984, Dr. Abouzeid’s newly wed son and daughter-in-law, Ahmed and Azza, moved into 
their apartment becoming the first residents of 11 El-Insha Street. Both my uncle and his wife were freshly graduated 
medical students at the time; he was embarking on both an academic and practicing career in surgery while she was 
embarking on a similar dual career in pathology. Almost two years later, they were followed by Dr. Abouzeid’s daughter, son-
in-law and grandson: Ola, Aly and myself. My mother and father had just returned from Canada after being awarded their 
doctorates in Political Science and Civil Engineering respectively and were set to assume their teaching posts in university. 
Upon their return, my grandfather insisted that they reside in the apartment he had entitled to my mother rather than the 
one my father had already provided as her suitor seven years earlier. My parents honored his will, and in early 1987 we 
moved into our apartment in 11 El-Insha Street.
15
fig.1.a.8   The  texture and color of 11 
El-Insha Street’s  facade and staircase 
finishings;  the  Royal  Poincianas  in 
front  of  the  building;  and  the  lotus 
pattern of the building gates. 
I was only four years old at the time, but I can still remember a lot about 11 El-Insha Street and its surrounding context 
back then. The building had a rather boxy volume; its almost flat facades were spray plastered in shades of ochre and had 
wooden window shutters of a deep green color. The building gates were ornamented in a lotus floral pattern, and the 
main staircase was finished in white terrazzo that contrasted its black metal railing. A low wall marked the perimeter of 
the land lot, and on the sidewalk beyond it, three Royal Poincianas stood blooming in front of the building. Collectively, 
these seemingly mundane features rendered 11 El-Insha Street with a warm homely feel; an impression that was further 
accentuated by what I recall to be a considerably empty and alienating context.
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fig.1.a.9   11 El-Insha Street’s main  facade, as  it briefly  looked 
like c. 1984, and a north-south section through  it; the facade is 
recreated from Alfonse’s original design and my memories of the 
building at the time me and my parents moved in.
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Driving in and out of Nasr City with my parents, I remember that almost all the buildings I saw around looked a lot like ours. 
But I also remember that there were way more empty land lots than there were buildings, and that more often than not 
buildings didn’t seem to have any occupants. Also, it seemed to me that there were much fewer buildings on main and 
wider streets than on narrower streets like El-Insha Street. There were hardly any cars driving or people walking down the 
streets during the day, and by nightfall the whole area lapsed into a haunting silence. I can recall all of that because those 
trips with my parents were quite frequent; we had to do all our shopping, seek services, and carry out almost any other 
everyday activity outside Nasr City since it clearly lacked the adequate facilities. 
By that time in 1987, Nasr City had definitely come a long way from being the bleak wasteland it was when Mr. Fahim 
bought his land lot on El-Insha Street almost twenty years earlier. Nevertheless, it was obviously still underdeveloped; Nasr 
City was not picking up the pace of development one would have expected after such a long period of time. This, however, 
was about to drastically change over the course of the following few years.
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fig.1.1.1    Decree  of  the  President  of 
the  United  Arab  Republic  #815  for 
the  year  1959  as  published  in  the 
Official Newspaper  (issue  #104, May 
21st,  1959);  the  original  decree  of 
President  Gamal  Abd-alNaser  for 
the establishment of  the public sector 
‘Institution of Nasr City in Abbaseyya’.
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The Cairene residential district of Nasr City originated in 1959 when the 
public sector ‘Institution of Nasr City in Abbasiya’ was established by 
decree of the President of the United Arab Republic. The decree granted 
the institution the full rights to 6,540 acres on the eastern desert plains 
outside Cairo, and assigned it with removing the army barracks in that 
area and developing it into a fully-fledged residential settlement with 
adequate infrastructure and services.1 That suburban settlement, given 
the name ‘Nasr City’, was meant to serve four primary objectives. The 
first of which was to direct the urban growth of Cairo towards the desert 
terrains to its east, and away from the agricultural lands to its north and 
west. The second was to provide sufficient areas for accommodating 
a series of large-scale national projects and government organizations’ 
headquarters. The third was to provide lots for developing middle class 
housing complexes, which were to be commissioned to the Institution 
of Nasr City and other public sector developers. And the fourth and final 
objective was to offer the public individual land lots at convenient prices 
for the construction of private residences.2
Despite how uneventful and generic they might seem, the launch of 
Nasr City and its prescribed objectives – especially the latter two – were 
unprecedented in modern Egyptian history. The stimulus behind that 
occurrence and its significance would only come into perspective in 
light of the evolution of the Egyptian middle class and how it related 
to the prevalent political and economic ideologies in Egypt during the 
1950s and 60s.
1.1  The Egyptian
Middle Class [1800s-1960s]
The origins and evolution of a homogeneous 
social stratum
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fig.1.1.2    Muhammad  Ali  Pasha  (1769-1849), 
viceroy of Egypt (1805-1848); founder of ‘Modern 
Egypt’ and a Dynasty that ruled the country as late 
as the mid 20th century. His reform efforts spawned 
the seed of the Egyptian middle class.
The failure of Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt at the turn of the 18th 
century set the stage for the inception of a modern middle class in Egypt. 
The power vacuum it left behind saw Muhammad Ali, an Albanian high-
ranking officer in the Ottoman army sent to regain control of Egypt, rise 
to power and eventually be appointed viceroy of Egypt by the Ottoman 
Sultan in 1805. Widely regarded as the founder of Modern Egypt, he 
practiced an almost autonomous rule over the country and pursued 
reforming it into a regional power through two main ventures. The 
first was establishing a sound economy based mainly on agriculture as 
the source of national revenue, and the second was building a modern 
military. In order to run the industries and administrative bodies 
associated with those two ventures, Muhammad Ali established a 
number of modern European-style schools and colleges in Egypt as well 
as sponsored educational missions to Europe to train professionals and 
a bureaucracy capable of such a task. That group of educated nationals 
was the seed of the Egyptian middle class.3
It’s quite crucial to make the distinction that the emergence of that 
social group was not an outcome of a genuine effort for social reform on 
Muhammad Ali’s part. It was but a byproduct of an endeavor aimed at 
centralizing power and wealth. The matter of the fact is, Muhammad Ali 
was determined to establish a monarchic rule over Egypt by passing his 
reign to his bloodline – a determination that spawned a dynasty which 
ruled Egypt for almost 150 years. During the course of his venture to 
establish the economy, Muhammad Ali, and subsequently his heirs 
and the aristocracy in general, came to be the sole proprietors of all of 
Egypt’s agricultural lands concentrating the capital wealth of the country 
in the hands of an elite few. Also, the key positions in the modern army 
he built were almost reserved for that same group.4 In other words, 
Muhammad Ali’s endeavor for a Modern Egypt culminated into a 
socioeconomic system that allowed minimal to no chances of social 
mobility and catered primarily to the interest of an elite class. That in 
turn kept the emerging Egyptian middle class at bay in terms of size and 
economic privileges throughout the reign of the Muhammad Ali Dynasty.
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Within the context of that system, education was accentuated as the 
defining characteristic of the middle class by way of being the primary 
asset for generating its income. The further modernization of Egypt 
under Khedive Isma’il, Muhammad Ali’s fourth successor who reined 
between 1863 and 1879, brought significant advancements to the 
Egyptian modern education system. The quality education that system 
offered was the steppingstone to public sector employment which had 
become the fundamental source of middle class earnings by the turn 
of the 20th century. Land concessions that were occasionally granted 
by the monarchy to certain members of the public – primarily during 
the reign of Isma’il predecessor, Sa’eed Pasha – introduced small 
agricultural property as an alternate stream of middle class revenue 
as well. Nevertheless, it was insufficient as an only income source and 
hence remained subsidiary to public sector employment. More often 
than not, middle class individuals who owned agricultural property 
were also working in the government.5
Acquiring the kind of education needed for public sector employment 
however was a rather expensive undertaking, not to mention that 
it required a high level of competence. And while this was not much 
of an issue for the elite class, it presented a challenge for the middle 
class which was naturally concerned with investing in education for 
the sake of self-sustenance.6 Moreover, it made it virtually impossible 
for individuals of the peasant lower class to obtain such an education 
prior to the early 1900s, save for the rare cases when they showed 
extraordinary potential within the traditional Islamic education system 
to earn them scholarships or monarchy patronage for receiving modern 
schooling. The extent of that impossibility was relatively reduced at the 
turn of the 20th century when the accumulation of foreign debt by the 
end of Isma’il’s reign brought about the British occupation of Egypt in 
1882 and a subsequent period of financial restoration that concluded in 
1904. One of the outcomes of that restoration was a slight improvement 
to the monetary standing of peasant farmers. Many lower class 
individuals were then able to obtain the modern secondary education 
required for a bureaucratic job placement, and, in some cases, pursue 
an even higher education at college level for a professional degree.7 
Nevertheless, the pursuit of a modern education still entailed a great 
deal of financial hardship for the lower class.
That is to say, attaining or maintaining middle class status at the 
time was a rather difficult process that involved hard-earned genuine 
achievement. That, coupled with the fact that the Egyptian economy 
didn’t experience any major introduction of new modes of production 
or runaway inflation, added to the restrictions on social mobility. As 
a result, the middle class did not exhibit any exponential growth and 
retained a homogeneous makeup over a long period of time. Those 
attributes were quite evident in the stratification of the Egyptian 
population according to income during the years that led up to World 
War I.
Almost 100 years after its inception, the Egyptian middle class was 
still a considerably subdued social stratum.8 Out of Egypt’s population 
of roughly 12 million at the time, the middle class constituted a little 
under 10 percent. The rest of the population was polarized between 
a lower class of peasants that amounted to 90 percent and an upper 
class of aristocratic landowners that didn’t exceed 1 percent.9 Among 
those accounted for in that stratification were a lot of foreigners who 
had settled in Egypt due to the ample consultancy and investment 
opportunities associated with the European-inclined reforms of 
the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, as well as the British intervention in 
government, economic, and army affairs since the 1882 occupation. They 
were mainly agricultural landowners, bankers, commercial & industrial 
entrepreneurs, and professionals. The majority of them fell within the 
upper class percentile, while those who didn’t constituted a rather 
small portion of the middle class percentile. The bulk of the middle class 
however were well-educated Egyptian bureaucrats and professionals 
chiefly employed in the pubic sector departments of education, justice, 
health, taxation, agricultural supervision and irrigation, transportation, 
and public utilities.10
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fig.1.1.3    The  stratification  of  the 
Egyptian  population  according  to 
income prior  to WWI and  in 1952; a 
comparison showing the growth of the 
relative size of the middle class.
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That structure of the middle class remained, to a great extent, unchanged 
as it continued to slowly grow during the decades following World War 
I.11 Over that period, however, the restrictions on social mobility within 
the rigid hierarchy of the Egyptian society were weakened as a result of 
two main factors. The first was the efforts of middle class intellectual 
and political figures since the 1920s to make the modern education 
system accessible to all Egyptians regardless of financial capability. By 
1950, those efforts culminated in decreeing free education across all 
the stages of the system preceding higher education at university level. 
And the second was the alleviation of social class related restrictions 
on the admission to the military academy in 1937.12 Consequently, the 
Egyptian middle class started to show a trend of rapid growth in the 
years between the beginning of World War II and the early 1950s; an 
increasing number of lower class individuals were attaining middle class 
status through public sector employment and military ranks. Also, those 
years saw a substantial growth in the population of professionals within 
the middle class. Moreover, and notwithstanding that government-
employed professionals were still the dominant percentile, the 
percentage of self-employed doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other 
professionals within such a population increased considerably as well.13
By 1952, that trend of growth was, once again, quite evident in the 
stratification of the Egyptian population according to income. The 
relative volume of the middle class almost doubled since before World 
War I to 19 percent of some 21.4 million Egyptians. The relative volume 
of the upper class remained at 1 percent, while that of the peasant lower 
class dropped to 80 percent, 14 clearly compensating for the middle class 
increase. As mentioned earlier, such an influx of lower class individuals 
into the middle class was still fundamentally based upon achievement 
in education which had then become less financially demanding than it 
was before. Nevertheless, during the span of World War II, and due to 
the associated high rates of inflation, a number of individuals rapidly 
ascended through the social hierarchy by way of making easy profit off 
stock speculation. Those, however, constituted a rather marginal portion 
of that influx and did not affect the homogeneity of the middle class or 
the qualities of sincerity and hard work associated with its status.15
In July of the same year, the ‘Free Officers’ movement, a group of 
young army officers who had attained middle class status through 
military ranks during the 1940s, staged a coup d’état that later came to be 
known as the July 23 Revolution of 1952. The agenda of that revolution 
was comprised of six principles: eradicating the British colonialism in 
Egypt and all its agents; eradicating feudalism; eradicating economic 
monopolies and the capital proprietors’ domination of key government 
positions; establishing a strong national army; establishing a system 
of government that promotes proper democracy; and fostering social 
justice.16 Almost a year after its outbreak, the monarchy was overthrown 
and Egypt was declared a republic in 1953. In the years that followed, the 
newly installed regime, under the presidency of the Free Officers’ key 
figure – Gamal Abd-alNaser, worked determinedly towards achieving the 
social and economic reforms prescribed by the revolution’s agenda. The 
outcome was an unprecedented era of government-sponsored growth 
and prosperity for the formerly disadvantaged Egyptian middle class.
The reform efforts of the new regime throughout the 1950s and 60s 
involved the redistribution of wealth, the redefinition of the national 
economic structure and the patterns of its activity, and the improvement 
of the standard of living. To those ends, the regime implemented a 
number of socialist-inclined policies that centralized all aspects of the 
economy under the control of the state. It enacted agrarian reform 
laws that stipulated a fixed ceiling for the size of private agricultural 
property, and rearranged the parameters of agricultural land tenancy 
to favor tenants over their landlords. By the decree of those laws, the 
mass agricultural holdings of the former aristocracy and social elites 
were confiscated and redistributed in small parcels among the vast 
base of landless and near-landless peasant farmers. Moreover, the 
amount of rent for leasing agricultural land was no longer determined 
by landlords but by the state instead, and was in turn reduced and fixed 
at convenient rates; and tenants were given the right to perpetually 
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fig.1.1.4   Members of the Revolutionary Command Council: the July ‘52 Revoultion’s junta. Nine of them were the founders of 
the ‘Free Officers’ movement. The head of the movement, Colonel Gamal Abd-alNaser [front row, second from the left], became 
president after the council was dissolved in 1956. The reforms of the revolution’s regime brought forth unprecedented benefits to 
the middle class during the 1950s and 60s.
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pass on leases to their heirs. The regime also nationalized all major 
industries; commercial & service businesses; insurance companies; 
and banks, including those under European ownership. As a result, 
the private and foreign sectors’ control over the means of production, 
distribution, and exchange was neutralized, and instead the public 
sector was installed as the predominant economic agent in Egypt. To 
consolidate that position, the regime brought the private sector under 
extensive regulations which limited its share in domestic investment, 
and enforced an embargo on foreign investment altogether.
The regime then augmented the public sector not only in terms of 
the size and number of its establishments, but also in terms of the 
scope of its activities. In addition to those of the education, health, 
transportation, and public utilities sectors, the government also came 
to own and operate virtually all the establishments of the finance, 
communications, wholesale, and housing sectors, as well as major 
retailers and construction firms. Moreover, the regime directed 
domestic investment towards productive economic activities to ensure 
an increased rate of national economic growth. It vested the sate 
with the authority to restrict the limited private investments to such 
activities, and allocated a substantial portion of state investment to 
establish a national industrial sector. The latter measure was also 
meant to instill manufacturing as a new mainstay of Egyptian economy 
so as to balance its excessive dependency on the agricultural sector. 
Notwithstanding that however, the regime still directed large portions 
of state investment towards revamping the agricultural sector and its 
infrastructure. In parallel to those economic policies, and as early as one 
year after coming into power, the regime extended the scope of free 
education to university level in 1954. It also put into effect employment 
policies which obligated the government to provide job opportunities 
for all university graduates.17
Those factors combined stimulated a rapid rate of social mobility 
during the two decades following the revolution which even surpassed 
that of the 1940s. With the financial hardships associated with education 
totally abolished, and the peasant farmers enjoying a significantly 
better economic status due to agrarian reforms and the state’s special 
attention to the agricultural sector, exponential numbers of the lower 
class were then flocking into the education system in pursuit of the 
conventional means for attaining middle class status. The resultant 
influx of professionals and bureaucrats was accommodated by way of 
the government’s new employment policies. They were offered well-
paid job placements in the various branches of the rapidly growing 
public sector, as well as in the recently established industrial sector. As 
a result, the middle class exhibited its highest growth rate to date while 
still retaining its long-standing homogeneous structure.18
The pivotal distinction in that case though was that such a trend of 
middle class growth was fully endorsed, if not induced, by the governing 
regime. Moreover, the qualities of academic competence and genuine 
accomplishment associated with its status were not only preserved 
but were also brought through as the only measures of social stature. 
During that period, professionals in the fields of engineering, medicine, 
education, law and agriculture were highly sought after in order to 
attend to the regime’s massive reforms; a task that was promoted as an 
honorable participation in a national cause. That demand was reflected 
in the prominent employment positions and the corresponding large 
salaries that the government offered to those professionals. That is to 
say, with the former elite class of aristocrats and foreigners effectively 
dismantled by way of the regime’s reforms, engineers, doctors, university 
professors, teachers, judges, lawyers and many other professionals were 
then being revered as an upper stratum of the Egyptian social hierarchy.
Accordingly, earning a university placement to receive a specialized 
training and eventually a degree in one of those fields almost guaranteed 
attaining economic and social high-standings. However, as late as the 
mid 60s there were only four public universities in Egypt whose student 
bodies were being kept at a limit so as not to compromise the quality 
of education they offered. Coupled with the fact that every individual 
was then provided an equal chance to an education, that limitation 
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stipulated the level of excellence within the schooling system as the 
sole determinant for earning such promising placements. Academic 
competence had hence become of the utmost social consequence 
across the full spectrum of Egyptian society, replacing hereditary titles 
and property as the source of wealth and status.19
Apart from instating its hallmark as the new standard for social 
hierarchy, the regime’s regard for the middle class was most evident in 
its commitment to the economic well-being of middle class individuals. 
For the sake of improving the standard of living for society as a whole, 
the regime adopted more policies that extended the state’s control over 
the economy. Those entailed the government heavily subsidizing the 
prices of goods and service offered through the public sector; regulating 
the prices of those not offered through it; and determining patterns 
of domestic production and foreign trade. In practice, however, such 
policies were of the greatest benefit to the middle class in particular. 
With the government already securing high-paying jobs for the middle 
class, subsidized and regulated prices allowed its individuals to afford 
comfortable lifestyles and commodities that were previously beyond 
their financial capabilities. Needless to say, universal free education was 
a major contributor to such prosperity since it alleviated the financial 
worries of sustaining their status. In addition to that, the government 
was clearly biased towards manufacturing and importing goods that 
were specifically meant for middle class consumption. Those were 
mainly luxury and accessory items such as automobiles and modern 
household appliances.20
Facilitating opportunities to own private residential property was 
yet another notable aspect of the unprecedented economic privileges 
granted to the middle class. The government’s primary concern within 
the housing sector at the time was to provide middle class individuals 
with quality residential units and land lots at considerably subsidized 
costs – which came, to a certain extent, at the expense of a more 
pressing need for providing low-income housing. In view of that 
concern, the government established a number of housing and urban 
development agencies to develop new high-end residential settlements, 
as well as nationalized the foreign companies which managed already 
existing ones.21 The first and most significant of the former group was 
the ‘Institution of Nasr City in Abbasiya’ with its assignment to develop 
the suburb of Nasr City.
That significance did not only show in the institution’s conception by 
direct decree of the highest authority at the time, but also in the name 
‘Nasr City’ itself. The word “nasr”, which means victory in Arabic, was 
then the regime’s preferred label for many of the contemporary reform 
ventures. It was part of its propaganda to indicate the “triumph” of the 
1952 Revolution and its ideologies in bringing about pioneering national 
reforms. Designating the prospective settlement with the name ‘Nasr 
City’ was essentially a proclamation of its stature as an urban venture 
meant to embody a particular aspect of those revered reform efforts. 
Given that the settlement was to cater exclusively to the middle 
class, such a name specifically implied the rise of the just social order 
advocated by the revolution – one that, in effect, championed a middle 
class which had been unprivileged since its inception.
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1.2  Nasr City [1960s]
Prospects of a middle class Utopia
Nasr City was indeed the legitimate urban-child of the Egyptian 
zeitgeist during the 1950s and 60s. It was unique in every possible 
aspect in correlation with the unprecedented favoritism towards the 
middle class at the time. Out of the five Cairene high-end residential 
neighborhoods during the latter half of the 20th century, Nasr City was 
the only one purposefully directed towards a middle class clientele at its 
outset. The other four neighborhoods – Zamalek, Garden City, Ma’adi, 
and Heliopolis, which all predated the 52 revolution – originated as 
suburban settlements for the social elite and foreigners. Those were 
also originally planned and developed by foreign entrepreneurs and 
private companies.1 Nasr City, on the other hand, was the first to be 
fully developed by a national public sector body – the ‘Institution of 
Nasr City in Abbasiya’.
Moreover, Sayyed Karim – the architect commissioned for planning 
Nasr City – was the quintessential middle-class professional who had 
deservingly attained such status during the years that led up to the 52 
revolution. He was born in 1911 to a typical pre World War I middle class 
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Garden City [1892]
Heliopolis [1905]
family; his father was then a government-employed civil engineer. In the 
late 20s he enrolled in Cairo University where he studied Architecture 
and was later awarded a scholarship to continue his graduate studies 
in ETH Zurich. There he specialized in Urban Planning and received his 
doctorate in 1938 becoming the first Egyptian to ever hold a doctoral 
degree in Architecture. Upon his return to Egypt, he assumed a faculty 
position in Cairo University’s Department of Architecture as well as 
founded the first architectural consulting firm in Egypt and the Middle 
East.2 Throughout the 40s and 50s he became a highly sought after 
practitioner. He was frequently commissioned to design public buildings, 
plan new urban projects, and devise development schemes for existing 
urban sites in Egypt and the Arab countries.3
Karim’s planning of Nasr City was by far the epitome of its distinction. 
It was a departure from the late 19th century planning trends of its 
precedent high-end residential settlements. In a clear reflection of his 
Modernist inclinations, he based the design of 1,525 acres designated 
for residential land use on a simple grid scheme that was intended to 
facilitate any future extension of the settlement. Those were bordered 
by desert plains to the east and south as venues for such an extension. 
In compliance with its prescribed objectives, the rest of Nasr City’s 
area was reserved for miscellaneous large-scale national projects that 
were meant to render it as a Utopia incorporating all the aspects of 
its contemporary national reforms. The most significant of those 
were an Olympic park; an exhibition & fair grounds; an international 
convention centre; the Azhar University new campus; the headquarters 
for a number of key government departments and organizations; and a 
strip of factories, warehouses, and bus depots for several state-owned 
industrial, commercial, and service enterprises. That multitude of land 
uses, together with areas retained by the military at the north of the 
settlement, constituted a buffer between Nasr City’s residential areas 
and the neighborhoods of Masr Al-Gadeeda district to the north, the 
neighborhoods of Waili district to the north west, and an area of steep 
limestone plateaus to the west.
29
fig.1.2.1   A comparison of the planning schemes of 
Cairene high-end residential neighborhoods; Nasr 
City’s  purely  orthogonal  scheme  set  it  apart  from 
its precedents.
fig.1.2.2    [next  spread]  An  excerpt  from  a  1958  map  showing  the  army 
barracks scattered across the desert plains east and south of the neighborhoods 
of Waili and Masr Al-Gadeeda districts. In 1959, the shown area became the 
northwest portion of the 6,540 acres assigned to the Institution of Nasr City. 
In  the  settlement’s  master  plan,  most  of  that  portion  was  divided  between 
large-scale national projects and army property; the 1,525 acres designated 
for residential land use spread across the shallow slopes south of the Cairo 
Municipal Boundary [bottom right corner].
Ma’adi [1904]
Nasr City [1959]
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fig.1.2.3   Nasr City’s master plan; the settlement’s zoning arrangement was greatly affected by its 
urban and topographic surroundings. The industrial strip was meant as a buffer against the steep 
limestone plateaus; the lands retained by the army as a buffer against the neighborhoods of Masr 
Al-Gadeeda and Waili districts; and the large-scale projects and condominium complexes as a 
transitional buffer into the bulk of private residential properties. The 1,525 acres of residential 
land use were specifically left with free ends towards the manageable flat topography to the east 
and west to facilitate possible extensions. 
fig.1.2.4   The location of Nasr City in relation to the 21 administrative 
districts  of  Cairo  in  1966;  The  settlement  was  yet  to  be  its  own 
administrative  district  and  encompassed  areas  that  were  technically 
under the jurisdictions of Waili and Masr Al-Gadeeda districts within 
its  vicinity.  [for  reference,  the  administrative  boundaries  of  Waili 
and  Masr  Al-Gadeeda  running  horizontally  across  Nasr  City  are 
represented as Cairo Municipal Boundary in fig.1.2.2] 
Private Residential Properties – to be developed by the public
Condominium Complexes – to be developed by the Nasr City
Company, public sector housing agencies and developers
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Government Headquarters
Miscellaneous Mid-sized Projects
Nasr City Boundaries
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fig.1.2.5   Nasr City’s residential zones and main street network [for reference, as Salah Salem road 
continues east, it becomes Al-Uruba street in fig.1.2.2]. Salah Salem and Al-Nasr roads were  designed 
as two of Cairo’s major vehicular arteries. They were intended to constitute a barrier between Cairo’s 
periphery and Nasr City’s residential areas in order to highlight their suburban character. Al-Tayaran 
and Youssef Abbas streets were meant to be the main entry routes into those areas. 
on wider main streets and had their own sets of regulations concerning 
building heights and footprints.
During the formulation of that detailed urban design, the ‘Institution 
of Nasr City in Abbaseyya’ was restructured into a state-run joint stock 
company in 1964 while retaining its original mission statement.8 It was 
renamed the ‘Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban Development’ 
and assumed its role as the regulator of all building processes in Nasr 
City to ensure their compliance with the stipulated bylaws. Shortly 
after approving the design in mid 1966, the company and public sector 
contractors started realizing the settlement’s infrastructure systems, 
as well as a number of the proposed state projects and condominium 
complexes.
As the proprietor of all the land within Nasr City’s vicinity, the 
company also started selling the private residential lots to the public 
at subsidized prices. Some of those lots were allocated to syndicates 
of professional practices which in turn offered their members the lots 
with convenient payment arrangements. In essence, the company 
was promoting a novel mode of residential property ownership to the 
middle class. It presented them with an easy opportunity to own private 
residences as opposed to rental which had been the prevalent mode of 
ownership to date.
Karim’s last contribution to the planning of Nasr City came in 1961 when 
he devised a detailed design for the Second Zone – a small residential 
neighborhood in the north of Nasr City – as a prototype for the rest of the 
residential areas of the settlement. Five years later in 1966, the detailed 
urban design of those areas was completed by architects Gamal Fahim 
and Kamal Shohaib.4 The 1,525 acres were divided into four zones – the 
First, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth – with an intended density of about 70 
to 100 persons per acre for each zone. On average, 30% of that area was 
assigned to residential land use; 20% for services and commercial land 
use; 10% for government buildings; and 40% for roads and green areas.5
The arrangement of those land uses followed a systematic pattern 
in all four zones; a feature mostly attributed to the orthogonal nature 
of their planning. Each zone was comprised of two pairs of residential 
neighborhoods surrounding a service nucleus designated for large-scale 
commercial, administrative, healthcare, and religious facilities. Similarly, 
the neighborhoods had smaller nuclei featuring parks, schools, and 
small markets. Such an arrangement was specifically designed to reduce 
vehicular traffic within the neighborhoods by providing basic day-to-day 
services at a walking distance from any residential unit.6
The areas of the residential lots within the neighborhoods ranged 
between 400 and 700 square meters. A number of building bylaws were 
stipulated for those lots in order to achieve the intended density and to 
maintain a uniform urban character throughout the settlement. Only 
one apartment building was allowed per lot with a footprint that didn’t 
exceed one third of the lot’s area. Building footprints were restricted to 
a minimum 7-meter setback from rear property lines and a minimum 
4-meter setback from side and street-facing property lines. Building 
heights were limited to four storeys at a maximum of 13 meters on 
streets with widths less than 50 meters, and five storeys at a maximum of 
16 meters on streets with widths equal or greater than 50 meters.7 And 
while those lots were directed towards a clientele of private individuals, 
a few large lots were reserved for public sector developers and housing 
agencies for developing condominium complexes. Those were situated 
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Second Zone
[planned 1961]
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Eighth Zone
Al-Tayaran Street
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Al-Tayaran Street Property of the EgyptianPostal Service 
Property of Cairo Governorate
Private Residential Lot -
showing min. permissible
setbacks for building footprint
Condominium Complex
Park
Market
Church
School
Hospital
Mosque
Preschool
Gas Station
Commercial
Unassigned
Service Facility
Water Tower
Administrative Abbas El-Akkad Street
Al-Nasr Road
Ali Ameen Street
Residential-Administrative
mixed use project
Property of Nasr City Company
Property of the Industrial
Fixations Company
Property of the Sorting and Microlm
Company [Al-Ahram Institution]
* Street widths measured from lot lines. All inner street widths at 12 meters.
Nasr City | First Zone | Detailed Urban Design ‘66
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Hassan Ma’moon Street Makram Ebied Street
Property of the Institution of
Labour Education
Private Residential Lot -
showing min. permissible
setbacks for building footprint
Condominium Complex
Park
Market
School
Unassigned
Service Facility
Abbas El-Akkad Street
Al-Nasr Road
Mustafa El-Nahhas Street
Ahmed Fakhry StreetPolice Station andEmergency Services
Property of the Egyptian Public
Institution for Electricity
Property of the General Committee
for Charitable and Foreign Aid
Al-Nasr Automobile
Company
Misr Company for
Automobile Trade
* Street widths measured from lot lines. All inner street widths at 16 meters.
Nasr City | Sixth Zone | Detailed Urban Design ‘66
fig.1.2.6   The original detailed urban design of Nasr City’s First [opposite 
page]  and  Sixth  Zones;  El-Insha  Street  and  lot  no.11  marked  in  red.  The 
First Zone had a more  intricate  design and a wider  variety  of  small-scale 
services within its neighborhoods. The Sixth Zone with its simpler design and 
wider  inner  street widths  served  as  a  template  for  the  Seventh  and Eighth 
zones. The strip of larger lots at the north of both zones was designated for 
miscellaneous mid-sized projects that were meant to act as a buffer between 
the zones’ residential lots and Al-Nasr Road.
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4 storey apartment buildings | max. height: 13 meters
First & Sixth Zones | Height Limits for Private Residential Properties ‘66
5 storey apartment buildings | max. height: 16 meters
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fig.1.2.7   [opposite page] An example of the configuration of maximum 
building heights  for private  residential properties as per Nasr City’s 
original  building  bylaws;  buildings  with  the  higher  maximum  limit 
lined  the  perimeters  of  Zones  and  neighborhoods.  Condominium 
complexes and non-residential facilities had their own building height 
regulations.
fig.1.2.8   Street  sections  showing  the  relation between  the maximum 
building  heights  stipulated  for  private  residential  properties  and 
the  range  of  Nasr  City’s  street  widths.  The  4-storey/13-meter  limit 
applied to all properties facing streets with widths less than 50 meters 
regardless  of  the  considerable  differences  between  street  widths 
encompassed within such range. As shown in  the bottom section,  the 
limit still applied if the street paralleled an open green space exceeding 
50 meters in width.
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fig.1.2.9   Nasr City’s official land use configuration in the early 70s. The largest and most significant of 
the assigned land uses were the Olympic Park [sports, dashed white subdivisions – Cairo International 
Stadium in the centre] and the Azhar University Campus [post-secondary education, south side of Al-
Nasr road]. Also, to the west of the Olympic park, the Cairo International Fair Grounds [cultural]; to 
its  southwest,  the Cairo  International Convention and Exhibition Centre [cultural];  to  its  south,  the 
Military Parade Square [cultural]; and to its east, the courts of the Armed Forces Federation [sports]. 
The isolation hospital, mental hospital, and police college at the north west corner of the settlement 
predated the inception of Nasr City [see fig.1.2.2 bottom left corner for reference].
Sports
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Condominum Complex
Park
Basic/Secondary Education
Nasr City Boundaries
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Governmental Organization/State-owned Company
Military Personnel Housing
Low-cost Housing
Cemetery
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One year later however, Nasr City’s development came to an abrupt 
stop due to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in June 1967. In the years 
that followed, the government’s military spending to rebuild the army 
and maintain attrition warfare, as well as the loss of two main sources 
of national revenue – the Suez Canal and the Sinai oil reserves, flung 
the Egyptian economy into stagnancy.9 As a result, the pace of all public 
sector works of construction and infrastructure in Nasr City dropped 
drastically. Also, middle class individuals who had purchased lots in 
the settlement were facing difficulties building their residences, and 
those who hadn’t were either reluctant or unable to buy property there 
altogether.
And so by the early 70s, Nasr City was far from being the Utopian 
suburban community it was meant to be. Karim’s model Second Zone 
was the only neighborhood close to completion with a few governmental 
organizations’ headquarters and condominium complexes developed 
by the company standing there. Apart form that, the majority of 
settlement was nothing more than desert landscapes with empty road 
networks cutting through. Such grim character didn’t change much over 
the following ten years. However, a number of socioeconomic changes 
in Egypt during that same period sparked an exponential trend of 
development in Nasr City in the mid 80s.
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fig.1.2.10   Arial photo of the Cairo International Stadium and the Military Parade Square on Al-Nasr 
road; those were among a sparse number of projects realized by the early 70s. The majority of Nasr 
City’s public sector projects and residential areas were still pending development at the time due to the 
economic aftermath of the Six-Day War.
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fig.1.2.12    Rab’a  Al-Adawiya  Complex  in  1968  [northwest 
corner of Al-Nasr and Al-Tayaran intersection]; one of the first 
condominium complexes developed by the Nasr City Company. 
The  special  bylaws  fashioned  for  condominium complexes  are 
quite evident in the buildings’ 11-storeys – more than double the 
maximum  height  stipulated  for  private  residential  properties. 
The complex was one of very few standing residential structures 
in Nasr City during the 70s.
fig.1.2.11    The  governmental  organizations’  headquarters  on 
Salah  Salem  road  c.  1970;  the Central Auditing Organization 
[far  right],  the  Central  Agency  for  Public  Mobilization  And 
Statistics, and the Ministry of Planning. Another example of the 
few projects that were fully developed at the time.
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fig.1.2.13   A view of an inner street in the Second Zone c.1970 
depicting  the  Utopian  character  intended  for  Nasr  City’s 
neighborhoods.  The  Second  Zone  was  meant  as  an  urban 
prototype for the rest of the residential areas in the settlement; 
it was mostly developed by the public sector into condominium 
complexes  that  conformed  to  the  building  bylaws  of  private 
residential properties.
fig.1.2.14   The condominiums on Youssef Abbas street in 1969; 
another  example  of  the  complexes  developed  early  on  by  the 
company.  The  headquarters  of  the  ‘Nasr  City  Company  for 
Housing and Urban Development’ appears  in  the  far  left. The 
majority of completed structures at the time were centralized in 
and around the Second Zone.
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fig.1.2.15   The typical landscape throughout the First, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth zones in the early 70s; 
the majority of Nasr City’s residential areas were hardly living up to their Utopian expectations. That 
bleak vastness lingered on for another decade of hindered development. 
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1.3  The Egyptian
Middle Class [1970s-1990s] 
A transformation into a divided social stratum
During the 1970s and 80s, the Egyptian society continued to exhibit 
rapid social mobility, arguably at a much higher rate than the 1950s 
and 60s. And while the trends of social mobility during both periods 
manifested mainly in a considerable growth of the middle class, they 
were however hardly induced by the same factors. The 70s and 80s saw 
a radical change to the socio-economic system that was established 
during the 50s and 60s, and the middle class that emerged by the end 
of 80s as result was far from the homogeneous class which had endured 
for almost a 160 years.
The change of the social landscape in Egypt during that period was 
brought about by three interrelated factors, all of which came into 
effect roughly around 1974. Those were the ruling regime’s adoption of 
the Open-Door Policy; the migration of Egyptians to work in Arab Gulf 
States; and runaway inflation. Out of the three, the most important of 
those factors was the adoption of the Open-Door Policy – an economic 
platform which sought to shift the 50s and 60s’ state-controlled 
economy towards free market capitalism.1
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fig.1.3.1  Anwar alSadat, President of Egypt (1970-1981). Sadat 
introduced the Open-Door Policy in 1974; an economic platform 
that  brought  about  a  number  of  fundamental  socioeconomic 
changes throughout the 70s and 80s.
The Open-Door policy was introduced by President Anwar alSadat, 
Abd-alNaser’s successor, shortly after the October War of 1973. 
Despite being a member of the Free Officers movement and its political 
establishment during the 50s and 60s, Sadat did not share his peers’ 
socialist conviction that maintaining an economy dominated by the 
public sector was the best way to address the economic stagnancy 
that had befallen Egypt since the Six-Day War. He instead was of the 
opinion that a capitalist economic model which relied primarily on the 
foreign and private sectors had the better potential to jump-start the 
war-crippled Egyptian economy and bring prosperity to society as a 
whole. He also saw in reorienting the economy towards such a model 
an opportunity for political alignment with the United States, which 
at the time played a chief role in the peace process with Israel. So in 
early 1974, Sadat announced the launch of an Infitah or Open-Door 
policy that would “open up” the Egyptian economy to the foreign and 
private sectors in hopes that they would displace the public sector as 
its primary engines. That policy, he decreed, was to involve three main 
courses of action: gradually relaxing the state’s universal control over 
the economy; encouraging the private sector to increase its share in 
domestic investment; and stimulating an inflow of foreign funds and 
investments into the economy.
Over the following two decades, the Sadat regime overturned 
many of the economic policies that were enacted during the 50s and 
60s in order to effectuate the mandate of the Open-Door policy. The 
restrictions that had previously limited the share of the private sector 
in domestic investment were alleviated; the state’s authority to direct 
private investment and restrict it to productive economic activities was 
rescinded; and the tax rates on private income and wealth were reduced 
significantly. The embargo on foreign investment was not only lifted, but 
foreign investors were also provided with ample incentives and granted 
exclusive economic privileges such as further tax cuts and exemptions 
and immunity from nationalization. And for the benefit of both private 
and foreign sectors, the state’s authority to regulate the prices of the 
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goods and services that they offered was diminished considerably, and 
imports were liberalized from state control.
With those measures in place, many foreign corporations, banks, 
hotels, consultancy firms, and international institutions established their 
practices in Egypt marking the return of a foreign sector that had been 
eradicated twenty years earlier. Those measures also saw the private 
sector grow and its activity increase considerably in comparison to the 
50s and 60s. But since the state no longer dictated the patterns of its 
activity, the private sector’s thriving investments were predominantly 
directed towards lucrative, yet less productive, economic activities that 
did not contribute much to national economic development – activities 
such as stock and real-estate speculation, brokerage, importing foreign 
goods, luxury housing, and tourism. The foreign and private sector’s 
upswing however did not live up to the expectations of the Sadat regime 
and the public sector continued to dominate the Egyptian economy 
throughout the 70s and 80s. But then again, in yet another break with 
the economic principles of the 50s and 60s, state investments during 
that period were predominantly directed towards less productive 
economic activities as well.  As per the Open-Door policy’s agenda of 
providing incentives to the foreign and private sectors, the majority 
of state investments went to works of infrastructure, and especially in 
cities, which came at the expense of investing in the development of the 
more productive industrial and agricultural sectors.
Despite the strong overtones of Capitalism inherent within the 
Open-Door policy however, the Sadat regime retained some of the 
50s and 60s’ socialist policies – most notably the subsidization of basic 
goods and services provided through the public sector, universal free 
education, and the employment policies obligating the government to 
provide job placements to all university graduates. Those policies were 
essentially kept in place in order to avert social unrest. And while they 
might have served such purpose, the state’s otherwise full compliance 
with the Open-Door policy rendered them far less reliable than they 
were during the 50s and 60s.
Owing to the newly adopted patterns of state investment for instance, 
the state spent less on maintaining, improving, and adequately 
increasing its production and service facilities. As a result, the quotas 
of subsidized goods and services provided by the government barely 
met the demand of the rapidly growing population, and their quality 
had become quite inferior – especially when compared to the wider 
variety of goods and services that had flooded the market thanks to the 
liberalization of imports from state control and the economic freedoms 
that were granted to the foreign and private sectors. Moreover, the 
various tax cuts and exemptions that were awarded to the forging 
and private sectors, as well as the decline that beset the country’s 
productive sectors due to the new patterns of state investment, seriously 
undermined some of the main sources of state revenue. Consequently, 
government spending, including its sizable expenditure on subsidies, 
came to rely heavily on a number of unsecured and external sources 
instead. Chief among those were the revenues from the Suez Canal 
duties and the Sinai oil exports that were restored to Egypt after the 
War of October ’73, and which – in the case of the Sinai Oil exports 
– were quite high thanks to the 1970s energy crisis; and the inflow of 
loans and aid that Egypt received from foreign creditor governments 
and international financial organizations in the wake of adopting the 
Open-Door policy and reorienting the country’s economy. Needless to 
say, that wasn’t a very sustainable approach as it became quite evident 
by the mid 80s when the drop in oil prices dealt a heavy blow to Egypt’s 
oil revenues, and the country’s growing external debts prompted foreign 
creditors and financial organizations to withhold any further loans or aid 
to Egypt until the government took serious steps towards curtailing its 
spending in order to relief those debts. Given such considerable loss 
of state revenue, the government began to gradually reduce subsidies 
on the goods and services it offered towards the end of the 80s, and 
stopped subsidizing a number of those goods and services altogether.2
Universal free education and government employment were both in a 
general state of decline as well. As the government continued to provide 
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universal free education for all, it perpetually increased the maximum 
quotas of students admitted into university each year. Although the 
government paralleled such increase with establishing new universities, 
the resultant influx of university admissions still overwhelmed the 
student capacity of universities, and it was hardly matched with a 
corresponding increase in faculties or adequate maintenance and 
upgrade of educational facilities.3 A similar, if not worse, imbalance 
burdened the public school system since the government exerted less 
effort building new schools and maintaining existing ones while allowing 
more and more students to enroll in the system.4 Those discrepancies 
led to the degradation of the quality education that was once offered 
through the public education system. Nevertheless, that system yielded 
exponential numbers of new university graduates each year all the same.
Due to the newly adopted patterns of state investment on the other 
hand, the growth of the industrial and agricultural sectors had slumped 
to a very slow rate, and there were hardly any new major government 
projects; which in turn meant that there weren’t enough new jobs within 
the public sector to absorb the full influx of new university graduates. 
Regardless of that shortage however, the government continued 
to offer jobs to all university graduates, mainly in its administrative 
sector. As a result, the public sector in general, and the bureaucracy 
in particular, had become vastly overmanned which had its negative 
effects on a number of different fronts. For one thing, an overmanned 
and therefore inefficient bureaucracy stood in sharp contrast to the 
regime’s proclaimed commitment to liberalizing the economy from 
state controls, and was arguably one of the main reasons why the 
Open-Door policy had failed to attract the desired volume of productive 
foreign and private investments. But most importantly, overmanning 
the public sector in general led to the detriment of the once prestigious 
institution of government employment. It limited career advancement 
opportunities within the public sector; and coupled with the slumping 
state revenues, it took a heavy toll on public sector salaries as the 
government was left with an extensive payroll and no adequate means 
to keep paying public sector employees the same sort of decent salaries 
it had offered them during the 50s and 60s. And even though in its 
superficial adherence to the socialist principles of that time period, the 
government continued to hand out annual bonuses and raises to public 
sector employees, such increments were rather miniscule and did not 
help much – public sector salaries became quite meager all the same, 
and were surpassed by their correspondent foreign and private sector 
salaries at any given employment field or station.5
All in all, the repercussions of adopting the Open-Door policy put large 
portions of the Egyptian society in considerable economic hardship. 
Professionals for instance no longer had easy access to the comfortable 
lifestyles and the decent economic standings they had enjoyed during 
the 50s and 60s. Between the inadequacy of government subsidies and 
the declining quality of all what the public sector had to offer, foreign 
and private sector goods and services had become their only option 
for maintaining an acceptable standard of living. But thanks to the 
state’s diminished authority to regulate their prices, those goods and 
services were far too expensive for the public sector-employed majority 
of professionals to afford on their meager government salaries. Many 
of those professionals therefore had to explore other career options 
besides, or instead of, their public sector jobs in order to make ends 
meet. They either became self-employed or sought better-paying 
jobs in the foreign and private sectors – which were quite hard to get 
considering that, due to their relatively small size, those sectors only 
offered a limited number of jobs. The high cost of foreign and private 
sector goods and services was also a burden to professionals who did 
not work for the government. Although they were better off than their 
public sector-employed counterparts, it was still rather difficult for them 
to afford those goods and services; and they were consequently caught 
in a constant financial struggle to provide a decent life for their families.
However, things were even more difficult for newly graduated 
professionals. They were no longer guaranteed a good start in life since 
the public sector jobs offered to them by the government weren’t 
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exactly their best option for a promising career;6 and unlike older, 
more accomplished public sector professionals, they neither had the 
experience nor the means to start successful private practices of their 
own. Their lack of experience also left them with a severe disadvantage 
when it came to getting jobs in the foreign and private sectors as they 
were up against strong competition from all the older, more experienced 
public sector professionals who were going after those limited jobs as 
well in their search for better career options; not to mention that the 
exponential number of professionals that graduated university each 
year made for an even more competitive job market. But then again, 
matters were even worse still for small-time government bureaucrats 
and clerks. Given their mid-level education, they had the most limited 
career options of all. They were essentially stuck in their government 
jobs, and more often than not, they also had to work one or more after-
hours jobs just to get by.
The repercussions of adopting the Open-Door policy had far-reaching 
negative effects on the poorer, less educated masses as well. The impeded 
growth of the national industrial sector for example undermined the 
government’s ability to employ labor from among those masses, which 
meant that more and more of them were out of a steady job and thus 
a secure source of income. Similarly, peasant farmers found themselves 
in a dire economic state due to the overall decline of the agricultural 
sector, and its infrastructure in particular, which was brought about by 
the state’s diminishing investments in agriculture. The plight of those 
farmers was compounded even further by the government’s failure to 
follow up on – let alone properly manage – the agrarian reforms of the 
50s and 60s, in what was yet another instance of working against the 
socialist polices of that era while upholding them only in name.7
Those economic hardships in turn prompted scores of Egyptians to 
temporarily migrate to the Arab Gulf States during the 70s and 80s in 
pursuit of high-paying jobs. At the time, those states’ new and thriving 
oil economies had a high demand for professionals, and an even higher 
demand for labor of all sorts. Moreover, they offered hefty salaries 
and wages that by far trumped those offered by any of the domestic 
sectors in Egypt. Given the multitude of difficulties they were facing 
at home, many Egyptian professionals therefore opted to leave the 
country altogether and migrate to work in the Arab Gulf States for a 
number of years in order to support their families back in Egypt and 
amass enough savings to secure their futures; or – in the case of newly 
graduated professionals – to make enough money that would help them 
start a family and a career once they returned to Egypt. However, the 
greater majority of Egyptian temporary migrants were semi-skilled & 
unskilled workers, craftsmen, and peasants who hailed form the poorer, 
less educated masses. They were essentially hired as cheap labor; 
nevertheless, the wages that they were offered in the Arab Gulf States 
were still quite high by Egyptian standards. Consequently, working in 
those states was a real game changer for those disadvantaged individuals 
and their families back in Egypt to whom they sent their earnings. It 
granted them access to relatively large incomes and better lifestyles 
which they couldn’t have possibly come by otherwise considering their 
low or non-existent education and limited skill-sets.8
Although migrating to work in the Arab Gulf States offered a lot of 
Egyptians a way out of their economic and career troubles, such a 
trend had quite the adverse side effect on Egypt’s economy. The sizable 
remittances of Egyptians working in those states to their families back 
home was chief among a number of factors which brought about a 
rampant rate of inflation that burdened the Egyptian economy for the 
better part of the 70s and 80s. On the one hand, those remittances, along 
with the foreign aid & loans granted to Egypt; the revenues of the Sinai 
oil exports; and the Suez Canal duties, introduced a large money supply 
into the Egyptian economy. On the other hand however, the diminished 
productive capacity of Egypt’s domestic sectors, which was precipitated 
by the patterns of state and private investment during the 70s and 80s, 
meant that such inflow was hardly matched by a comparable increase 
in products. As a result of that discrepancy, market prices skyrocketed 
taking inflation rates through the roof.9 Over the fifteen years since the 
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adoption of the Open-Door had brought the aforementioned factors 
into play – namely between 1975 and 1990, the cost of acquiring a 
market basket of goods and services increased by 775% at an average 
annual rate of 15.5%. Those figures were astronomical to say the least, 
especially when considering that over the previous fifteen years that 
cost had only increased by 81% at an average annual rate of 4%.10
Needles to say, such runaway inflation made the already strenuous 
economic hardships of a great many Egyptians even more difficult. Small-
time government bureaucrats & clerks, as well as professionals who still 
depended solely on their public sector jobs, were among those whom 
it hit the hardest. The very slow rate at which their government salaries 
increased through meager annual bonuses & raises was nowhere near 
the rate at which the cost of living was surging as a result of inflation. 
Newly graduated professionals also reeled from the surging cost of living 
which was not at all conducive to them starting a family or a career. 
But at the same time though, the high rates of inflation during the 70s 
and 80s benefited a lot of other Egyptians. Reputable professionals who 
had their well-established private practices for instance profited from 
the rapidly rising cost of services as it brought in a substantial increase 
to their earnings. Likewise, craftsmen and workers also capitalized on 
the rising cost of services, if not more, considering that they were in 
such high demand as a result of the shortage of labor caused by the 
migration of large portions of the Egyptian workforce to the Arab Gulf 
States. Such shortage allowed them to ask for much more than what 
they would have typically charged for their services even after factoring 
in inflation, which in turn enabled them to significantly increase their 
profit margins.11
However, it was the multitude of entrepreneurs who dealt in and took 
advantage of the surging market value of highly sought-after items – 
such as imported consumer goods; foreign currency; land property; and 
housing – that by far benefited the most from the 70s and 80s’ rampant 
inflation. During that period, many Egyptians were able to make fortunes 
virtually overnight by anticipating the price fluctuations of those items; 
and accordingly knowing when to buy them at a relatively cheap cost and when 
to sell them for a sizable return once their value had surcharged. Interestingly 
though, not all of those Egyptians were originally tradesmen or businessmen 
by profession. As a matter of fact, that sort of opportunistic entrepreneurial 
activity was particularly common among the Egyptian workforce returning from 
the Arab Gulf States, as well as the aforementioned craftsmen and workers 
who capitalized on the rising cost of services and shortage of labor. It was a 
relatively fast and rather easy way for the former group to invest and multiply 
their savings, and for the latter group to do the same with their increasing profit 
margins – one that did not require either group to develop any significant skills, 
save for an ability to read and play the market. The 70s and 80s therefore saw 
a significant portion of both such groups adopt those entrepreneurial activities 
as a source of income; and in turn accumulate considerable wealth that they – 
once again – couldn’t have garnered under any other circumstances given their 
limited or lack of education and skills. It goes without saying here that such a 
trend was one of the main reasons why private domestic investment during 
that period was predominantly directed towards lucrative, yet less productive, 
economic activities. Not to mention that the prevalence of those entrepreneurial 
activities made for a very volatile market which further discouraged earnest 
investors from committing capital to long-term investments in Egypt’s more 
productive economic sectors despite of all the incentives offered to them by 
the Open–Door Policy.12
Ultimately, the adoption of the Open–Door Policy; the migration of the 
Egyptian workforce to the Arab Gulf States; and runaway inflation, along with 
their various effects throughout the 70s and 80s, had a number of significant 
social outcomes. For one thing, the introduction of new veins of generating 
income, and the subversion of others, induced very high rates of both upward 
and downward social mobility, which – much like the social mobility of the 50s 
and 60s – translated mainly in an exponential growth of the Egyptian middle 
class. By end of the 80s, namely in 1991, such growth was quite evident in the 
stratification of the Egyptian population according to income. Over the span of 
almost 40 years since the July Revolution of 1952, the relative volume of Egyptians 
receiving a middle class income more than doubled from 19% to 45% of the 
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country’s total population.13 Admittedly, such a time span encompassed 
two very distinct periods of social mobility that were brought on by two 
fundamentally different sets of ideology and economic policy. However, 
based on his observations and the strong impressions they’ve left him, 
prominent Egyptian economist Galal Amin argues that – despite the lack 
of hard data to support his claim – social mobility during the 70s and 80s 
was much higher than it was during the 50s and 60s; and that in turn, 
a much bigger portion of the middle class growth throughout those 40 
years or so occurred during the 70s and 80s rather than 50s and 60s.14
Unlike the 50s and 60s though, the social mobility during the 70s 
and 80s deeply altered the long-standing homogeneous makeup of 
the Egyptian middle class; and as a result, by the early 90s the middle 
class had become hardly the same harmonious stratum of well-
educated, public sector-employed bureaucrats and professionals that 
it had always been ever since its genesis in the early 1800s. Among 
those involved in that drastic social transformation were small-time 
public sector bureaucrats and clerks, who found themselves up against 
insurmountable odds starting in the mid 70s. Between the overall 
decline of the public sector; the multitude of economic challenges 
they were facing; and their extremely limited career options, they were 
soon caught in a downward social mobility that eradicated their middle 
class status; and they quickly fell down the social ladder to effectively 
become part of the lower class instead.15
With the bureaucracy out of the mix, the middle class that emerged 
by the early 90s consisted of two very distinct groups. Professionals – 
such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, accountants, university professors, 
and teachers – accounted for one of those two groups, and as such, 
they were essentially the only remnant of the original middle class 
structure that survived the socio-economic upheaval of the 70s and 
80s. But although professionals had managed to retain their long-
standing middle class status, their modes of employment and sources 
of income, as well as their relative position within the middle class 
itself, were still the subject of considerable change during the 70s and 
80s. By the end of those twenty years, and for the first time in the 
history of modern Egyptian society, middle class professionals were 
no longer predominantly employed in the pubic sector, or primarily 
dependent on a government job for their income. Instead, the greater 
majority of them were either self-employed, held jobs in the private 
or foreign sectors, or worked in the Arab Gulf States. Moreover, and 
most importantly, professionals lost their rank as an upper echelon of 
the middle class. As opposed to the ideologies and economic policies 
of the Nasser Regime during the 50s and 60s, which worked to their 
benefit and helped them attain such rank, the ideological and economic 
platforms adopted by the Sadat Regime in the mid 70s put professionals 
under a lot of financial strain; and in turn made it exceedingly difficult 
for them to maintain their status as members of the middle class, let 
alone hold a position at its top tier.
Alternately, professionals were displaced by an influx of entrepreneurs 
who hailed from the lower classes and quickly ascended through the 
social hierarchy during the 70s and 80s to become the uppermost tier, 
as well as the other major component of the Egyptian middle class. 
That social group was basically comprised of all the craftsmen, workers, 
and peasants who amassed considerable financial gains by capitalizing 
on the unstable economic circumstances in Egypt at the time and 
adopting the aforementioned opportunistic entrepreneurial activities 
as occupations and primary sources of income. Their newly found large 
incomes in turn saw them attain middle class status, and in some cases 
even upper class status, accounting for the majority of the increase in 
the relative size of both those classes between 1952 and 1991.16 Such 
social placement made entrepreneurs the first new major addition to 
the structure of the Egyptian middle class in the entirety of its history; 
however, as a social group, they were widely regarded as a parasitic 
class that did not contribute much to society as a whole.17
But perhaps the most significant social outcome of the 70s and 80s 
was the drastic change in the values of Egyptian society. With the 
rapid social rise of the entrepreneur class, academic competence and 
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excelling in the realm of education, as well as the sincere handwork 
associated with both those aspects, were no longer the hallmarks of 
the Egyptian middle class or the main methods of attaining a higher 
status within Egypt’s social hierarchy. Instead, starting in the mid 70s, 
size of income and wealth – regardless of their source – became the 
main criteria for societal stratification in Egypt, and the most common 
means of climbing the social ladder.18 As a matter of fact, middle class 
professionals were the only social group who, since then, remained 
keen on pursuing a good education, excelling at it, and making a living 
using it. It was essentially their way of self-preservation, their way of 
perpetuating their social species. That is to say, the majority of upward 
social mobility in Egypt since the mid 70s was mainly the byproduct 
of chasing monetary gain by whatever means possible no matter how 
unscrupulous they might be, rather than what had become the less 
“conventional” pursuit of education.
Also starting in the mid 70s, the Egyptian society was beset with 
widespread corruption in yet another instance of major change in its 
value system. As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian government retained an 
extensive bureaucratic apparatus despite of its proclaimed commitment 
to a more liberal, private sector-driven economy that is free of state 
controls. That basically resulted in a situation in which a vast body of 
grossly underpaid government officials, inspectors, and civil servants, 
who held the authority to issue legal permits and oversee compliance 
with regulations and bylaws, was put in direct contact with a host of 
morally lax entrepreneurs who were willing to do almost anything to 
maximize returns on their investments. Consequently, bribery soon 
became a rather commonplace occurrence in the interactions between 
those two groups as entrepreneurs almost always paid off bureaucrats 
to issue permits for ventures that did not meet stipulated regulations, 
or to overlook certain violations of official bylaws. Those entrepreneurs 
regarded such bribes as an integral and a totally justifiable part of any 
investment – and a very feasible one at that considering that it was such 
a small price to pay for a measure of leniency towards transgressions 
that would help them garner astronomical profits in comparison. On 
the other hand, many of those who accepted such bribes, particularly 
small-time bureaucrats and clerks, were driven to do so by a desperate 
need to keep their heads above the rising social tide rather than by an 
inherent flaw in their moral compass. Those bribes were essentially a 
lifeline that helped them cope with the rising cost of living. And so, not 
before long bribery also became a staple in even the simplest dealings 
between the bureaucracy and the general public as the former group – 
albeit not explicitly – usually asked for such payments, not to violate any 
bylaws or regulations per se, but to expedite the latter group’s requests 
and paperwork through the endless red tape of the government’s 
bureaucratic apparatus.19
In conclusion, the Egyptian middle class that emerged by the end of 
the 70s and 80s, and which is largely the same stratum that still exists 
today, was a class divided. On the one hand, professionals constituted a 
more moral, older middle class; and on the other hand, entrepreneurs 
constituted a new middle class that was morally lax in comparison. 
Neither of those two factions shared the same values or sources of 
income, and they were basically lumped together as one class solely 
on the basis of an abstract range of how much income they generated 
annually.20
In the context of such divide, a phenomenon that could be best 
described as social emulation became rather prevalent within the 
Egyptian middle class as its newer members resorted to imitating 
almost every aspect of its older members’ lifestyles, often in an 
ostentatious manner, in order to assert their newly attained middle 
class status. This peculiar phenomenon manifested itself across a 
number of different domains. For instance, members of the new middle 
class were preoccupied with acquiring the same grade of goods and 
products typically consumed by the old middle class. They also sought 
the same level of education as the old middle class regardless of the fact 
that it didn’t have any bearing on what they did for a living. Moreover, 
and most importantly, they were also quite keen on situating their 
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residences in the same neighborhoods where large populations of the 
old middle class were known to dwell. In a sense, such behavior was 
essentially a social form of a compensation mechanism. At that time, 
and despite the relative decline of their economic status, members of 
the old middle class – namely professionals – were still considered to 
be a social ideal to aspire to in the collective consciousness of Egyptian 
society. The members of the new middle class on the other hand had 
just attained their middle class status; and they had done so over a very 
short time span and not through the long-standing tradition of excelling 
in the realm of education, but rather by accumulating wealth through 
practices that were then widely regarded as unscrupulous. It was 
therefore only natural for them to feel the need to associate themselves 
with that old, revered, and more established faction of the middle 
class. From their standpoint, a visible display of their ability to match 
the material attributes of the old middle class using their newly found 
wealth served such purpose; and proved to themselves, as well as to the 
rest of society, that they had indeed become part of the middle class.21
The main argument here is that this notion of social emulation, as it 
was outlined above, played the central role in the urban boom of Nasr 
City which began towards the end of the 80s. Both this argument, as 
well as the outlined understanding of why and how social emulation 
operates, draw primarily on the works of Abraham Maslow and Jean 
Baudrillard.
Maslow’s 1943 paper entitled “A Theory of Human Motivation” holds 
the key to comprehending the psychological drive behind the tendency 
of the members of a rising class to imitate the archetype of the class 
into which they have been newly introduced. In this paper, Maslow 
identifies five basic human needs and arranges them in an ascending 
order of satisfaction priority as follows: the physiological needs; the 
safety needs; the love and belonging needs; the esteem needs; and 
finally the need for self-actualization. Basically, he argues that an 
individual is typically preoccupied with satisfying the needs found at 
the lowermost tier of this hierarchy; and that once such goal is reached, 
he or she then moves on to the next, higher tier and seeks satisfying 
the needs it entails, and so on (375). This hierarchy of human needs is 
a rather popular concept, and its tiers are self-explanatory for the most 
part. An in depth discussion of each one of these needs is therefore not 
all that pertinent to the discourse of this thesis. What is of particular 
relevance here is the third and fourth tiers of this hierarchy; namely the 
belonging needs and the esteem needs.
The belonging needs are defined by Maslow simply as a condition 
wherein “[a person] will hunger for . . . a place in his group, and he will 
strive with great intensity to achieve this goal” (381). His definition of 
the esteem needs, however, is a bit more elaborate:
“All people in our society . . . have a need or desire for a stable, 
firmly based, high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, 
or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. By firmly based 
self-esteem, we mean that which is soundly based upon real 
capacity, achievement and respect from others. These needs may 
be classified into two subsidiary sets. These are, first, the desire 
for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for confidence 
in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom. 
Secondly, we have what we may call the desire for reputation 
or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), 
recognition, attention, importance or appreciation.” (381-382)
In the same paper, Maslow also points out that the hierarchal 
arrangement of the five basic human needs is not all that rigid; and 
identifies satisfying the esteem needs before the belonging needs as 
the most common reversal within the hierarchy (386). To paraphrase, 
he argues that, for some people, satisfying the esteem needs takes 
precedence over satisfying their need to belong mainly due to the 
notion that a person who is most likely to be considered as part of a 
certain group is one who inspires the same kind of respect reserved for 
the members of such group. These people therefore seek “self-esteem 
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and its behavior expressions more as a means-to-an-end than for its 
own sake”. That is to say, they seek respect for the sake of belonging 
rather than for sake of esteem itself.
Although Maslow’s arguments deal primarily with abstracts and the 
realm of human psychology, extrapolating them to the social context in 
Egypt during the 70s and 80s explains why social emulation was such a 
prevalent phenomenon at the time. By imitating their old middle class 
counterparts, members of the new middle class were, albeit indirectly, 
satisfying an innate human need to belong. As discussed earlier, despite 
the fact that their newly found wealth categorized them as members of 
the middle class, the then unconventional means by which they came to 
posses it casted doubts on their status as such. Acquiring and exhibiting 
the same material attributes as the old middle class was essentially 
their way of commanding the same kind of respect and prestige that 
society reserved for its members; which in turn gratified their desire 
to feel and be recognized as true members of the Egyptian middle 
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class themselves. In Maslow’s terms, members of the new middle class 
sought out satisfying their esteem needs as a means of gratifying their 
belonging needs; and in doing so, they were particularly focused on 
satisfying their need for respect from others rather than their need for 
self-esteem that is based on real capacity and achievement.
It is worth nothing here that this imbalance in how members of the 
new middle class went about satisfying their esteem needs was yet 
another aspect that set them further apart from their old middle class 
counterparts. Given that their sense of self-worth was almost entirely 
dependant on external input – namely other people’s respect, and 
that they relied on nothing but their monetary ability for projecting a 
sophisticated social front in order to elicit that respect; the members 
of the new middle class clearly neither possessed the healthiest of 
character traits, nor shared the best of social values. On the other hand, 
and within the same social context, the members of the old middle class 
derived their sense of self-worth from their hard-earned achievements 
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From there, Baudrillard then postulates that “consumption (taken in the 
sense of expenditure, of the purchase and possession of visible objects) 
will gradually concede to other criteria and other types of behavior the 
preeminent role it currently plays in the variable geometry of status”; 
meaning that it will be replaced by new, more effective social signifiers. 
In that respect, he identifies level of education and habitat – among 
others – as the most important emergent means of social distinction in 
consumer societies.
Baudrillard’s notion of level of education as a means of marking one’s 
status within the social hierarchy holds the key to understanding why the 
regime in Egypt exponentially increased the student capacities of public 
universities during the 70s and 80s; as well as why it was particularly 
committed to establishing new universities as opposed to new schools. 
Prominent Egyptian scholar Galal Amin argues that the regime did not 
take those steps out of its genuine desire to make higher education 
accessible to larger portions of the Egyptian society. He was rather of 
the opinion that those steps were merely the regime’s response to 
an overwhelming public demand for the type of higher degrees those 
universities offered – a demand that was primarily driven by the rising 
new middle class.22 Much like their visible consumption of the goods 
and services typically used by their old middle class counterparts, 
members of the new middle class did not seek university degrees for 
their use-value since their education hardly ever had a bearing on how 
they earned their income. Instead, they sough university degrees strictly 
for their function as a symbol of social distinction. As discussed earlier, 
a university degree was the hallmark of a middle class professional; and 
at the time professionals were the ideal reference for what it is to be a 
member of the Egyptian middle class. Therefore, by Baudrillard’s logic, 
obtaining the same sort of degrees as those professionals was yet another 
means for the members of the new middle class to set themselves apart 
from the lower classes and register their newly attained higher status.
That is to say, university degrees ultimately had a “homogenizing” 
social effect within the context of the Egyptian middle class despite of 
throughout their education and subsequent professional careers, 
which then earned them other people’s respect. In other words, unlike 
members of the new middle class, their sense of self-worth did not 
hinge on other people’s opinion of them, but was rather the product of 
a more balanced, and thus healthier, process. Needless to say, this stark 
contrast made the failings of both the value system and the collective 
psychological disposition of the new middle class all the more evident.
Moving on from the realm of Human psychology and onto the field of 
sociology, Jean Baudrillard’s 1970 book “The Consumer Society: Myths 
& Structures” offers a material understanding of how social emulation 
takes effect in a modern consumer society – which is precisely the sort of 
social structure that the Egyptian society was developing into during the 
70s and 80s. In the section entitled “The Social Logic of Consumption”, 
Baudrillard states that in a consumer society “you never consume the 
object in itself (in its use-value); you are always manipulating objects (in 
the broadest sense) as signs which distinguish you either by affiliating 
you to your own group taken as an ideal reference or by marking you 
off from your group by reference to a group of higher status” (61). This 
explains why the members of the new middle class developed such a 
voracious appetite for acquiring the same goods and services as their old 
middle class counterparts. Their visible consumption of such “objects” 
was basically a “social signifier” that distanced them from the lower 
classes they had risen from, and associated them with the members of 
the old middle class who were the ideal reference of the higher-status 
group they had recently become part of.
In that same section however, Baudrillard also argues that given 
the very nature of manufactured goods and services, the visible act 
of consuming them is bound to become the least effective of social 
signifiers (57). His argument is this: because those consumer objects are 
by definition mass-produced, they are therefore abundant and readily 
available to all. This in turn will make them “less and less expressive of 
social rank”, and instead of being a means of social distinction, they will 
eventually have a completely opposite “homogenizing” social effect. 
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the many differences between the members of its two factions. This 
is exactly the reason why occupation, rather than level of education, 
will be used as the primary criteria for identifying members of the old 
middle class throughout the demographic and statistical analyses of this 
thesis, even though they were the only members of the middle class that 
actually made use of their formal education. On a somewhat relative 
note, it is also worth mentioning here that the status-driven demand for 
education and the regime’s response to it were, in some sense, major 
contributors to the financial woes that beset middle class professionals 
since the mid 70s. As it was outlined before, the government-sanctioned 
exponential increase in the student capacities of public schools and 
universities had a very adverse effect on the quality of education that 
those institutions offered. Middle class professionals therefore had 
to find a better alternative to the declining public education system 
given that their livelihoods depended on getting a good education. To 
that end, they turned to private education institutions with their well-
maintained facilities and limited student capacities. But like all that was 
offered through the private sector, getting a private education proved to 
be a rather costly undertaking for most middle class professionals, and 
soon they found themselves in a very similar situation to the one that 
previous generations of professionals were in before the introduction of 
universal free education in Egypt.
However, it is Baudrillard’s observations regarding habitat as one of 
the more effective means of social distinction in consumer societies 
that are of the most relevance here. He states:
“Segregation by place of residence is not new, but, being 
increasingly linked to consciously induced shortage and 
chronic speculation, it is tending to become decisive, in terms 
of both geographical segregation (town centers and outskirts, 
residential zones, rich ghettos, dormitory suburbs, etc.) and 
habitable space (the inside and outside of the dwelling, the 
addition of a ‘second home’, etc.). Objects are less important 
today than space and the social marking of space. Habitat thus 
perhaps has an opposite function to that of other consumables. 
The latter have a homogenizing function, the former a 
differentiating function in terms of space and location.” (57)
In light of this statement, it is easy to understand why members of 
the new middle class fervently pursued residing among their old middle 
class counterparts. It was mainly because a dwelling and its urban 
context are by far the most visible, and least accessible, of consumer 
objects; and therefore the most expressive of social signifiers. That 
is to say, in comparison to obtaining the same level of education or 
acquiring the same grade of goods and services as their old middle class 
counterparts, members of new middle class were able to communicate 
their association to the middle class ideal in a far more conspicuous 
manner by situating their residences in the same neighborhoods where 
their old middle class counterparts were known to dwell. Such an act 
amounted to putting up a literal social façade that concealed their 
lower class origins and showcased their new, higher status against a 
comparable middle class backdrop – it basically assimilated them into 
the social milieu of the middle class by helping them physically blend 
in a middle class urban environment. Moreover, the relative scarcity 
and high cost of “middle class” residential property in Egypt at the time 
added to the effectiveness of this particular means of social distinction. 
Compared to the innately abundant manufactured goods and services 
or the accessible universal free education, a dwelling in a middle class 
urban context was a far less obtainable commodity, which – according 
to Baudrillard – made it far more indicative of social rank.
Of all the residential neighborhoods in Cairo at the time, the use of 
a dwelling and its urban context as a tool of social emulation was the 
most prevalent in Nasr City – and it was such prevalence that fueled 
Nasr City’s rapid urban development towards the end of the 80s. This 
raises two very important questions: Why Nasr City in particular, and 
why the end of 80s? As it was discussed earlier in this chapter, Nasr 
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was mainly because the influx of returning middle class professionals 
who were settling in Nasr City back then served to further highlight 
its status as the quintessential middle class neighborhood. But more 
importantly, it was also because, owing to its underdeveloped character, 
Nasr City had a relative abundance of available residential property in 
comparison to other Cairene neighborhoods, such as Heliopolis and 
Ma’adi, which had substantial middle class populations but were already 
fully developed at the time. Ultimately, that made Nasr City a far more 
convenient middle class neighborhood to settle in.
By the mid 80s, Nasr City had thus become one of the most sought-
after housing markets in all of Cairo, which in turn made it also one 
of the most sought-after markets for private investment. Thanks to 
the surging demand for middle class residential property during the 
80s, real estate prices in middle class neighborhoods were increasing 
at exponential rates that exceeded even the rampant rates of inflation 
that beset the Egyptian economy back then. Consequently, investment 
in middle class, or “luxury”, housing became one of the most profitable, 
and thereby one of the most popular, quick-return entrepreneurial 
activities in Egypt at the time – as evident by the fact that 57% of all 
private investment in Egypt went to the housing sector in the five years 
between the beginning of 1982 and the end of 1986.24 In comparison 
to other middle class neighborhoods, the exceptionally high demand 
for residential property in Nasr City saw real estate there register some 
the highest rates of price-increase. Between 1980 and 1987, the price 
of land in Nasr City surged from 80 pounds per square meter to about 
450 pounds per square meter; that is a 460% increase at an annual 
rate of 28% when the consumer price index during that same period 
increased by only 186% at an annual rate of 16%.25 Needless to say, such 
skyrocketing rates made Nasr City a particularly lucrative quick-return 
investment market, and as a result, it became the focus of yet another 
type of demand that was driven by a multitude of aspiring individuals 
of lower societal origins who saw in Nasr City a golden opportunity for 
accumulating wealth and subsequent social advancement.
City was the only Cairene residential settlement that was conceived as 
a middle class neighborhood from the outset; and it continued to live 
as such in the collective consciousness of Egyptian society even after its 
development came to an abrupt stop with the outbreak of the Six-Day 
war in 1967, and as it remained mostly undeveloped throughout the 
following twenty years or so. The status of Nasr City as the quintessential 
middle class neighborhood, along with its underdeveloped character, 
were essentially what made it the most fertile urban medium for the 
manifestation of the abovementioned variant of social emulation when 
the demand for “middle class” residential property surged around the 
mid 80s.
That upswing was brought on by a number of different factors. For 
one thing, owing to the drop in oil prices since 1986, and the subsequent 
decline in the economic boom of the Arab Gulf States, scores of the 
Egyptian professionals and labor who were working there at the time 
were dismissed and sent back home. Moreover, the escalation of the 
Persian Gulf war from the mid 80s onwards, and later the outbreak of 
the Gulf War in the early 90s, prompted many more of those Egyptians 
to return back home as well.23 Also, the mid 80s was roughly the time 
when many members of the rising entrepreneur class had effectively 
attained middle class status after they had accumulated enough wealth 
from their ventures over the previous decade – that is to say, it was the 
time when the new middle class had grown into a social force to be 
reckoned with.
Naturally, Nasr City was a very fitting urban environment for many 
of the returning Egyptian professionals to settle with their families. 
They either purchased single-family apartments there, or built their 
own apartment-building houses on residential properties that they had 
either already owned or acquired upon returning from the Gulf States. 
Likewise, Nasr City was also a very fitting urban environment for new 
middle class entrepreneurs to situate their homes – one that perfectly 
met their criteria for a place of residence that would liken them to the 
middle class ideal and, in turn, assert their newly attained status. That 
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As it was discussed earlier, a lot of the Egyptian laborers who had 
returned from the Gulf Region in the mid 80s were looking to multiply 
the savings they had amassed while working there. Likewise, and around 
the same time, a lot of the craftsmen and workers who did not migrate 
to the Arab Gulf States were also looking to multiply the financial gains 
they had amassed due to the shortage of labor in Egypt during the 70s 
and 80s. With its emergence as one of the most lucrative quick-return 
investment markets at the time, many of those aspiring individuals 
turned to Nasr City in order to achieve their goals. They most commonly 
purchased land there, kept it off the market for some time until its value 
multiplied, and then sold it to the highest bidder, garnering substantial 
returns on their initial investments in the process. Another very 
common practice for them was to exploit loopholes in the system, bribe 
officials, or both, in order to construct apartment buildings that violated 
Nasr City’s building bylaws and which thus had largest possible number 
of units.26 Given the surging demand for residential property in Nasr 
City, they then sold those units at a very high asking price, once again 
garnering substantial returns on their initial investments in land and 
construction costs. Eventually, those individuals accumulated enough 
wealth from such ventures that effectively elevated them to middle 
class status. Needless to say, once they had attained such status, they 
too sought situating their residences in Nasr City in order to assert it.
In response to such overwhelming demand for Nasr City, the 
Egyptian government took a number of key steps with regard to the 
neighborhood’s building bylaws and the extents of its area. Around 
the mid 80s, the government amended Nasr City’s building bylaws 
increasing the maximum allowable residential building footprint from 
one third to one half of the lot’s area. It also increased the maximum 
height of all residential buildings by one storey. That is to say, residential 
buildings overlooking streets with widths less than 50 meters were 
allowed a height of five storeys at a maximum of 16 meters, while 
residential buildings overlooking streets with widths equal or greater 
than 50 meters were allowed a height of six storeys at a maximum of 19 
meters. Moreover, in the two decades between the early 70s and the 
early 90s, the government extended Nasr City’s limits increasing its area 
by about five times, and sanctioned the planning of a number of new 
neighborhoods within those extended limits.27
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5 storey apartment buildings | max. height: 16 meters
First & Sixth Zones | Height Limits for Private Residential Properties ‘85
6 storey apartment buildings | max. height: 19 meters
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fig.1.3.5  Street  sections  showing  the  relation  between  the 
maximum  building  heights  stipulated  for  private  residential 
properties  and  the  range  of  Nasr  City’s  street  widths  after 
amending the settlements building bylaws in 1985. The addition 
of the extra floor, as per that amendment, had little effect on the 
urban sections and character of Nasr City’s streets.
fig.1.3.4  [opposite  page]  An  example  of  the  configuration  of 
maximum building heights for private residential properties after 
Nasr  City’s  building  bylaws  were  amended  in  1985.  An  extra 
floor was added to the maximum height for all private residential 
buildings, but the configuration remained the same – buildings 
with the higher maximum limit still lined the perimeters of Zones 
and neighborhoods.
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fig.1.3.6  Between 1974 and 1993, the area of Nasr 
City was increased by about five times, and five new 
neighborhoods of varying sizes were planned.
Nasr City | 1974 – 1993
New Residential Neighborhoods
eleventh zone – planned in 1985
sefarat neighborhood – planned in 1992
tenth zone – planned in 1974
ninth zone – planned in 1974
twelfth zone – planned in 1993
rst, sixth, seventh & eighth zones
It is worth noting here that those steps were essentially what 
Baudrillard (1970, 57) referred to as a “consciously induced shortage” 
on the government’s part. The incremental increase to the maximum 
allowable residential building heights in Nasr City did not really allow 
for a substantial increase in its population density, at least not on an 
official level since, in practice, Nasr City’s building bylaws were quite 
often violated by all the profit-seeking real estate investors. Also, owing 
to their smaller sizes; dissimilar planning; and peripheral character, the 
newer neighborhoods that were added to Nasr City form the early 70s 
onwards only served to highlight the higher quality of its four original 
neighborhoods and the social weight that they carried. That is to say, 
the prime real estate in Nasr City remained concentrated in the first, 
sixth, seventh, and eighth zones.
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Nasr City | 1974 – 1993
New Residential Neighborhoods
eleventh zone – planned in 1985
sefarat neighborhood – planned in 1992
tenth zone – planned in 1974
ninth zone – planned in 1974
twelfth zone – planned in 1993
rst, sixth, seventh & eighth zones
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Nasr City | Planning c.1990
fig.1.3.7  Nasr City’s land use patterns in the early 90s. The only major change 
to the Nasr City’s original core was the conversion of the large military sports 
courts  area  to  the  south of  the Second Zone  into  condominium complexes. 
Out of the five new neighborhoods added between the 70s and 90s, three, the 
Ninth and Tenth Zone, and Sefarat Neighborhood, were primarily  intended 
to a middle class clientele;  the other  two,  the Eleventh and Twelfth Zones, 
comprised an assortment of low cost housing and condominium complexes. 
The extended limits of Nasr City came to include ‘Ezbet elHaggana; a large 
squatter settlement. The rest of the area added to Nasr City remained largely 
unplanned, as evident by the very general planning scheme of the area on it 
eastern boundary.
fig.1.3.8  [next  spread] A map of Nasr City’s  core 
residential  neighborhoods  in  the  mid  90s.  In  ten 
years,  Nasr  City  has  come  a  long  way  from  the 
desolate, underdeveloped suburban settlement that 
it was up until the mid 80s.
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And so, by the early 90s, Nasr City had grown into one of the biggest 
middle class habitats in all of Cairo. However, as it shall be demonstrated 
in the next chapter, both the urban and architectural characters of 
Nasr City closely mirrored the deep social differences that divided the 
Egyptian middle class.
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Chapter Two
71
2.A  A Street of 
Extended Family Houses
72
fig.2.a.1  [previous  page]  El-
Insha Street’s sign on  the outer 
wall of building no.15.
The late 80s was a very interesting time for the household of 11 El-Insha Street. In 1988, my sister Abla was born, and shortly 
afterwards, my grandparents moved into their apartment on the building’s ground floor. Also In 1988, my uncle Ahmad, his 
wife, and his 2-year old daughter Samar, returned from the United Kingdom after he had finished his graduate studies there; 
and they were back into their apartment on the buildings second floor. In other words, 1988 was the year that 11 El-Insha 
Street became an extended family household.
In addition to myself and my cousin Samar, the arrival of my sister Abla gave my grandfather, Dr. Abouzeid, three 
grandchildren in total. He accordingly had a mind to provide each of us, his grandchildren, with our own apartments in 11 
El-Insha Street. So, shortly after Nasr City’s building height bylaws were amended to allow for an extra storey, Dr. Abouzeid 
approached Mr. Fahim with the proposition of adding two more floors to El-Insha Street’s three floors and bringing it to the 
maximum allowable height of 5 storeys. His idea was to grant the two new apartments on his side of the property that such 
an addition would leave him with to myself and Samar, and to grant Abla with his own apartment on the ground floor since 
she was the youngest of his grandchildren, and therefore would most likely have no use for her apartment until after both 
him and my grandmother would have passed away and vacated the apartment.
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Mr. Fahim was quick to agree to his friend’s proposition because he was still looking to provide his daughter and her future 
family with their own apartment in 11 El-Insha Street. But since he only really needed one more unit to do that, and did 
not have that much liquidity on hand, Mr. Fahim sold one of the apartments on his side of the property to one of my 
grandfather’s younger acquaintances, Dr. Hatem elHabiby, in order to front his share of the construction costs of adding the 
two extra storeys to 11 El-Insha street. However, when Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim went to issue a permit for adding those 
two extra storeys, they were informed that although Nasr City’s amended building bylaws technically allowed a maximum 
height of five storeys on their property, the original permit for 11 El-Insha Street was issued before the passing of those 
amendments and therefore they technically do not apply to their already constructed apartment building. Instead, they 
were told that in order to have a building of 5 storeys on their property, they had to knock down 11 El-Insha Street, issue a 
new permit as per Nasr City’s amended building bylaws, and then rebuild it to that height. Needless to say that was a rather 
ludicrous stipulation, and it was suggest to Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim that they should just follow the then conventional 
practice of adding the two extra storeys without an official permit and later exploit the system loopholes to deem them legal 
after the fact. Left with no other feasible choice, Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim elected to do so and the addition of two extra 
storeys comprising four new apartments to El-Insha Street started in 1989, and was completed by 1990.
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fig.2.a.2  The  generational  allocation  of  property 
among  the  extended  family  households  of  11 
El-Insha  Street  in  the  early  90s.  Although  my 
grandfather, Dr. Abouzeid, only owned half of  the 
building,  he  was  still  able  to  endow  each  of  his 
children, and grandchildren at the time, with their 
own apartments. 
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I was only a child of seven when 11 El-Insha Street became a 5-storey extended family household in 1990. At such a young 
age I genuinely thought that its social configuration was the standard template for all residential buildings, and I had every 
good reason to believe so. For one thing, most of the relatives that I visited with my family back then, who many of which 
also dwelled in Nasr City, lived with their extended families in their own apartment buildings that resembled 11 El-Insha 
Street. Also, on my daily bus ride back from school, it was more often than not a group of cousins that got off the bus 
when it made stops at apartment buildings that looked a lot like 11 El-Insha Street. As for those who were on the bus 
alone, or just with their brothers and sisters, they still usually spoke of their grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins who 
lived with them in the same house if, once again, they were dropped off at buildings the were quite similar to 11 El-Insha 
Street. And then there was El-Insha Street itself where every single building on it had pretty much the same height, feel, 
and look as my extended family’s apartment building. For the longest time, I was only aware that the apartment building to 
the left of ours, that is 9 El-Insha Street, and the one other apartment building at the end of the street, 10 El-Insha Street, 
were in fact extended family houses like 11 El-Insha Street, simply because my sister and myself went to the same schools 
as the youngest generations of both households. It must have been that awareness, along with the strong resemblance 
between my extended family’s apartment building and the rest of the buildings down El-Insha Street, that left me with the 
impression that each of those apartment buildings was a multi-generational family household as well. And it wasn’t until 
I started working on this thesis that I came to learn that this was in fact the case – El-Insha Street was indeed a street of 
apartment building–extended family houses.
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fig.2.a.3  El-Insha Street between the early 90s and 
mid  2000s.  Throughout  that  period,  every  single 
apartment  building  on  the  street  was  in  fact  an 
extended family household.
1050 20m
El-Insha Street | Early 90s – Mid 2000s
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fig.2.a.4  [opposite  page]  1  El-Insha  Street;  or  Bayt  alReda,  houses  an 
extended  family  of  three  generations.  The  second  generation  –  the  main 
inhabitants  of  the  building  –  consists  of  three  siblings,  two  sisters  and  a 
brother, each with their own apartment for their respective nuclear families. 
One  of  the  sisters,  however,  lives  in  the  states.  The  family  rents  out  the 
unoccupied apartments in the building.
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fig.2.a.5    5  El-Insha  Street;  a  very  secretive 
extended  family  lives  in  that  apartment  building. 
Not much is known about the household.
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fig.2.a.6    3  El-Insha  Street;  like  Bayt  alReda, 
this extended family household rents out the vacant 
apartments in the building to exchange students in 
the nearby Azhar University.
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fig.2.a.7        9  El-Insha  Street;  an  extended  family 
household  of  three  generations.  Mr.  Fahim’s  and 
this  household’s  families  are  acquaintances.  9 
El-Insha  Street’s  family  consists  of  a  patriarch, 
who  owns  a  longstanding  family  business;  two 
daughters;  and  two  sons.  The  ground floor  of  the 
building is the business’s secondary headquarters. 
The  first  and  second  floors  have  one  apartment 
each.  The  patriarch  and  matriarch  of  the  family 
live  in  the  apartment  on  the  first  floor  with  the 
understanding  that  it  would  pass  to  the  nuclear 
family of the last of their sons to get married. The 
second floor apartment  is  allocated  to  their  other 
son. The third floor comprises two apartments, one 
for each of their daughters’ nuclear families.
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fig.2.a.8    7  El-Insha  Street;  another  very 
secretive extended family household. By the looks of 
it though, 7 El-Insha Street has one apartment per 
floor for a total of three apartments. The patriarch 
and  matriarch  of  the  family  occupy  one  of  those 
apartments, and the other two are allocated to the 
nuclear families of each of their two children. 
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fig.2.a.9    15 El-Insha Street; An extended family 
household  consisting  of  the  nuclear  families  of  3 
brothers and two sisters. Most of the siblings of 15 
El-Insha Street are Azharites.
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fig.2.a.10       13 El-Insha Street; an extended family 
household of  three generations. Like  that of 9 El-
Insha Street,  the patriarch of  this  extended  family 
household  also  owns  a  longstanding  business. 
He  built  this  4-storey  apartment  building  for 
himself and the nuclear families of his 3 sons and 
2  daughters.  The  patriarch  and  matriarch  of  the 
household live on the apartment on the ground floor.
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fig.2.a.11    17 El-Insha Street; this one-storey villa housed one 
couple  who  had  no  children.  After  the  wife  passed  away,  the 
husband’s nephew, along with his nuclear family, came to reside 
with his uncle in the house.
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fig.2.a.12    2  El-Insha  Street;  this  two-storey 
building  is  an  extended  family  household  where 
the  patriarch  and  matriarch  of  the  family  live  in 
the  ground  floor  apartment.  I  went  to  the  same 
university as one of  the patriarch’s grandchildren. 
Although my university  colleague’s  father  had his 
own apartment in 2 El-Insha Street, for some reason 
he did not reside there with his nuclear family. The 
building  was  intended  to  be  an  extended  family 
household regardless.
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fig.2.a.13    4 El-Insha Street; an extended  family 
household  consisting  of  three  generations.  The 
patriarch  and  matriarch  of  the  family  live  in  the 
household, and one their of  their sons has left  the 
country, but still has his apartment in the building. 
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fig.2.a.14  [opposite  page]  8  El-Insha  Street; 
another  extended  family  household  consisting  of 
three generations. The patriarch and matriarch of 
the family live in a duplex comprised of apartments 
on  the  ground  and  first  floor.  Each  one  of  their 
children, and their respective nuclear families, has 
their own apartment in the building.
fig.2.a.15  10  El-Insha  Street;  another  extended 
family  household  consisting  of  three  generations. 
The patriarch and matriarch of the family had only 
one son. He has his own apartment in the building, 
and  his  son  and  daughter,  the  grandchildren, 
each have  their own apartments as well. An extra 
apartment in the building was sold to a close family 
friend.
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Some time after I got into architecture school in Cairo, I began to fully understand and appreciate the qualities and uniqueness 
of 11 El-Insha Street’s architectural typology. Given Egypt’s wealth of architectural history, we were extensively taught 
about the correlating subjects of the traditional houses of medieval Cairo and design by accretion; and I soon started to 
notice a lot of similarities between the typology of those traditional houses and that of 11 El-Insha Street. The most obvious 
of such similarities was that both typologies housed multiple generations of the same family simultaneously. In that sense, 
it seemed to me that 11 El-Insha Street was a modern take on a very old concept – it was essentially a traditional extended 
family house cloaked in a very modular, typical-floor-plan apartment building typology where each of the nuclear families 
that made up the extended family household had its own private unit. And while, at first glance, it appeared as though 
the very modular nature of 11 El-Insha Street’s typology was quite different from the atypical character of the traditional 
houses of medieval Cairo, a closer look made it rather clear that, at a very basic level, both typologies “evolved” over time 
in a very similar manner. One of the fundamental concepts we were taught about those traditional extended family houses 
was that none of them had a predetermined long-term design scheme at the outset. Rather, a traditional extended family 
house started off as a simple single-family home that was neatly arranged around a spatial element of pristine geometry 
– typically a central courtyard; and as the family that inhabited it grew, and the needs of its members changed, the house 
itself grew as well, and by multiple instances of addition and omission, its design was altered several times over the years 
to accommodate the changing needs of its inhabitants. Many generations and layers of design later, those extended family 
households ultimately became the highly irregular and atypical traditional houses that exist today.
11 El-Insha Street on the other hand featured a very standardized design that was devised with a set number of units 
for a set number of generations and nuclear families in mind; and it was constructed in its entirety before many of its 
intended inhabitants were ready to occupy or even had any use for their assigned units in the building. Despite that uniform, 
predetermined character however, and much like the traditional extended family houses of yore, 11 El-Insha Street was 
consistently altered over the years to accommodate the changing needs of its two extended families, which was a relatively 
easy process due to the modular nature of the building’s simple post-and-beam construction. As a matter of fact, with 
the exception of my grandparents who lived in their ground floor unit for some years before changing its original spatial 
arrangement, the only time any of 11 El-Insha Street’s apartments followed the building’s original floor plan was when they 
were unoccupied. Albeit at different times, my parents; as well as my uncle and his wife; and each of Mr. Fahim’s children 
and their spouses, all altered the original spatial arrangement of their respective apartments in 11 El-Insha Street prior to 
moving into the building; and some of them even went on to change those spatial arrangements again and again over the 
following years. Those alterations to 11 El-Insha Street’s typical floor plans ranged from a simple addition of a wall to make 
one big room into two smaller ones, or removing an existing wall or annexing a balcony to make a smaller room bigger; to 
complete overhauls of the floor plan for the sake of repurposing an entire apartment into monastic accommodations, or 
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fig.2.a.16  Ground  floor  of  alSuhaymi  House;  the 
quintessential traditional extended family house of 
medieval Cairo. 11 El-Insha Street’s  typology  is a 
modern take on its socio-spatial arrangement.
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fig.2.a.17  [opposite  page]  Dr.  Abouzeid’s 
apartment  on  the  ground  floor;  it’s  the  only 
apartment  that was  occupied without making  any 
changes to its floor plan
punching through floor plates to make two separate apartments into one duplex. As a result, all throughout the 30 years it 
has housed the extended families of Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim, 11 El-Insha Street hardly had a typical floor plan to speak 
of, but rather it has been in a constant state of spatial flux. That is to say, despite its formal architectural beginnings, 11 El-
Insha Street ended up having a non-uniform character that is quite similar to that of traditional extended family houses and 
by way of the same process.
Another striking similarity I found between the traditional extended family houses of medieval Cairo and 11 El-Insha 
Street was how the extended family household itself interacted within both typologies. In the former, the central courtyard 
typically functioned as both the spatial and social focal point of the household. It was the seat of the households’ patriarch 
and a common space shared by all the inhabitants of the house – a place where the members of the extended family’s 
different generations met, socialized and accepted guests away from their own private quarters. 11 El-Insha Street on the 
other hand did not have a geometrical centre per se, but it most certainly had a spatial and social focal point as well; and 
that was my grandparents’ apartment on the building’s ground floor. As the patriarch of the family, Dr. Abouzeid’s apartment 
served the same purpose as the central courtyard in a traditional extended family house. In a sense, it was the gateway 
to the household as a whole with its location on the ground floor and its proximity to the street. It was where my mother, 
father, uncle, aunt, sister, cousins and myself gathered on Fridays every weekend, and on every seasonal holiday, to share a 
meal that my grandmother cooked for us. It was where we had our birthday parties, and where we came together to meet 
relatives when they came to visit. It was where me and my sister met and played with our cousins when we were younger. 
And its veranda was where we waited for our school bus every morning with our grandparents, and where they waited 
for us every afternoon when we got back from school. Essentially, 11 El-Insha Street’s unit number 2 was the communal 
space that allowed for a healthy measure of interaction between the household’s nuclear families without infringing on the 
privacy of their own apartments.
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fig.2.a.18  My parent’s apartment on the first floor; 
one of the back bedroom was split into a bedroom 
for myself,  and  later  for my  sister  as well,  and  a 
living room. Part of the front balcony was annexed 
into a small study; an important space to my parents 
since both are academics. Located at front portion 
of the apartment next to the very formal, and hardly 
used,  reception  and  dining  room,  the  study  was 
intended to be a quieter room to work in.
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 4 | 1987 – 1998
Ola Abouzeid & Aly elBahrawy
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fig.2.a.19  My  uncle’s  apartment  on  the  second 
floor; like in my mother’s apartment, one of the back 
bedrooms was split into a bedroom for his daughter, 
and  later  for his younger daughter as well, and a 
living room. Part of the front balcony was annexed 
to make for an extra reception area. 
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 6 | 1984 – 1995
Ahmed Abouzeid & Azza elDinasoury
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fig.2.a.20  Throughout the years, my grandfather’s apartment has been the focal point of all sorts of social activity for 11 El-Insha Street’s extended family 
household. It is where members of the household, usually received family guests and celebrated birthdays [top right]; where they gathered for a weekly meal that 
my grandmother cooked for them on Fridays; where they celebrated seasonal occasions [bottom left and bottom right]; where me, my sister, and my cousins met 
to play or watch TV together; and its veranda was where me and my sister waited for our school bus every morning with our grandfather [top left].
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fig.2.a.21  In 1997, my grandfather added a veranda 
to the front of his unit making his apartment more 
accessible  which  in  turn  further  emphasized  its 
character  as  the  central  communal  space  for  the 
extended family household.
11 El-Insha Street
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fig.2.a.22  In 1998, my nuclear family moved out of 
apartment 4 on the first floor to apartment 10 on the 
fifth floor. The two back bedrooms were rearranged 
into  a  bedroom  for  my  parents;  two  separate 
bedrooms for me and my sister, and a living area. 
The  portion  of  the  front  balcony was,  once  again 
annexed,  this  time  to make  for  a  larger  reception 
area.
fig.2.a.23  [opposite page,  left] Two years  later,  in 
2000,  I  got  into  architecture  school.  Accordingly, 
the  front  portion  of  apartment  4  was  repurposed 
to  become  my  studio,  where  I  worked  on  school 
projects  since  my  room  in  apartment  10  was  too 
small to fit my drafting table or receive classmates 
to work on group projects. The back portion of the 
apartment was repurposed into a bigger study area 
for my parents, with  their  former bedroom  turned 
into  an  office  and  our  former  living  room  turned 
into a library for all their books.
fig.2.a.24  [opposite  page,  right]  Five  years  after 
that, in 2005, my sister got into architecture school 
too. Accordingly, our living room in apartment 10 
was repurposed to be her own separate studio; and 
the  living room was moved  to  the  front portion of 
the apartment.
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fig.2.a.25  My  uncle  is,  by  far,  the  one  inhabitant 
of  11  El-Insha  Street  who’s  responsible  for  the 
most drastic, and  the most  instances of change  to 
his  apartment  over  the  years.  Not  being  a  fan  of 
eating  in  front  of  TV,  and  barred  from  using  the 
highly ceremonial dining room; in 1995, my uncle 
got  rid  of  the  hardly  used water  closet  and  redid 
his main bathroom to create more space for having 
a  small  dining area  that  led  into  the  living  room. 
That  expanded  living  space  became  the  centre  of 
activity in his apartment, where his kids studied and 
received friends and relatives.
fig.2.a.26  [opposite  age]  In  1997,  my  uncle  had 
male twins. With four children, and in need of more 
space;  in  2002,  my  uncle  embarked  on  his  most 
ambitious  rearrangement  of  his  unit  to  date.  He 
punctured  through  the floor  slab of his apartment 
with  a  staircase  that  connected  it  to  his  eldest 
daughter’s  intended  apartment  on  the  next  floor 
turning both units into one duplex. The lower level 
of  that  duplex,  namely  apartment  6,  consisted  of 
living  and  sleeping  spaces.  The  former  reception 
in  apartment  6 was  turned  into my  uncle  and  his 
wife’s bedroom; allowing  for  the  two bedrooms at 
the back of the apartment to become those of their 
two  daughters,  and  two  sons  respectively.  The 
former dining area in apartment 6 was turned into 
an extra living space, and from there,  the internal 
staircase  led  to  the  upper  level  of  the  duplex, 
namely apartment 8. The front potion of apartment 
8  consisted of  a  large,  open  reception and dining 
area, complete with their own small bathroom and 
kitchenette; a ceremonial space that was primarily 
designated to receive and entertain guests without 
interfering  with  the  privacy  of  the  family’s  living 
spaces  on  the  lower  level.  The  back  portion  of 
apartment  8  had  a  study  for  my  uncle,  and  a 
separate study for his daughters.
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 6 | 1995 – 2002
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11 El-Insha Street
Apartments 6 and 8 | 2002 – 2008
Ahmed Abouzeid & Azza elDinasoury
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fig.2.a.27  [opposite  page]  Realizing  that  his  and 
his  wife’s  bedroom,  which  overlooked  El-Insha 
Street,  was  too  noisy  for  his  own  taste; my  uncle 
relocated it to the quieter back portion of apartment 
6  in 2008,  switching bedrooms with his  two  sons. 
That  simple  move,  however,  entailed  yet  another 
spatial  rearrangement  of  the  back  portion  of 
apartment  6.  My  uncle  got  rid  of  the  living  and 
dining  space  there  to  make  for  a  bigger  master 
bedroom for himself and his wife; complete with its 
own little balcony and walk-in closet – which is a 
rather novel concept in Egypt. He also reverted the 
main bathroom  to  its original  form, and redid his 
kitchen giving it more area. The rest of the duplex 
remained unaltered.
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fig.2.a.28  The  same  year  my  grandfather  added 
a  veranda  to  his  unit, Mr.  Fahim’s  youngest  son, 
Ramy,  got  married  and  was  ready  to  move  into 
his  unit  on  the  ground  floor;  apartment  1. Before 
moving  in  with  his  newly  wed,  the  front  portion 
of  the  apartment  was  altered.  The  reception  was 
opened  up  on  a  walled  porch  that  annexed  the 
setback  in  front of  the apartment; and  the kitchen 
wall was knocked down opening it up to the dining 
room.
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fig.2.a.29  [opposite  page] After  having  two  sons, 
in  2010,  Ramy  Fahim  went  through  another 
rearrangement of his unit. The rear set back behind 
his apartment was annexed into another porch and 
allowed  for a bigger bedroom  for himself and his 
wife.  It  also  gave  him  enough  space  to  turn  the 
other bedroom into two separate one of each of his 
sons. In the front portion of the apartment, the open 
kitchen was closed up to become its own separate 
space  once  again,  after  the  open-concept  kitchen 
did not sit well with  the heavy nature of Egyptian 
cuisine.
fig.2.a.30  Hatem  elHabiby’s  unit,  apartment  3, 
featured the most minimal alteration in all of 11 El-
Insha  Street.  The water  closet was  disposed  of  to 
allow for a bigger kitchen.
11 El-Insha Street
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fig.2.a.31  In  Nady  Fahim’s  apartment,  part  of 
the  front  balcony was  annexed  and  turned  into  a 
study. The most common spatial alteration in 11 El-
Insha Street also occurred, as one of the two back 
bedrooms  was  split  into  a  bedroom  for  his  older 
son, and a living area; which was later turned into 
his younger son’s bedroom.
fig.2.a.32    [opposite  page,  left]  Apartment  7 
featured  one  of  the  most  interesting  spatial  and 
functional  adaptations  in  11  El-Insha  Street. 
After  graduating  university,  Mr.  Fahim’s  son, 
Victor, became a monk. Now Father Dionysius, he 
accordingly  transformed  his  unit  in  11  El-Insha 
Street  into  something  of  a  miniature  monastery. 
The  back  portion  of  the  apartment  was  split  into 
four monastic cells; and part of  the  front balcony 
was  annexed  into  a  guest  bedroom,  which  along 
with  the  reception and big dining  room, made  for 
a communal  space  for  less  fortunate wayfarers  to 
stay while Father Dionysius’ parent monastery set 
them up with jobs and their own accommodations.
fig.2.a.33  [opposite  page,  right]  Nahed  Fahim’s 
unit, apartment 9, also  features  the most  common 
spatial  alteration  in  11  El-Insha  Street  also 
occurred, as one of the two back bedrooms was split 
into a bedroom for her son, and a living area; which 
was then turned into a bed room for other son later 
on. With the arrival of her third and youngest son, 
the dining room was appropriated into a bedroom 
for her eldest  son, while his  former  room became 
that of his youngest brother. The  reception, which 
now doubles as a living room, came to also include 
the dining room.
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fig.2.a.34  The  transformation  of  11  El-Insha 
Street’s  façade  over  30  years;  clearly  less  effort 
was  exerted,  as  well  as,  less  attention  given  to 
altering  it  in  comparison  to  the  buildings  floor 
plans.  However,  it  has  as  much  resilience  and 
capacity  for  adaptation  as  the  floor  plans.  The 
arched  window  on  the  top  floor  is  my  mother’s 
pride and  joy. Having  that  sort of window  in was 
one of her primary concerns during the furnishing 
of  apartment  10  before  we  relocated  to  it  from 
apartment  4.  Apparently,  this  window  became 
an  identifying marker  in  the  area  for  11 El-Insha 
Street, much to my mother’s content.
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However, it wasn’t just the parallels between the traditional extended family houses of medieval Cairo and 11 El-Insha 
Street’s apartment building–extended family house typology that caught my interest. I also became quite interested in what 
seemed to be a particular prevalence of that unique architectural typology within Nasr City’s urban context. By the time I 
finished primary school in 1993, I had definitely outgrown my earlier childhood notion that 11 El-Insha Street’s apartment 
building–extended family house typology was the template for all residential buildings. At the time, Nasr City was at the 
height of its development boom that had started in the mid 80s, and condominium towers were clearly emerging as the 
predominant residential typology throughout the whole neighborhood. Those towers looked like a much taller and bulkier 
variant of 11 El-Insha Street since they obviously, and in the strictest architectural sense, followed a similar apartment 
building typology. But it was also quite obvious that, unlike 11 El-Insha Street’s typology, those towers did not house the 
same social structures. Instead, the substantially larger number of apartments in a condominium tower were inhabited 
by unrelated nuclear families. Although it was much simpler version of it, I’ve had that impression since a very young age 
because the majority of my schoolmates who dwelled in Nasr City lived in apartments in condominium towers, and rather 
than relatives, they instead spoke of unrelated neighbors who lived with them in the same building.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming prevalence of condominium towers in Nasr City, once the apartment building–
extended family house typology caught my interest; I noticed three distinct trends that pertained to it within the context 
of the neighborhood. The first was that, while it most definitely was not exclusive to Nasr City, the apartment building–
extended family house typology was by far the most prevalent there. More than any other Cairene neighborhood, it seemed 
to me that Nasr City hosted some of the largest clusters of those apartment building–extended family houses, and had quite 
a few streets that, much like El-Insha Street, were made up entirely of buildings that followed that typology. From there, it 
also appeared to me as though, within the urban fabric of Nasr City itself, the streets on which apartment building–extended 
family houses generally stood, as well as the streets that were made up entirely of such typology, were almost always inner 
streets. Condominium towers on the other hand seemed to be far more common on Nasr City’s wider main streets.
And finally, it seemed to me that this clear distinction between the general locales of apartment building–extended 
family houses and condominium towers within the context of Nasr City reflected an equally clear distinction between the 
social groups that inhabited both such typologies. Apartment building–extended family houses appeared to be an almost 
exclusive dwelling typology for middle class professionals, while members of the new middle class seemed to predominately 
dwell in the condominium tower typology. That is not to say that no middle class professional ever dwelled in Nasr City’s 
condominium towers, because a great many of them did. It just appeared to me as though this did not work in reverse 
since there were hardly any new middle class extended families who dwelled in their own apartment building households. 
I had this distinct impression since a very young age because I was aware that the older members of 11 El-Insha Street’s 
two extended family households were all professionals – my grandparents, uncle and aunt were doctors; my parents were 
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university professors; and Mr. Fahim’s sons, daughters, and their spouses, were pharmacists, veterinarians, and accountants, 
et cetera. I was also aware that those of my relatives, as well as the parents of my schoolmates, who dwelled in the same 
type of building as 11 El-Insha Street were all professionals too. Conversely though, the parents of my schoolmates who 
lived in condominium towers almost always had jobs that sounded both different and rather ambiguous to me at such a 
young age – they either owned export and import companies, or dealerships, or were simply just “businessmen”.
All in all, in the fifteen years or so between the early 90s and the mid 2000s, 11 El-Insha Street stood as a quintessential 
example of the apartment building–extended family house typology, and along with the other apartment building extended 
family households down El-Insha street, it constituted one of several building blocks for a unique street model that was 
particularly prevalent in Nasr City. By the end of those 15 years, I had no reason to believe that any of this would change. I 
thought that 11 El-Insha Street will continue to adapt to the changing needs of my extended family for years to come, and 
that the other extended family apartment buildings down the street will do so too. I also thought that El-Insha Street would 
remain the urban enclave of middle class professionals that it had always been for decades to come. But little did I know, all 
of that was, once again, about to drastically change over the following few years.
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fig.2.1.1  Aerial  photo  of  a  typical  Nasr  City 
neighborhood,  showing  the  discrepancy  between 
the  bylaw-abiding  apartment  buildings  and  the 
towering,  bylaw  violating  condominium  typology. 
There’s  clearly more  of  the  latter  than  there  is  of 
the former. 
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“Although the broader changes in the Arab world have 
favored the nuclear family, the extended family still plays a 
role outside the household. This is visible in the preference for 
related nuclear family households to reside near one another, 
and to maintain a fairly intense contact. In cities like Cairo, a 
typical pattern at present is to build a multi-storey or multi-
apartment building with various married kin, each occupying 
their independent apartment. This novel combination gives the 
adults many of the positive features of modern nuclear family 
and gives the children many of the positive features of the 
traditional extended family. Relatives live as neighbors, but in 
economically independent households.”
(Hopkins and Ibrahim 1997, 178)
Apart from the very broad reference to the apartment building–
extended family house typology in the quote above, and as far as the 
research for this thesis went, no other formal study or statistical data 
that directly linked such typology, Nasr City, and the Egyptian middle 
class together was to be found. Accordingly, a series of statistical maps 
that were reproduced from raw data pertaining to certain demographic 
criteria in Cairo’s managerial districts in 1996 are going to be used here 
2.1  Nasr City [1990s]
An urban testament to a middle class divide
to establish that link by demonstrating two key findings. The first is that 
Nasr City, at the time, was the residential hub for professionals who, as 
it was established earlier, represented an older, more moral Egyptian 
middle class. And the second is that Nasr City, at the time, had the 
largest concentration of the building–extended family house typology 
in comparison to the other Cairene neighborhoods – a point that would 
be made by way of cross-referencing demographic indicators pertaining 
to the prevalent housing typologies and modes of housing ownership 
in each of Cairo’s managerial districts. From there, another series of 
statistical maps applying the same demographic criteria to Nasr City’s 
managerial sub-districts will be used to establish that, out of all those 
sub-districts, the apartment building–extended family house typology 
as a unique form of middle class housing was the most prevalent in the 
First Zone – the sub-district where 11 El-Insha Street is located. That will 
then be followed by a number of urban analyses based on a survey that 
was carried out in Nasr City’s First Zone. Those analyses will illustrate 
the conformity of its residential structures to Nasr City’s building height 
bylaws, in order to contextually visualize the urban patterns of where 
apartment building¬–extended family houses stood in relation to 
condominium towers within the First Zone. In essence, the following set 
of mapping exercises aims at corroborating the main arguments of this 
thesis by way of concrete demographic and urban data.
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fig.2.1.2  Managerially,  Nasr  City  consists  of  two 
districts,  Nasr  City  First,  and  Nasr  City  Second. 
The latter comprises most of Nasr City’s large-scale 
projects,  industrial  areas,  and  low-cost  housing. 
The latter, on the other hand, comprises Nasr City’s 
core residential zones, and thus is going to be the 
main  focus  of  the  following  analysis.  Although  it 
is  technically  part  of  the  Nasr  City  First  district, 
‘Ezbet elHaggana sub-district, one of Cairo’s larger 
squatter settlements, has been excluded from Nasr 
City First here so as not to skew the data. Moreover, 
the seventh neighborhood, which technically is part 
of the Nasr City Second district, had been included 
here with the Nasr City first district, since it belongs 
to Nasr City’s core Seventh Zone. 
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fig.2.1.3  Between 1986 and 1996,  the  years of  its 
socially  driven  urban  boom,  Nasr  City  exhibited 
one  of  the  highest  population  growth  rates  in  all 
of Cairo, rivaled only by the typically fast-growing 
lower end residential districts of the city.
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fig.2.1.4  In  1996,  Nasr  City  had  some  256,000 
inhabitants, a much higher population than Cairo’s 
other high-end middle class neighborhoods, such as 
Masr AlGadeeda and Nozha districts to Nasr City’s 
north (120,000 inhabitants and 154,000 inhabitants 
respectively).
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fig.2.1.5  In  the  same  year,  55.5%  of  Nasr  City’s 
working population were professionals, versus 46% 
in Masr AlGadeeda and 52% in Nozha. Combined 
with  its  fairly  larger  population,  this  means  that 
Nasr City was  indeed  the  hub  of  professionals  as 
a social group. Given the high real-estate rates in 
Nasr City at the time, it  is safe to assume that the 
other  half  of  it’s  working  population  belonged  to 
the entrepreneurial middle class who could afford 
those rates.
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fig.2.1.6  As  defined  in  the  census,  a  house  is  a 
residential  structure  of  one  to  five  storeys  with 
only one apartment on each storey; and a villa  is 
a residential  structure of  two storeys  linked by an 
internal  staircase.  And  while  these  criteria  might 
have  been  useful  to  identify  Nasr  City’s  bylaw-
abiding apartment building–extended family house 
typology,  the  fact  the  apartment  buildings  that 
follow  such  typology  in  the  district  usually  have 
more  than  one  apartment  per  storey  renders  this 
criteria  useless.  Not  to  mention  that  the  census’s 
definition of a “family” does not explicitly exclude 
on  include  extended  families.  Indeed,  in  1996, 
Nasr City, like the majority of Cairo’s districts, had 
a  very  low percentage of  its  families  living  in  the 
defined “House” or “Villa”.
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fig.2.1.7  Alternately, a single apartment  is clearly 
the prevalent form of dwelling for families in Nasr 
City,  as  94.5%  of  its  families  in  1996  dwelled  in 
a  single apartment. That  is also  the case  in Masr 
AlGadeeda  (91.4%)  and  Nozha  (92.25%).  An 
alternate  criteria  for  identifying  the  apartment 
building–extended family house typology had to be 
found.
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fig.2.1.8  The criteria for identifying the apartment 
building–extended  family  house  typology  presents 
itself  in  the  mode  of  residential  unit  ownership. 
A  purchased  unit  is  one  that  has  been  “sold”  by 
its  owner  to  another  party  through  a  monetary 
transaction. Apartments  in  condominiums,  bylaw-
abiding or  not,  that were  built  by  private  citizens 
and sold later to the general public, fall under that 
type of unit. In other words, this criterion could be 
used  to  identify  unrelated  nuclear  families  in  any 
given  district.  In  1996,  64%  of  families  in  Nasr 
city dwelled in a purchased unit, one of the highest 
percentages  compared  to  the  older  districts Masr 
AlGadeeda  and  Nozha  where  rental  was  still  the 
prevalent form of residential unit ownership.
0% – 5% 5% – 15% 15% – 25% 25% – 35% 55% – 65% 75% – 85%
Cairo Governorate Districts 1996
Families dwelling in a Purchased Residential Unit
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fig.2.1.9  Alternately,  an  owned  unit  is  one  that 
has  been  intended  for  its  owner  at  its  inception. 
Apartments  in  condominiums  developed  by 
syndicates, or other community regulatory bodies, 
for  its  members  who  paid  for  it  beforehand  fall 
under that type of unit. Most importantly however, 
apartments  that are entitled  to certain  individuals 
without a monetary transaction fall under that type 
of unit as well. In residential areas directed towards 
a  clientele  of  private  citizens,  this  criterion  could 
be  used  to  identify  nuclear  families  that  are  part 
of an extended  family household, as  the patriarch 
and  owner  of  an  apartment  building–extended 
family  household would  endow  his  offspring with 
apartments in the household without the transaction 
of money. In that regard, in1996, 13.07% of families 
in  Nasr  City  dwelled  in  owned  apartments,  three 
percentage points higher than Masr AlGadeeda and 
Nozha. Keeping  in mind  that  the percentile  range 
for  that  criterion  is  rather  small,  and  that  Nasr 
City  has  a  considerably  higher  population  than 
either  middle  class  district,  this  difference  could 
be  extrapolated  to mean  that  Nasr City  hosts  the 
highest concentrations of  the apartment building–
extended family house typology.
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fig.2.1.10  Crowding  is defined as a  ratio between 
the number of  individuals  to  the number of rooms 
available in a certain area. It is a good measure for 
assessing living quality and population density. In 
that regard, in 1996 Nasr City had a crowding ratio 
of  0.89  persons  per  room.  It  was  a  considerably 
higher density  in comparison  to  the much smaller 
Masr  AlGadeeda  (0.83)  and  Nozha  (0.86).  This 
speaks of the negative effect of the prevalence of the 
bylaw  violating  condominium  towers  throughout 
Nasr City, which typically had smaller apartments 
with fewer rooms in order to allow for the maximum 
possible number of apartments to sell per building, 
and in turn the maximum possible return profit for 
the building’s owner.  
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fig.2.1.11  The same criteria applied on the district 
scale  in  Cairo  will  now  be  applied  on  the  sub-
district scale  in Nasr City  to demonstrate  that  the 
First  Zone,  where  11  El-Insha  Street  is  located, 
has  the  highest  concentration  of  the  apartment 
building–extended  family  house  typology  within 
the district. What  is of concern here are  the core, 
original residential zones on Nasr City.
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fig.2.1.12  In 1996, the First Zone had some 24,000 
inhabitants. Owing to their highly underdeveloped 
character at  the  time data  from the Ninth and  the 
Tenth  Zone  are  rather  skewed  and  should  not  be 
taken into account in the following analysis.
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fig.2.1.13  In  1996,  50.7%  of  the  First  Zone’s 
working population were professionals.
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fig.2.1.14  Most importantly however, in 1996, only 
40.8%  of  families  in  the  First  Zone  dwelled  in  a 
purchased residential unit; the lowest percentage in 
all of Nasr City’s core residential Zones.
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fig.2.1.15  On  the  other  hand,  in  1996,  21.6%  of 
families  in  the  First  Zone  dwelled  in  an  owned 
residential unit; by far the highest percentage in all 
of Nasr City’s  core  residential Zones;  in  turn  this 
could be extrapolated to mean that the First Zone 
has  the  highest  concentrations  of  the  apartment 
building–extended family house typology.
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fig.2.1.16  The First Zone also has the second lowest 
crowding  ratio  of  the  districts  core  residential 
zones, at 0.89 persons per room, indicating a lesser 
presence of the towering condominium typology.
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fig.2.1.17  As  illustrated  here,  the  grossest 
violations  of  Nasr  City’s  building  height  bylaws 
in  the First Zone  in 1994 were mostly confined  to 
the major, wider streets. At the time, the narrower 
smaller  streets  in  the  First  Zone’s  core  had more 
bylaw-abiding  apartment  building  than  they  did 
towering condominiums. Building on the preceding 
statistical findings, it is safe to assume that a good 
portion  of  those  bylaw-abiding  buildings  follow 
the  apartment  building–extended  family  house 
typology.
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First Zone | 1994
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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fig.2.1.18  A  three  dimensional  representation 
of  the  building  heights  in  the  first  zone  in  1994, 
illustrating  the  volumetric  urban  character  of  the 
zone’s streets at the time.
First Zone | 1994
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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Chapter Three
137
3.A The Begining
of an End
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fig.3.a.1      [previous  page]  the 
demolition  of  a  bylaw-abiding 
apartment  building–extended  family 
house  against  a  backdrop  of  two 
towering new condominiums. 
In 2003, during an urban course lecture about squatter settlements, our professor asked the class this question: what is 
the largest informal settlement in all of Cairo? The class responded by naming some of the major squatter settlements like 
Mansheyyet Nasser, ‘Ezbet elHaggana, etc. The professor rejected all of our answers as incorrect, and finally replied with a 
smile on her face “Actually it is Nasr City”. A resident of Nasr City herself, she went on to explain that a squatter settlement 
is just a type of informal settlement. Any urban settlement in which building bylaws are being consistently disregarded or 
violated is, by definition, an informal settlement.  Given Nasr City’s sheer size and the number of structures that violate its 
building bylaws, she contended that Nasr City is by far the largest informal settlement in all of Cairo.
My professor didn’t really have any data to corroborate such a statement. It was more of an anecdote that spoke to the 
perseverance of the condominium typology throughout Nasr City and the toll it had taken on the urban quality of living 
in Nasr City. Almost ten years after Nasr City had become fully developed, the neighborhood was exhibiting a multitude 
of problems with its infrastructure. Water and electricity were hardly dependable, there were constantly traffic jams that 
blocked the main arteries in and out of the district, and there was a chronic shortage in parking spaces. Naturally that was 
an inevitable outcome to the consistent violation of bylaws in Nasr City – an urban settlement in which the infrastructure 
was designed to accommodate buildings of a maximum height of five storeys, and yet has ended up with the majority of 
buildings that exceeded this height limitation. Needless to say, that put a great deal of pressure on the infrastructure of Nasr 
City and led to the aforementioned problems, much to the dismay of its inhabitants. 
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fig.3.a.2    Traffic  congestion  and  lack  of  parking 
space  are  some  of  the  many  troubles  and  woes 
the  residents  of  Nasr  City  live  everyday,  thanks 
to  the  consistent  violation  of  building  bylaws 
that  culminated  in  overloading  the  settlements 
infrastructure.
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fig.3.a.3    [right]  and  fig.3.a.4    The 
new  style  of  condominium  tower  that 
took Nasr City by storm starting in the 
mid  2000s;  a  close  up  on  the  overly 
ornate,  yet  only  skin  deep,  details  of 
the facade 
fig.3.a.4    Accum  sus,  ipicti  dolorem 
fugit  dundit  volorec  toreperest, 
aliquod  minvenectur  modicia  sectest 
iniendantium  haris  et  volorrum  facia 
de  non  nem  as  ad  ut  ut  quat.Pid  es 
sae  voluptatus  dis  molorum,  qui 
ommolorunt,
Around the same time, as a junior architecture student, I began to notice a certain style of condominium towers spread 
throughout Nasr City. I vividly remember a condominium tower popping up two streets down from where I live, which 
had a very ornate style to it. It looked to me as though it was a very gaudy derivation of a Neo-Classicism. But as far as its 
functional arrangement and floor plans went, that building pretty much followed the same typology as the condominium 
towers that pervaded throughout Nasr City since the early 90s. That is to say it was merely a new stylistic take on Nasr 
City’s condominium tower typology. Not even a year later, a new condominium tower that looked almost identical to the 
aforementioned building, was constructed on the same street. And then another soon followed on another street nearby. 
And then another, and another, and so on. It just seemed to me that every new building constructed in Nasr City from the 
early 2000s onwards followed that overly ornate style.
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fig.3.a.5   [top] and fig.3.a.6   Bustling 
construction  in  New  Cairo  in  2008; 
Buildings  there  had  the  same  gaudy 
neo-classist  style  as  the  emerging 
condominium typologies in Nasr City
The early 2000s was also the first time I began hearing about New Cairo – A new suburban development that was emerging 
on the eastern outskirts of Nasr City. It sounded as if most of my teaching assistants, who also had their small private 
practices on the side as well as most of my professors who had fully established firms, had most of their business centered 
around designing and constructing residential buildings in New Cairo. It was quite interesting for me to notice that most of 
their residential building designs followed that same gaudy Neo-Classicist style of the condominium towers that were then 
taking Nasr City by storm.
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fig.3.a.7    17  El-Insha  Street,  after 
widowed  owner  of  the  villa  died,  his 
nephew  sold  his  uncle’s  house  and 
shortly  there  after  it  was  demolished 
in 2008.
In late 2008, this gaudy style of condominium tower came to El-Insha Street. At the time, I had returned to Egypt for my first 
visit since I had moved to Canada earlier that year, and was surprised to find that the house at the corner of El-Insha Street 
had been demolished and already another building was in the process of being constructed. When I inquired as to what had 
happened, I came to know that the owner of the one-storey house that used to stand there had died, and that he was not 
survived by any children of his own, but rather by a nephew who had sold the property.  Shortly afterwards, the new owner 
demolished the house and began constructing a 10-storey condominium tower.  
During the same visit, both my mother and my uncle, each on a separate occasion, voiced their discontent with the 
construction of the new condominium tower at the end of the street. I had the sense that they felt that structure would 
infringe on the social character of El-Insha Street. They felt that it would bring in a new class of inhabitants to El-Insha 
Street – a class they were not accustomed to. On a related note, they also both voiced their discontent with the overall 
declining quality of urban living in Nasr City. These concerns were not new since they have always complained about the 
power outages and water shortages ever since the late 90s and the early 2000s, but it seemed as though their complaints 
were stepped up a notch.
Two years later in 2010 I came back to Cairo for another visit. The condominium tower on the corner of El-Insha Street 
was fully constructed into the 10-storey stylistic monstrosity that it was. Right across from it, on the street perpendicular 
to El-Insha Street, another bylaw abiding apartment building was being demolished. As a matter of fact, during that visit, 
I noticed numerous similar buildings being demolished all over Nasr City and especially in the area around El-Insha Street.  
During that same visit, I also learned that the inhabitants of the extended family house to the right of El-Insha Street 
had relocated to the suburbs and repurposed the whole building to become the headquarters of their family business. 
Moreover, I also learned that the inhabitants of the extended family house to the left of El-Insha Street were putting their 
property up for sale.
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fig.3.a.8  The vacant lot where 17 El-Insha Street used to stand. In Summer of 
2008, the construction of a new building was already afoot.
fig.3.a.9  Two years later, a 10-storey condominium tower stood in place of the 
one-storey villa that was 17 El-Insha Street.
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fig.3.a.10    
1050 20m
El-Insha Street | 2010
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fig.3.a.11    
El-Insha Street | 2010
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fig.3.a.12  An  increasingly  common 
scene  in  Nasr  City  since  2008; 
demolition of bylaw-abiding buildings
Most important of all, however, during that visit I also learned that my uncle had already purchased property and was in the 
process of constructing his own extended family house in the suburb of Shorouq City. Most of Mr. Fahim’s children had also 
each purchased property and were in the process of building their own separate extended family homes in the suburbs of 
New Cairo. Both my uncle and Mr. Fahim’s children maintained that they were not intending on moving to those suburban 
homes, but were rather constructing them for their own children to start their own families since, in the particular case 
of 11 El-Insha Street, there wasn’t any space for them to provide each of their children with their own apartments. Most 
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fig.3.a.13    [left]  and  3.a.14  Another 
very common scene in Nasr City since 
2008; the construction of condominium 
towers  that  feature  a  very  gaudy 
derivation of neo-classicism
peculiarly however, my mother was also voicing a very keen interest on moving to the suburbs as well, even though as it 
stands right now, herself, myself, and my sister each have our apartments in 11 El-Insha Street.  
By the end of that visit, I came to the sad realization that El-Insha Street had quickly lost its very unique character as 
a street of apartment building-extended family houses. The even sadder realization that twenty years after it had truly 
become a modern version of extended family house, 11 El-Insha Street was itself on the verge of no longer being as such.
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fig.3.a.15  Abouzeid  Residence  façade 
in  Shorouq  City,  this  “villa”  barely 
accommodates  the  future  nuclear 
families  of  my  uncle’s  4  children.  The 
coexistence  of  two  full  generations  is 
impossible,  and  a  third  generation, 
namely my uncle’s future grandchildren, 
are not account  for at  all  in  that  villa. 
A quite different situation than when my 
uncle’s father, Dr. Abouzeid, built 11 El-
Insha Street.
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fig.3.a.16    
Abouzeid Residence | Shorouq City
Ground Floor | Apartment 1
Ali Abouzeid [future occupant]
Ahmed Abouzeid & Azza elDinasoury
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fig.3.a.17    
Abouzeid Residence | Shorouq City
First Floor | Apartment 2
Muhammad Abouzeid [future occupant]
0 1 m 2 m 5 m
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fig.3.a.18   
Abouzeid Residence | Shorouq City
Second Floor + Roof | Apartments 3 & 4 [duplexes]
Samar Abouzeid & Noha Abouzeid [future occupants]
0 1 m 2 m 5 m
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fig.3.a.19  [opposite  page]  Ghattas  Residence  Facade;  this  “villa”  in  New  Cairo  is  intended  to 
accommodate Mrs. Fahim’s three sons’ nuclear families. Neither her nor her husband have units the 
structure they built for their children
Fawzy Ghattas Nahed Fahim
Bishoy GhattasKirolos GhattasMina Ghattas
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Ghattas Residence | New Cairo
Ground Floor | Apartment 1
Mina Ghattas [future occupant]
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fig.3.a.20   [opposite page] and fig3.a.21
Ghattas Residence | New Cairo
First + Second Floor | Apartments 2 & 3
Kirolos Ghattas & Bishoy Ghattas [future occupants]
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fig.3.1.1  Since the mid 2000s, and driven by social 
motives,  the  Nasr  City’s  middle  class  has  been 
flocking to new (sub)urban attractors to the east. 
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The main antagonist of this thesis is the city of New Cairo. This large 
suburban development was formally established and planned in the 
year 2000 to encompass an area of nearly 72,500 acres right on the 
eastern border of Nasr City.1 In many ways, the suburbs of New Cairo 
were quite different from Nasr City.
For one thing, New Cairo’s urban design is quite a departure from 
Nasr City’s modernist, orthogonal planning. Instead, the over all design 
of New Cairo closely followed the North American suburban model 
with wider, meandering streets, and more open spaces. And then, there 
were the differences in land use patterns in comparison to Nasr City. 
More areas of New Cairo were assigned to private sector investors for 
the development of gated communities of a variety of different scales. 
As for the land that was assigned for development by private citizens, 
3.1  An Urban Exodus
New Cairo and the wasted potential of
Nasr City’s extended family house typology
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fig.3.1.2  A comparison of the planning patterns of 
Nasr  City  and  New  Cairo.  The  latter’s  is  clearly 
reminiscent  of  and marks a  return  to  the patterns 
of the high-end residential neighborhoods of yore.
fig.3.1.3  [opposite  page]  In  comparison  to 
Nasr  City,  New  Cairo’s  planning  features  much 
more  areas  designated  for  developers  and  gated 
communities  of  varying  scales.  Apart  from 
the  apparent  difference  in  geometry,  the  areas 
designated  for  development  by  private  citizens 
follow  the  same  arrangements  in  both  Nasr  City 
and New Cairo.
0 0.5 1.0 2.0 km
0 0.5 1.0 2.0 km
Nasr City [1959]
New Cairo [2000]
that is to say single land lots that would be sold individually to Egyptians 
to build their private homes, those were predominantly allotted to a 
villa typology versus Nasr City’s apartment building typology. The areas 
of those lots ranged between 600 and 800 square meters.2 As far as 
building footprint and setbacks went, the building bylaws for New 
Cairo’s villas were not any different than those for Nasr City’s apartment 
buildings at the time. Villas in most areas of New Cairo were allowed a 
maximum footprint of 50% of the lot area with front and side setbacks 
of 3 meters and rear setbacks of 4 meters. But with regards to building 
heights, there was quite a difference. Villas in New Cairo were allowed a 
maximum height of 3 storeys at 11 meters and in some areas a maximum 
height of only 2 storeys at 8 meters.3
Although the curvilinear or deformed character of New Cairo’s grid 
stands in sharp contrast to that of Nasr City’s orthogonal grid, land uses 
in both settlements are organized in a very similar manner. Much like in 
Nasr City, residential neighborhoods in New Cairo are typically situated 
around a central nucleus or spine of large-scale services with smaller 
service nodes in the subdivisions of the neighborhoods themselves.
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fig.3.1.4  Although the streets are wider and are of 
rather curvilinear geometry, neighborhoods within 
New  Cairo  feature  the  same  patterns  as  those  in 
Nasr City with a  central  small-scale  service node 
around which private residential lots are arranged.
Private Residential lots – Villas
Small-scale Retail / Service
Park
20 50 100 m
New Cairo | Sample Neighborhood
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Towards the mid 2000’s, New Cairo emerged as one of the strongest 
urban attractors in all of Cairo. With the simulacrum of luxury conveyed 
through its novel urban form, many middle class, upper-middle class, 
and upper class Egyptians were situating their homes there. Around the 
same time, specifically from 2008 onwards, Nasr City began exhibiting a 
very peculiar trend. Many of its apartment buildings there that followed 
Nasr City’s building bylaws were being systematically demolished and 
replaced by condominium towers. It could be argued that this trend 
was triggered by a single event: the enactment of the Universal Building 
Code of 2008.  By decree of that code, all residential buildings in Cairene 
neighborhoods, including Nasr City, were allowed a maximum height of 
one and a half times the street width they stand on with a maximum of 
36 meters. Residential building footprints were further increased and 
setbacks were decreased to a minimum.4 This code basically nullified 
Nasr City’s building bylaws and in turn made it much easier for all those 
who wanted to capitalize on the high real-estate values there. It allowed 
them to construct towering apartment buildings with more units to 
sell without having to break the bylaws and bribe officials or exploit 
system loopholes in the process. And since Nasr City was essentially 
fully developed at the time, this interest translated into buying and 
demolishing the five or less storey, bylaw-abiding buildings. Needless to 
say, New Cairo was exempt from that code.  Much like Nasr City when it 
was first established, New Cairo had its own bylaws that were enforced 
by a separate regulatory body; in this case the New Urban Communities 
Authority, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Housing.
As it was established in chapter 2, most of the bylaw abiding apartment 
buildings in Nasr City were extended family houses for middle class 
professionals. The systematic elimination of the apartment building–
extended family house typology could therefore mean one thing: 
Many of those who were flocking to the suburbs of New Cairo were 
professionals who were seeking to relocate their extended family homes 
there. What comes next is a series of urban surveys and demographic 
analysis that aim to highlight two very important phenomena that are 
essential to demonstrating this link. The first is the trend of systematic 
demolition of apartment building–extended family homes in Nasr City 
and their replacement with condominium towers. The second is the 
exodus of middle class professionals from Nasr City to New Cairo.
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fig.3.1.5  Comprising  the most  developed  portions 
of New Cairo, the New Cairo First district emerged 
as a new urban attractor and  the main contender 
to  Nasr  City  First  district  in  its  capacity  as  a 
residential  hub  for  the  middle  class.  New  Cairo 
First is bordered by New Cairo Second to the north 
and New Cairo Third to the south. 
0.5 1.5 2.5 5.0 km
Cairo Governorate Districts 2006
Nasr City First Boundaries
New Districts since ‘96
New Cairo First
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fig.3.1.6  Between 1996 and 2006, the population of 
New Cairo as a whole grew at  the second highest 
rate in all of Cairo, and at a much higher rate than 
Nasr City did during its heyday between 1986 and 
1996.
13.4%
4.7%
1.1%
2.1%
2.2%
1.9% 3.3%
1.6%
0.4%
0.9%
4.4%7.3%
1.1%
5.4%
52.8%
5.4%
0.3%
4.5%
N/A
DecreaseNo Change Increase
Cairo Governorate Districts
Annual Population Growth 1996 – 2006
164
fig.3.1.7  Compared to Nasr City First’s population 
of 433,000, New Cairo First’s population of 28,000 
is  rather  miniscule.  This  discrepancy  could  be 
attributed  to New Cairo First’s  far  less developed 
character,  but  could  also  be  foreshadowing  a 
sustained trend since it was clearly designed with a 
much lower population density in mind.
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fig.3.1.8  In  2006,  Nasr  City  First  still  held  an 
edge over New Cairo First, and nay other Cairene 
district,  in  terms  of  its  professional  population. 
However,  the  relative  size  of  its  professional 
population  has  dropped  by  about  10%  compared 
to  1996.  This  either  indicates  an  influx  of  non-
professionals moving into Nasr City, or an exodus 
of  professionals  out  of  Nasr  City,  or  both.  On 
the  other  hand,  with  professionals  constituting 
38.6%  of  its  working  population,  New  Cairo  is 
clearly  a  very  strong  urban  attractor  for  middle 
class  professionals,  and  even  more  so  for  the 
entrepreneurial  middle  class  who  can  afford  the 
real-estate values there. 
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fig.3.1.9  Unlike Nasr City, New Cairo was designed 
to be the hub of the “Villa” and “House” typology 
as defined in the Egyptian census. In 2006, 10.6% of 
the families dwelling there lived in such typologies.
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Cairo Governorate Districts 2006
Families dwelling in a Villa or a House
167
fig.3.1.10  Conversely,  with  so  little  of  its  area 
designated for the “apartment building” typology, 
New Cairo First had one of the lowest percentages 
of families living in an apartment in all of Cairo at 
about 77%.
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Families dwelling in an Apartment
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fig.3.1.11  Modes of ownership for residential units 
is  still  a  very  revealing  criteria. While  Nasr  City 
First  did  not  exhibit  a  lot  of  change  in  terms  of 
families dwelling in purchased units in the ten years 
between 1996 and 2006, New Cairo first exhibited 
one of  the lowest percentages of  families dwelling 
in  a  purchased  unit  among  other  middle  class 
Cairene  districts.  This  seems  to  coincide  with  it 
high percentage of families dwelling in a House or 
a Villa – typologies of low occupant densities that 
are hardly developed by private citizens looking to 
make a profit through real-estate investments.
0% – 5% 5% – 15% 15% – 25% 25% – 35% 35% – 45% 55% – 65% 65% – 75% 75% – 85%
Cairo Governorate Districts 2006
Families dwelling in a Purchased Residential Unit
64.2%
68.1% ‘06 
‘96 
Nasr
City
First
169
fig.3.1.12  On  the  other  hand,  in  2006,  at  almost 
19%, New Cairo First  boasted  one  of  the  highest 
percentages of families dwelling in owned units in 
comparison to other Cairene middle class districts. 
That is more than double the percentage of families 
dwelling  in  owned  units  in  Nasr  City;  which 
dropped by 4% from 13.1% in 1996 to 9% in 2006; 
a whopping  4%  given  the  rather  small  percentile 
range for that criterion. This may indicate a number 
of things: that New Cairo First is becoming the new 
hub for extended family households, and that there’s 
been  a  sharp  drop  in  the  number  of  apartment 
building–extended  family  households  in  Nasr  city 
due to an exodus of their middle class professionals 
inhabitants  to  the  suburbs  of  New  Cairo,  or  an 
exponential increase in the number of condominium 
towers in Nasr City, or both.
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fig.3.1.13  The  increase  in  the  crowding  ratio  in  Nasr  City  first  from  0.89 
persons per room to 0.97 persons per room further indicates decline of the 
apartment building–extended family house typology in the face of  the more 
crowded condominium tower 
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fig.3.1.14  The same criteria applied on the district 
scale  in  Cairo  will  now  be  applied  on  the  sub-
district scale  in Nasr City  to demonstrate  that  the 
First Zone, where 11 El-Insha Street is located, has 
quickly lost its character as a hub for the apartment 
building–extended  family  house  typology  over  the 
ten years between 1996 and 2006. Over the span of 
that decade, the population of the First Zone, which 
was,  for  the most part, already developed  in1996, 
still increased by a considerable 4,000 inhabitants. 
This  is strong indication that good portion of new 
buildings  erected  during  that  period  followed  the 
condominium tower typology.
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fig.3.1.15  During  that  same  period,  the  relative 
population of professionals in the First Zone fell by 
about 5%.
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fig.3.1.16  [opposite  page]  and  fig.3.1.17  Also 
during that same period, the percentage of families 
dwelling  in  a  purchased  unit  in  the  First  Zone 
increased by a whopping 10% while the percentage 
of  families  dwelling  in  an owned unit  dropped by 
almost to almost half what it was in 1996, in one of 
the strongest indication of the fall of the apartment 
building–extended  family  house  typology  against 
the condominium tower typology, and possibly the 
exodus of the former’s middle class inhabitants out 
of the First Zone.
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fig.3.1.18  While  the  crowding  ratio  in  the  First 
Zone hovered around  the same value  in 1996 and 
2006,  it  increased  to  varying  degrees  in  every 
single one of the rest of Nasr City’s core residential 
districts,  indicating  the  rise  of  the  condominium 
tower typology and the toll it has taken on the living 
quality and densities in said zones.
0.80 – 0.90 0.90 – 1.00 1.00 – 1.10 1.10 – 1.20
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fig.3.1.19  What follows is a series of maps tracking 
urban changes in the First Zone 14 years after Nasr 
City came into its own and on the eve of passing the 
Universal Building Code of 2008.
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fig.3.1.20    
First Zone | 1994 – Late 2007
New Residential Buildings
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New Residential
Buildings
179
fig.3.1.21     
First Zone | 1994 – Late 2007
Demolished Residential Buildings
14 Years
17 Demolised Residential Buildings
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fig.3.1.22    
First Zone | 1994 – Late 2007
New Residential Buildings
Replacement
built on a vacant residential lot
built in place of a demolished residential building
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fig.3.1.23      
First Zone | 1994 – Late 2007
New Residential Buildings
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within height limit
1 to 2 storeys above height limit
3 to 4 storeys above height limit
5 or more storeys above height limit
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1994
First Zone | 2007
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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fig.3.1.24      
1994
First Zone | 2007
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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fig.3.1.25  The passing of the Universal Building Code of 2008 was a turning point for Nasr City. It made legal the construction of condominium towers that were, up to that 
point, bylaw-violating structures in Nasr City. As illustrated above, applying the formula for building height stipulated in that code to Nasr City had a drastic altering effect to 
the quality and character of its urban street sections in comparison to its original building bylaws. But most importantly, the passing of that code opened the floodgates for the 
trend of demolishing the bylaw-abiding apartment building–extended family houses for the sake of replacing them with the now officially approved towering condominiums. 
The following set of maps tracks the prevalence of that trend and its urban effects throughout the First Zone two years after the passing of the Universal Building Code of 2008.
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fig.3.1.26     
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fig.3.1.27      
First Zone | 2008 – 2010
New Residential Buildings
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fig.3.1.28      
First Zone | 2008 – 2010
Demolished Residential Buildings
2 Years
14 Years [1994 – late 2007]
17 Demolised Residential Buildings
36 Demolished Residential Buildings
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fig.3.1.29      
First Zone | 2008 – 2010
New Residential Buildings
Replacement
built on a vacant residential lot
built in place of a demolished residential building
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fig.3.1.30       
First Zone | 2008 – 2010
New Residential Buildings
Adherence to Height Limit Bylaws
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1994
2007 First Zone | 2010
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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fig.3.1.31      
1994
2007 First Zone | 2010
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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Now that it has been established that there is indeed an exodus of middle 
class professionals from Nasr City to the suburbs of New Cairo, the main 
argument to be made here is that there is no logical sense for middle 
class professionals to abandon their apartment building–extended 
family houses in order and relocate to the suburbs of New Cairo. The 
basis for making this argument is that the apartment building–extended 
family house typology of Nasr City has a latent potential for providing 
all what middle class professionals are seeking in the suburbs of New 
Cairo.
First and foremost, there is little difference between the architectural 
typologies of Nasr City and New Cairo.  When middle class professionals 
relocate their homes to New Cairo, they still construct their new homes 
as extended family houses. Although they are dubbed ‘villas’ in New 
Cairo, the internal organization of the villa typology is still comprised of 
apartments, each of which is typically assigned to a current or future 
nucleus family of their decedents. These might not be as typical as those 
in Nasr City’s typology, but they are still apartments nonetheless. The 
only difference of note between both typologies is the architectural style 
of the building facades. In New Cairo, the prevalent architectural style 
can be best described as a gaudy derivation of Neo-Classicism while the 
apartment building–extended family houses in Nasr City hardly boasts 
any style due to their very bland outward appearance. This is usually 
cited by middle class professionals as one of the primary reasons for 
relocating to the suburbs of New Cairo. Setting aside any commentary 
on taste and style, their justification is inherently flawed because of 
the very adaptable nature of the Nasr City typology. It is relatively easy 
to alter the outward appearance of an apartment building–extended 
family house so as to resemble the same prevalent style of New Cairo 
without the need to relocate there.
There is also the issue of how the villas of New Cairo are constructed. 
The floor plans of those villas more often than not follow a non-modular 
structural grid and employ structural systems such as hollow block slabs 
and flat slabs that maximize spans and in turn allow for larger, more 
open interior spaces. The prevalence of such structural schemes is 
primarily driven by a desire for more grand and luxurious character to 
the home. The downside to utilizing those systems, however, is that floor 
plans are much more difficult to alter. In comparison, the simpler and 
modular post and beam construction system of the Nasr City apartment 
building typology endows it with a very adaptive quality, as it has been 
demonstrated earlier in the evolution of 11 El-Insha Street. That is to 
say it is far less likely for the villas of New Cairo to accommodate the 
changing needs of the extended families that live in them as opposed to 
the Nasr City typology that has done so for multiple generations and has 
the potential to continue to do so for generations to come.
However, the aspect in which the Nasr City typology has a clear 
advantage over the New Cairo equivalent is how many generations they 
can house simultaneously. With a maximum building height of 3 storeys 
for the villa typology in New Cairo, and extended family house can’t even 
fully accommodate 3 generations simultaneously. Assuming that each 
floor has 2 apartments of a decent size and that each generation has two 
descendants that would leave 1 grandchild with no accommodation. That 
is not taking into account extended families in which each generation 
would have more than 2 decedents. Whereas in Nasr City, where the 
original building bylaws allowed for 5 storeys, an extended family house 
for the same extended family can easily house 3 of its generations 
simultaneously with 3 apartments to spare. In other words, middle 
class professionals are essentially trading down when they relocate to 
the suburbs and in turn, are compromising an inherent architectural 
characteristic that defines them as a social group. Not to mention, 
that leaving their extended family houses in Nasr City usually involves 
breaking up the extended family as most commonly each of the siblings of 
the second generations will construct their own extended family house, 
since if they were to build an extended family home together, the home 
would only be able to accommodate 2 generations simultaneously.
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fig.3.1.32  Given  the  same  base  multigenerational 
family,  Nasr  City’s  apartment  building–extended 
family house  typology has a clear edge over New 
Cairo’s  villa  typology  in  terms  of  generational 
capacity.
Nasr City | Apartment Building
Generational Capacity
New Cairo | Villa
Generational Capacity
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Finally, and most importantly, there is the question of the cost for middle 
class professionals to relocate their homes to the suburbs. Although 
real-estate values in Nasr City are still much higher than in New Cairo, 
when you take into account that the value of their extended family 
home in Nasr City is going to be divided amongst its inhabitants, as 
well as the construction and permit costs of their new extended family 
homes, more often then not they hardly break even, or even end up 
losing money with their new acquisition.5 Such high costs have a deep 
impact on their economic standing as a social group, and in turn their 
status in Egyptian society, in which currently money is the determinant 
of place in the social hierarchy.
The tragedy here is that most professionals are fully aware of all the 
above-mentioned shortcomings of relocating to the suburbs. Yet, they 
are still resolved in their decision to move there. That is mainly because 
such a decision is not based on any rational reasoning, but is rather 
socially driven. The ideas of Norbert Elias (1998) concerning the social 
role of kitsch in a modern society, holds the key to understanding such 
drive:
“If we leave aside obviously utilitarian forms, any aesthetic work 
has for the “public”, for the mass of the working population, 
the function of a leisure dream.  This function gives our arts 
a very different face, compared to those of court, patrician 
or church hierarchies. The need of mass society for leisure 
pastimes, which the specialists have to satisfy, is supplementary 
to the primary needs for work and bread. It is never as vitally 
important as these, and the form it takes is determined by them 
– for example, by the constant strain of professional life, the 
desire to discharge feelings heavily suppressed in working 
life, or the tendency to seek in leisure substitute satisfactions 
for wishes not fulfilled by work. In face of the compulsive way 
in which professional life pushes the leisure activities of the 
industrial man in a highly specific direction, the individual art 
specialist is powerless. He may poke fun at such activities as 
much as he likes, deriding the leisure dreams and the taste of 
souls deformed by work pressures as ‘kitsch’, and mocking the 
‘sentimental’ manner in which feelings pent up and damaged 
under the constraint of work are expressed. The need for that 
which is here called ‘kitsch’ is socially imposed, while kitsch 
itself, in the negative sense of the word, is the faithful reflection 
of a state of the soul engendered by industrial society. This 
endows the problem of kitsch with a seriousness with which it is 
not normally credited.” (33)
Although Elias’ ideas apply to the abstract realm of art, they are quite 
pertinent to the contemporary social dynamic in Egypt. Those whom 
he refers to as “the working population who’s souls [are] deformed by 
work pressures” are essentially middle class professionals, and what 
he refers to as their “leisure dreams” is their desire to relocate their 
homes to the suburbs of New Cairo. Their strong desire to move there 
is the outcome of the “constant strain of professional life, the desire to 
discharge feelings heavily suppressed in working life, or the tendency to 
seek in leisure substitute satisfactions for wishes not fulfilled by work.” 
Today’s middle-aged Egyptian Professionals grew up in the 50s and 60s, 
at a time when professionals were revered as a social ideal, considered 
the upper echelon of the middle class, and guaranteed a comfortable 
lifestyle and economic standing by the socio-economic system of the 
era. Accordingly, this generation worked hard and excelled in the realm 
of education in order to become professionals themselves. However, 
when they started their professional careers in the mid 70s, the socio-
economic landscape in Egypt was drastically shifting in the wake of the 
introduction of the open-door policy. Instead of leading comfortable 
lifestyles they were expecting, professionals struggled to maintain their 
middle class status and a decent economic standing and they continued 
to do so over the span of the last forty years.  Now, they believe they are 
entitled to feel and project that they have indeed retained their middle 
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class status in the face of such adversity. This is where their relocating 
their homes to the suburbs of New Cairo comes in as a tool of achieving 
such a goal.
Forty years after the open-door policy has been introduced, the 
radical change of the value system of Egyptian society has been firmly 
established, where size of income and wealth are the sole basis for 
societal stratification regardless of their source. In turn, the much more 
affluent new middle class entrepreneurs became more socially confident. 
They no longer felt the need to reside in the same urban context as the 
old middle class in order to prove their worthiness of a middle class 
status. Accordingly, they relocated to the suburbs of New Cairo, making 
it the new urban mainstay of social status. This prompted the middle 
class professionals whose middle class status had been hanging by a 
thread for so long, and who now feel entitled to be recognized as still 
being a part of the middle class, to move to the suburbs as a means 
of social validation. That is to say, much like the social emulation by 
place of residence that has contributed to the rapid growth of Nasr City 
throughout the 90s, it is now contributing to the rapid growth of New 
Cairo – only the role of who is emulating whom has been reversed. It is 
now middle class professionals who are seeking the respect of others in 
order to feel that they indeed belong to the middle class. They are the 
ones whose sense of self worth is becoming more and more dependant 
on other people’s opinions of them. In other words, they are exhibiting 
the same unhealthy imbalance in how members of the new middle class 
went about satisfying their esteem needs forty years prior.
As Elias pointed out, it is futile for any critic, including the author 
of thesis, to argue against this trend with the hopes of countering it. 
The argument that the decision of the middle class professionals to 
relocate to the suburbs is essentially a waste of the untapped latent 
potential of their Nasr City apartment building–extended family houses, 
or that it is quite absurd for them to expend large amounts of money 
and jeopardize their economic standings in their attempts to do so in 
order to assert their status in a society where the social hierarchy is 
predicated on monetary standings, would both fall on deaf ears, for the 
social logic behind that move trumps any rational reasoning. And after 
all, there is no feasible way to counter that trend in reality.  
One of the main reasons middle class professionals cite as a basis 
for the decision to move to the suburbs is the degradation of the social 
and urban contexts of their extended family houses of Nasr City. It is 
beyond anyone’s control to put an end to that degradation.  Initially 
this thesis would have concluded with a redesign scheme of 11 El-
Insha Street that would have been intended to highlight how the latent 
potential inherent in its adaptability would have further accommodated 
the changing needs of its inhabitants, nullifying their desire to move to 
the suburbs of New Cairo. From there the idea would have been that 
other extended families down El-Insha Street would pick up on this re-
design approach and implement it in their own extended family houses, 
nullifying their desire to move to the suburbs of New Cairo as well, and 
thereby preserving the urban and social character of El-Insha Street as 
a whole. The rather optimistic construct that the extrapolation of that 
model throughout Nasr City’s inner streets which are predominantly 
comprised of the apartment building–extended family house typology 
would have collectively preserved the social and urban character of Nasr 
City as a habitat for middle class professionals and ultimately would 
have countered the trend of relocating their homes to the suburbs of 
New Cairo. Needless to say, such a proposal had too many unknown 
and unpredictable variables since people’s good judgment cannot be 
the sole basis upon which to depend.  As it has been proven in the case 
of El-Insha Street, the first of the apartment building–extended family 
houses that was sold, demolished, and replaced by a condominium 
tower, was the first and last nail in the street’s coffin. It began a chain 
reaction in which almost every extended family down the street either 
abandoned or were looking to sell their apartment building houses. 
With that design approach rendered useless, the only possible way to 
counter that trend would have been an intervention on a legislative 
level. That is to say, the government excluded Nasr City from the scope 
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of the Unified Building Code of 2008, reinstated its original bylaws, 
and strictly enforced them, or more ideally if it past a bylaw or law 
that specifically deters families that own apartment building–extended 
family houses in Nasr City, from selling their homes and buying new 
homes in the suburbs of New Cairo.  
Once again, this is rather unrealistic because the Egyptian government 
is the one party that stands to gain the most from this trend since 
the state owns the land in the suburbs of New Cairo and is making a 
lot of money selling it to the public. In many ways it seems that the 
government is fueling the overwhelming demand by what Baudrillard 
refers to as a “consciously induced shortage and chronic speculation”. 
This is evident in a number of factors. First and foremost, the state does 
not sell the land in New Cairo directly, but through a ballot system. It 
also enforces a number of very stringent laws that require the owners 
of land in New Cairo to build their residences in a very short time after 
winning this land lottery or the government revokes their ownership of 
the land after pocketing a percentage of the full cost of the land that the 
owner had already paid. These difficulties in owning land create a sense 
of shortage that in turn, incite more demand from the general public.
The tragic conclusion is that Nasr City is destined to lose, if it has not 
already lost, its character as a hub for middle class professionals and 
the apartment building–extended family house typology. Inevitably 
all middle class professionals will abandon their apartment building-
extended family houses in Nasr City, waste the latent potential of that 
typology, relocate to the suburbs of New Cairo for a watered-down 
version of their former residences, and erode the monetary basis for 
their middle class status, all for the sake of feeling and projecting that 
they are still at the forefront of the Egyptian middle class. Ultimately, 
it is beyond anyone’s power to combat this trend.  All that is left now, 
is to watch as the professional class self-destruct, and in turn for the 
Egyptian society to descend into social mayhem.
197
Chapter Four
198
199
fig.4.a.1   [opposite page] The 2Vth; A 
graffiti by Marwan Shahin in Louran, 
Alexandria. The 25th of January 2011 
saw  thousands  of  Egyptians  take  to 
the streets across the country marking 
the onset of what was later dubbed as 
January 25 Revolution.
4.A Safe House
The perks of living in Nasr City
during the January 25th Uprising
When Egyptian protestors first took to Tahrir Square on the 25th of January 2011, my initial reaction was that of calm, and 
almost detached, cynical analysis of events as they unfolded. I believe that being here in Canada at the time – some 9000 
kilometers away from Egypt – had little to do with having such reaction. It was more because I’ve always been cynical about 
the realm of applied politics. Although I was impressed by the huge turnout of Egyptian protestors, the way I saw it there 
were going to be only two possible scenarios as to how the standoff between the protestors and the government will play 
out – both of which were quite grim. In the first scenario, the Egyptian government was going to violently come down on 
the protestors the way that it always did, and in turn the protestors will back down and that would be the end of it. And in 
the second, the government was going to have the same response, but the protestors will stand their ground regardless; 
and judging by what happened in Tunisia a month earlier, the governing regime – or at least its top officials – will be ousted. 
But then again, in the aftermath of this momentous event, the protestors will still be robbed of their achievement and the 
chance to realize the changes they sought by more organized, power-hungry groups in a dirty game of politics.
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fig.4.a.2   “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice”; The 
protestors’  trifecta  of  demands  to  the  Egyptian 
government.  As  legitimate  as  they  were,  those 
demands were more than anything else a testimony 
of the protestors’ naïveté since the protestors did 
not  seem  to have a  clear-cut agenda  for how  to 
achieve such abstract demands.
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It was mainly because of the romantic naïveté of the protestors’ demands that I had such a pessimistic outlook. “Bread, Freedom, 
Social Justice” was a very popular slogan among the protestors as they marched and rallied – one which basically summarized 
all what they were demanding from the government. Surely, they specifically called for things like raising minimum wages and 
suspending certain laws that have been abused by the Mubarak regime, but apart from that they provided no comprehensive 
agenda as to how to realize that poetic triad of abstract ideals. To me, that was quite the blunder. In principle, the protestors 
indeed had every right to ask the government to uphold such ideals. Yet the fact of the matter was this: On their own, “Bread, 
Freedom, Social Justice” were very broad and ambiguous terms. As far as political and socio-economic ideologies went, they 
could have been interpreted to mean very different things, and in turn there were a lot of diverse options for the manner in 
which they may be put into effect. And still, whatever the interpretation or approach, those terms suggested a whole world 
of problems that needed to be addressed; problems that ran deep across a wide range of various fields. The few ragtag issues 
that the protestors appended to their poetic triad of demands were only the tip of the iceberg, and dealing with them was 
definitely not enough to see that triad realized. To put it simply, without a comprehensive agenda of concrete parameters 
and steps that grounded them in specifics and defined how they were to be achieved, “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” were 
merely a hodgepodge of unrealistic utopian ends and not a set of tangible demands that any government could work with.
Whichever way I looked at it, the protestors’ failure to present the Egyptian government with such an agenda inevitably put 
them in a position of weakness. For one thing, I just couldn’t understand how were they going to determine whether or not 
their demands were met if the government were to accept them. “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” were as unquantifiable as 
they were ambiguous. Outlining an agenda of steps for the government to follow wouldn’t have only cleared the ideological 
and procedural ambiguity that came with those demands. More than anything else, that agenda would have also served 
as a reference for gauging how the government fared in responding to them. As a matter of fact, it would have been the 
only feasible criteria of assessment in that situation. There was simply no other workable scale against which the protestors 
could have measured to what extent the government was upholding the unquantifiable ideals they’ve demanded.
But then again the chances that the government would agree to meet the protestors’ demands were very slim. I believed 
that the protestors’ failure to present the government with that agenda was most likely going to be an invitation for the 
Mubarak regime to either reject or make a mockery of their demands. In my mind, the two and only logical responses from 
such a corrupt regime were either that it will completely dismiss the protestors’ demands on the basis that they are too 
vague – which sadly would have been a legitimate excuse; or that it will offer the protestors promises of reform that are as 
vague and poetically ambiguous as their demands. I didn’t believe that either response would have satisfied the protestors 
however. They might have been naïve, but they weren’t that stupid to settle for the latter, and they most certainly were not 
lacking in determination to just easily accept the former. This is exactly why I came to the conclusion that, one way or the 
other, the protestors and the Mubarak regime were bound to clash violently.
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fig.4.a.3    Strength  in  numbers; 
Hundreds  of  thousands  of  young 
protestors assembled in Tahrir Square. 
The  protestors’  vast  numbers  and 
determination  were  no  doubt  their 
greatest  strength,  but  I  felt  that  their 
failure  to  present  an  agenda  to  back 
their demands meant left the door open 
for more organized political groups to 
exploit  such  strength  in  order  further 
their own agendas.
I also felt that it wasn’t only the Mubarak regime that was going to exploit the protestors’ failure to present the government 
with that agenda. Such a failure left the door wide open for many a political group banned by the Mubarak regime to step 
in and impose their already well-established agendas and ideologies which didn’t necessarily sit well with the protestors. 
As power-hungry and Machiavellian as most political organizations are, it was quite plausible that those banned groups 
would take advantage of the ideological ambiguity of the protestors’ demands and claim making common cause with them 
just to use their numbers and determination to put pressure on the Mubarak regime. Whether those groups then cut deals 
with the Mubarak regime, or waited until it was driven out of power and then won popular favor under the pretext that 
they were part of the protests, were both viable possibilities. Those groups were devious enough not to shy away from 
the former if the opportunity presented itself, and – unlike the protestors – they had extensive and organized networks to 
manipulate the public and ensure that the latter would come to pass. Either way, they would eventually weasel their way 
into power and fill the ideological vacuum created by the protestors’ lack of an agenda with one of their own.
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fig.4.a.4    A Muslim  Brotherhood  banner  in  Tahrir  Square. 
Although the Muslim Brotherhood initially declared that they 
would  not  partake  in  the  protests,  they  soon  changed  their 
position seeing the huge turnout of young protestors and their 
apparent resolve not to leave the square until their demands 
were met. Not  two  days  after  it  had  started,  power-hungry 
political  groups  began  jumping  on  the  January  Uprising’s 
bandwagon.
As much as I was bothered by the protestors’ naïveté though, a part of me did identify with it. George Carlin once said: 
“Scratch any cynic and you will find a disappointed idealist”, and he couldn’t have been closer to the truth of it. Indeed, I 
was once an idealist myself, and that persona still lingers. And so I didn’t really have anything against what the protestors 
were ultimately trying to achieve; it was rather the quixotic manner in which they were going about it that troubled me. 
I just dreaded the utter frustration that I knew they were bound to experience when their idealistic aspirations shattered 
against the solid wall of real-life political power struggles. And as it happened, only two days into the protests most of what 
I feared had already started to come true.
On the 27th of January, the Muslim Brotherhood – one of the oldest, largest, and most organized banned political groups in 
Egypt – announced its full support for the protestors and their demands, as well as the intent of its members to participate 
in the protests until such demands were met. In the days that followed however, the Muslim Brotherhood were tacking 
on their own sets of demands to the Mubarak regime, and sitting on the protestors’ side of the negotiations with the 
government, as if they were the sole sponsors of what the media had then begun referring to as the January Uprising. I 
also distinctly remember watching in anger as a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood told a BBC correspondent 
in a very assertive manner how the Brotherhood could easily secure a 35 to 40 percent of the popular vote right there and 
then, provided that no electoral fraud would be involved. It was just beyond me that he had the audacity to sit there and 
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fig.4.a.5    Time  Magazine’s  Person 
of  the  Year,  2011.  The  romantic 
notion  of  the  anonymous  protestor 
who  does  not  associate with  any  one 
particular  ideology  clearly  appealed 
to  the  idealistic  inclinations  of  the 
young protestors  in Tahrir Square.  In 
response  to  the  attempts  of  many  a 
political group to claim the leadership 
of  the  January  Uprising,  both  young 
and  old  activists  who  had  originally 
called for the protests proclaimed that 
the uprising did not belong to a specific 
political  current  or  group,  but  that  it 
was rather an uprising of the “people”.
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fig.4.a.6   On January 28, in his first televised address since 
the outbreak of the uprising, Mubarak offered the protestors 
a plethora of ambiguous reform promises in response to their 
equally vague demands. The quote on the screen here reads: 
“We will  take new steps towards more democracy, granting 
more freedoms to individuals, and battling unemployment.”
discuss the makeup of a post-uprising political scene while such an uprising still had no foreseeable end, and protestors 
were loosing their lives in violent clashes with the Mubarak regime as he spoke. But then again, the protestors didn’t allow 
the Brotherhood’s and other groups’ attempts at hijacking the uprising go unanswered. Many of the protestors were soon 
declaring that the January Uprising was a leaderless uprising which did not belong to a specific ideological orientation 
but rather represented the Egyptian people as a whole. As much as it was actually true, I once again found that response 
absurdly romantic and detached from the reality of the situation – its utter naïveté only rivaled by the naivety of announcing 
it publicly. To me, it essentially offered the Brotherhood and all of those other groups an undeniable reassurance of how 
easy it would be to take advantage of the protestors.
Then on the night of 28th of January, President Mubarak – who was still in power at that point – appeared to address the 
Egyptian people on national television. And as I expected, he offered a whole lot of nicely worded, yet empty, promises 
of reform, and announced that he’s dissolving the government and forming a new one in hopes that the protestors would 
be appeased, abandon their stand, and leave the square. The response that speech elicited from the protestors left me 
with mixed feelings of fascination and disappointment. In its wake, and as I imagined they would be, the protestors were 
indeed unsatisfied with Mubarak’s unsubstantiated promises, and opted to stand their ground refusing to leave the square. 
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fig.4.a.7    As  it  is  quite  evident  from 
this  facetious  rewording  of  Eric 
Cartman’s catchphrase, the protestors 
weren’t  the  least  bit  satisfied  with 
Mubarak’s  hollow  promises  and 
refused to abandon their stand. 
But then something else also happened; something which I did not anticipate. In their anger over Mubarak’s speech, the 
protestors developed a new set of demands which quickly took precedence over the abstract triad of ideals that they initially 
called for. “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” was no longer the most popular slogan chanted in the square as it was being 
overshadowed by two new slogans: “The People want to bring down the Regime” and “Down, Down with Hosni Mubarak”. 
Yet, again, the protestors didn’t seem to have a clue or care about what came next if and when the regime was disbanded 
or Mubarak stepped down. The flicker of the idealist in me found that development quite intriguing. The power vacuum and 
lack of an organized government that it seemed to hint at would have been, in a way, the closest thing to a manifestation of 
Anarchism in its most fundamental form – and I have always been fond of the Anarchist school of political thought. But as 
much as I admire it, I’ve also always understood that anarchism is an inherently flawed and unrealistic model. It is human 
nature to seek out systems of control and think of them as the foundation of civilized society, and to assume that it could 
be otherwise is just plain silly. And so the cynic in me had no illusions that it would actually ever boil down to situation 
where an organized government did not exist in Egypt, let alone that the protestors had ever intended it to be that way. 
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fig.4.a.8  &    fig.4.a.9    A  pair  of  new 
demands  emerged  in  response  to 
Mubarak’s  TV  address  on  January 
28.  [left] A  young  protestor  sits  with 
a  sign  that  reads:  “The  People  want 
to bring down the Regime”. [right] A 
man holds a sign he fashioned out of a 
shoe  that reads: “LEAVE” in Arabic, 
referring  to  the  protestors’  demand 
for Mubarak to relinquish his position 
as President. Holding  up  a  shoe  is  a 
sign  of  extreme  disrespect  in  Middle 
Eastern culture. The protestors didn’t 
seem to have the slightest idea of what 
would  follow  in  the  eventuality  of 
Mubarak stepping down.
Their demands for Mubarak and his regime to step down were clearly not calculated, but were rather another outcome of 
their headstrong and quixotic mindset. That is why, for the most part, I found the protestors’ response to Mubarak’s speech 
very frustrating. Because if anything, it just made it even easier for all the power-hungry political groups out there to step 
in whenever the Mubarak regime was overthrown, fill the political vacuum left behind, and cheat the protestors of what 
should have been theirs by rights.
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fig.4.a.10    [opposite  page]  Scores 
of  protestors  running  through a  thick 
cloud of tear gas. Starting on January 
28,  the  tense  standoff  between  the 
protestors  and  the  Mubarak  regime 
took  a  turn  to  the  worst  as  security 
forces resorted to the use of excessive 
violence against the protestors.
fig.4.a.11    [bottom  right] A  protestor 
being  brutally  beaten  by  riot  police. 
Rubber  bullets  and  water  cannons 
were also used in hopes of dispersing 
the  crowds  of  protestors,  but  to  no 
avail.  The  protestors  stood  their 
ground and began to fight back.
fig.4.a.12    [bottom  left]  A  protestor 
holds a  spent bullet  cartridge. As  the 
crowds refused to back down, security 
forces  began  to  use  live  ammunition 
against the unarmed protestors. Many 
protestors were shot dead.
However, over the span of the 28th and 29th of January, my analytical and detached approach towards the protests just 
went out the window. It had become quite difficult to keep an objective distance from it all considering what happened 
during those two days. By the afternoon of the 28th, the clashes between the protestors and the security forces had quickly 
taken a very violent turn, and Tahrir square had effectively become a war zone. There were reports of numerous injuries 
and deaths among the protestors as security forces resorted to the use of live ammunition and their vehicles ran down 
crowds; public buildings were set ablaze; a night curfew was announced by the government; and the Egyptian army was 
deployed on the streets of Cairo. The Mubarak regime also shut down all Internet services, mobile phone networks, and 
even conventional telephone landlines in a communication blackout targeting the protestors’ reliance on social media, such 
as Facebook and Twitter, for coordination. And that wasn’t even the worst of it. Towards the end of the night there were 
reports of looting, acts of vandalism, and gunfights erupting across many of Cairo’s residential districts, including Nasr City 
and the suburbs of New Cairo and Shorouq City where my family and most of my close friends dwell. And to my distress, all 
those reports maintained that such incidents were taking place in a complete and unexplained absence of the police. Then 
to make matters worse, the 29th brought news that swarms of convicted felons had escaped from prisons, and nobody 
seemed to know whether they broke out themselves or if it was actually prison officials that had let them out.
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fig.4.a.13   [opposite page,  top left] A riot police truck burning on the night of January 28 
as Cairo descended  into  chaos. After  the  violent  events  of  the day,  a  citywide  curfew was 
announced  for  the  night  of  January  28. The protestors  however  defied  it  and  remained  in 
Tahrir Square where they fought running battles with security forces for the better part of the 
night. Security forces then began to fall back towards the end of the night giving the protestors 
free reign over the square. And around the same time,  the police conveniently disappeared 
from  the  streets of Cairo as an overwhelming wave of mayhem and vandalism swept  in  to 
engulf the entire city.
fig.4.a.14    [opposite  page,  bottom  left]  A  column  of  tanks  rolling  into  Tahrir  Square  on 
January 29. After chaos had taken over Cairo the night before, and with the continued and 
unexplained absence of the police, the Army was deployed to restore order to the capital.  The 
Army’s  involvement was an alarming development  to say  the  least since nobody seemed to 
know whether the Army was acting on Mubarak’s orders, or if it had decided to take matters 
into  its  own  hands. As  tanks  and  troops marched  into  Tahrir  Square,  the  protestors  were 
reassured  that  the Army was only  there  to protect  the  interests of  the nation, which wasn’t 
really much of a clarification as to which side of the conflict did the Army with.
fig.4.a.15   [opposite page, right] An Air Force helicopter hovering low over Tahrir Square 
as a protestor waves an Egyptian flag with the words “Down with Mubarak” scribbled on it. 
Adding to the confusion regarding whose side the Army was on, jet fighters and helicopters 
flew rounds over the square in what looked like an attempt to intimidate the protestors. That 
was quite contradictory to the very friendly attitude that the ground forces in the square had 
towards the protestors. Such contradiction raised the worrisome suspicion that there might be 
a rift within the ranks of the Egyptian Armed Forces, especially that the Air Force is generally 
associated with Mubarak given that he was its commander during the October War of ’73.
fig.4.a.16   [top] On January 29, evidence of the mayhem that had erupted the night before 
began to emerge. In Tahrir Square, the headquarters of Mubarak’s ruling party – the National 
Democratic Party – was still smoldering from when it was set ablaze by an unknown culprit 
on  the  night  of  January  28. Many  public  buildings,  banks,  shops,  and  private  properties 
were ransacked in almost every part of Cairo that night. And as the looting and plundering 
continued  for  days  to  follow,  the  government maintained  that  the  protestors,  or  at  least  a 
corrupt few among them, were responsible for those acts of vandalism; while the protestors on 
the other hand accused the government of using hired thugs to carry out such crimes in order 
to create a state of chaos in the capital.
fig.4.a.17    [bottom]  The  run-down  fortifications  of  Abu  Za’bal  prison  –  a  notorious 
penitentiary on the outskirts of Cairo. The looting epidemic that hit the capital on January 28 
seemed to worsen on the night of the 29th amid reports of mass prison breakouts. With scores 
of dangerous convicts reportedly loose in the streets of Cairo and the Army mainly occupied 
with securing the capital’s vital sites, the safety of Cairene families and homes was at an even 
higher risk than the night before.
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fig.4.a.18    Marked  here  is  the  area 
of downtown Cairo  that had been  the 
main  stage  for  unrest  in  the  capital 
since the outbreak of the uprising. The 
fastest route from there to Nasr City is 
roughly 15 kilometers long. New Cairo 
is even further at almost 40 kilometers 
form downtown Cairo, while Shorouq 
City  is  the  furthest  at  45  kilometers. 
It  therefore  seemed  highly  unlikely 
that  those  residential  districts  would 
ever  get  caught  up  in  the  unrest  that 
had  been  raging  so  far  away  at  the 
administrative  heart  of  Cairo.  But 
as  unlikely  as  it  seemed,  the  night  of 
January 28 brought such unrest to the 
doorsteps of those residential districts. 
1.00.5 2.0 km
It seemed that in its attempts to deter the protestors, the Mubarak regime had decided to hit them where it hurt the most 
– their home bases. It also could have been that the Mubarak regime was trying to create a state of mayhem and blame 
it either directly or indirectly on the protestors in the of hopes of overturning the public support and sympathy that they 
had gained. Or maybe it was both. I really couldn’t tell because as soon as the final development of the night of the 28th 
came about, I started to panic. Up until that point, all the action had been centered in Tahrir Square in Downtown Cairo; a 
predominantly administrative, business, and commercial district that is miles away from either Nasr City or the suburbs of 
Cairo. I therefore didn’t have a reason to worry beyond a mild concern for the few causal friends and acquaintances that I 
knew were at the square that day; besides, those had made the decision to be there knowing full well the consequences it 
might entail. But then out of nowhere and for no fault of their own, it was my family and close friends that were potentially 
in grave danger, and with Internet and phone services down, there was no way of telling whether or not they were safe. It 
was just too hard to keep my composure about me with their well-being hanging in the balance. And it became even harder 
as the events of the 28th continued on into the 29th and I was still unable to reach them. So by the time communications 
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fig.4.a.19    My  thoughts  exactly.  A  sign  held  up 
in  a  solidarity  rally  in  Toronto  during  Egypt’s 
communication  blackout.  With  the  rampant 
disorder  that  engulfed  Cairo’s  residential 
districts, it was very hard not to be able to reach 
one’s family and friends.
were restored and I finally got through on the 30th, I was quite frantic. And needless to say, this thesis and my arguments 
about the latent potential of Nasr City’s extended family house typologies and their edge over those of suburban Cairo were 
the last things on my mind. However, three out of the five phone calls I made that day and on the 31st contributed directly 
to further validate those arguments.
Naturally, the first phone call I made was to my mother in Nasr City. The first thing she told me when she picked up was: 
“Amr, you should come see how safe we are here!”. She was clearly trying to reassure me that she and the rest of my family 
in 11 El-Insha street were safe and sound, because, as a mother, she must have known how distraught I was by then. That 
statement however was not an exaggeration – from what she told me next and what I later learned from other family 
members and friends living on El-Insha street, it turned out that my family, and all the residents of El-Insha street for that 
matter, were indeed quite safe. Apparently as soon as the dire developments of the night of the 28th were underway, every 
grown man from every household on El-Insha street came together and quickly organized themselves into an emergency 
neighborhood watch to secure the street. They first blocked all four entrances to the street with makeshift barricades 
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fig.4.a.20   The men of El-Insha street 
chopping  down  tree  branches  to 
barricade  the  south  end of  the  street. 
As  soon  as  the  unfortunate  events  of 
the night of the 28th began to unfold, 
those  men  organized  themselves  into 
a neighborhood watch that proceeded 
to  secure  El-Insha  street  in  a  very 
thorough and efficient manner.
fashioned out of chopped-off tree branches, empty crates, old tires, and basically every other piece of junk they could get 
their hands on. They then lit a series of small fires down the length of the street for warmth and for keeping darkness at bay, 
armed themselves with sticks and household blades for self defense, and kept watch in shifts all through the night and up 
until the next morning. They had themselves strategically arranged in such a way that there were several lookout groups on 
duty at any given time; that each of those groups was stationed at a visible distance form the next one down the street; and 
that none of them was made up of less than three individuals. And to avoid any sort of confusion in the heat of dealing with 
whatever or whoever might have come their way, they decided that all those who stood sentry or went down to the street 
for any reason must at all times wear a white armband for identification. Moreover, even the storekeepers of almost all the 
shops in the small market on El-Insha street took part in that neighborhood watch. They helped with set up and preparation, 
stood sentries themselves, and kept their shops open all night long providing everybody on the street with snacks and hot 
beverages. And so, except for a couple of false alarms that only served to show how alert the vigilantes of El-Insha street 
were, the night of the 28th passed without incident, and so did the night of the 29th.
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fig.4.a.21,  fig.4.a.22  &  fig.4.a.23    Besides  tree 
branches,  the  vigilantes  of  El-Insha  street  used 
everything from fallen lamp posts, crates, and old 
furniture to safety guards that they borrowed from 
near  by  construction  sites  to  fashion  makeshift 
barricades and block every entry point to the street.
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fig.4.a.24    The  vigilantes  of  El-
Insha  street  standing  sentry  late  on 
the  night  of  January  28.  After  they 
had  barricaded  all  of  the  street’s 
entrances,  they  lit  a  series  of  small 
fires  to  illuminate  the  darker  corners 
of  the  street  and  kept  watch  in  shifts 
all through the night. And in a show of 
solidarity, the storekeepers of El-Insha 
street’s  small market  [appearing here 
on  the  right]  kept  their  shops  open 
all night, provided the vigilantes with 
snacks  and  hot  beverages,  and  even 
stood sentry themselves. 
I was quite relieved to know it was that safe for my family in Nasr City. Sadly though, I was soon struck with feelings of 
anxiety once again when I learned that that wasn’t the case for one of my very good friends who lived alone with her two 
children in the suburb of Shorouq City. In my phone call to her on January 31st, she painted a very different picture of the 
situation there during those two fateful nights. Not that anything bad happened, but the impression I got from her was that 
she and her children in their suburban villa were in a much more compromised position in comparison to my family in 11 
El-Insha street. In our conversation, my friend told me that with the trouble that was brewing on the night of the 28th, her 
primary concern was the safety of her children. So she tucked them in, barricaded all possible entrances to the villa with 
furniture and bricks, then armed herself with a piece of rebar, and kept guard throughout the night from the villa’s main 
balcony. But then she added that even though she was ready to face whatever might have come her way for the sake of her 
children, she was not quite sure if she would have been able to fend it off after all. She said that she felt quite alone and 
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vulnerable with how ominous her suburban street was that night. From her vantage point in the balcony, there was no soul 
in sight on the street – let alone a friendly one; and the street was shrouded in darkness and a haunting silence that was 
shattered form time to time by the sound of gunshots echoing in the distance. And it didn’t get any better the following 
night, nor the night after that for that matter.
Although El-Insha street’s neighborhood watch was still operating on the night of the 30th when I called my mother, it 
seemed that the worst of it had already passed in Nasr City. But in my phone call to my friend almost 24 hours later on 
the night of the 31st, she made it quite clear that the daunting situation in Shorouq City had persisted through the night 
of the 30th, and that it didn’t look like it was going to be any different that night either. As a matter of fact, she told me in 
a much later phone call that it had been almost two weeks after the 28th of January before she finally felt that her street 
was relatively safe. During that call she also did mention that before those two weeks were over, the few residents on her 
street had finally managed to put together a neighborhood watch of their own. From what she told me though, that didn’t 
really make much of a difference – her street was still foreboding and she did not feel any less vulnerable. She explained that 
despite of her neighbors’ best efforts, they were stretched too thin as they tried to secure and hold all the entrances to their 
vast suburban street. She saw no sign of a neighborhood watch operating except for a patrol of two men making their rounds 
up and down the street. And even worse, those two men didn’t pass by her villa as frequently as she would have wanted 
them to; and whenever they did, they seemed dwarfed by the scale of the street. She did notice however that they were 
carrying machetes and firearms. They waved them around while shouting threats at the top of their lungs, and sometimes 
even fired warning shots, all in order to deter whoever might have been lurking in the distance. But then again from the way 
she described it, my friend found that hollow display of power more disconcerting than reassuring. It felt as if the two men 
on patrol duty were overcompensating for their own vulnerability, as well as that of the neighborhood watch in general.
On the whole, it just sounded like my friend did not trust that her street’s neighborhood watch was fully capable of 
dealing with the imminent threat. So I wasn’t really surprised when she told me that she continued to stand sentry in her 
balcony regardless of the fact that it was operating. And although I was sad to hear it, I still was not surprised when she 
recounted a particular incident in which the shortcomings of that neighborhood watch had allowed the danger to come too 
close for her comfort. At around 2 a.m. one night, the microphone of a nearby mosque, which is typically used to announce 
the call for prayer, began to bellow a warning that thugs have been spotted in the area. From her balcony, she saw the 
men on patrol duty that night racing to the one end of the street where they believed the thugs were approaching. She 
also heard the sounds of the few other men of the neighborhood watch rushing to the same spot, followed by the sounds 
of the rest of her male neighbors, who weren’t on the street at the time, leaving their houses and joining them. From her 
portrayal, it just seemed that they were all caught off guard – her street’s neighborhood watch was clearly oblivious to how 
close the danger was until the mosque broadcasted the warning. However, her neighbors made it just in time to cut off the 
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thugs before they went too far down the street. And no sooner than they had encountered one another, both groups were 
at each other’s throats. My friend said that, standing in her balcony, the sounds of the fight were so loud and clear that it 
felt as if she was right in the middle of it. She heard the thundering discharge of firearms; the loud metal clatter of machetes 
clanging against each other; and underneath it all she was literally able to make out the muffled thumps of blows exchanged 
in fistfights. It wasn’t just some potential threat far out in the distance any more; the danger was as real as it could ever get 
and it was a mere few meters away from her and her children. My friend found herself seriously considering her very limited 
and extremely bleak options if the thugs came out on top as the fight raged on and neither side seemed to be having the 
upper hand in it. Thankfully though, it never came to that. After what seemed to her like an eternity, my friend’s neighbors 
were finally able to overwhelm the thugs bringing an end to what she referred to as one of the most horrific experiences 
of her life.
Before I knew all of that however, and in light of what my friend told me in our first phone call alone, I began to look at the 
discrepancy between the perilous situation on her suburban street and the considerably safer situation on El-Insha street 
as the basis for a potential addition to this thesis. Right after I hung up with her on January 31st, I felt that such glaring 
discrepancy could very well strengthen the case I was making for Nasr City’s latent potentials. My analytical faculties, which 
had then come around for the first time since the 28th, were already formulating arguments about a whole new set of 
advantages that the urban and architectural typologies of Nasr City had over those of suburban Cairo. My biggest concern 
though was not to jump to conclusions or make hasty generalizations. After all, both my mother’s and my friend’s accounts 
were very specific, and I needed to know if they were actually reflective of the overall situation in Nasr City on one hand, 
and Shorouq City and the Cairene suburbs in general on the other. Over the following weeks, I managed to verify that that 
was indeed the case from all the news reports and blog entries that I came across, as well as the correspondences I had with 
other friends, neighbors, and family back in Cairo. However, the first and most substantial reassurance came as early as the 
same day, the 31st of January, when I called another one of my very good friends back home. That friend lives in Moqattam 
City in his wife’s extended family house which has the same typology as that of 11 EL-Insha street. He is a practicing architect 
with a sharp critical sense. He keeps in touch with our wide circle of friends and acquaintances who predominantly dwell 
in Nasr City and the suburbs of Cairo. And most importantly, he is quite familiar with the arguments of my thesis, as I have 
discussed them with him many times before. And so, if there were anybody who could have given me an objective and 
reliable opinion about the half-baked arguments and hypotheses I had at that point, it would have been him.
Naturally, my phone call to him began with me making sure that he, his wife, and the rest of his in-laws in Moqattam 
City were fine, and that his parents in Nasr city were alright as well. After that was done, and on a lighter note, he jokingly 
proposed that I roll up my thesis and inappropriately place it up some of the academics back home who had rejected the 
validity of its arguments. He said that, if for nothing else, the case for Nasr City’s advantage over the Cairene suburbs could 
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fig.4.a.25    A  group  of  vigilantes  keeping 
watch  on  their  street  on  the  night  of 
January 29. As it turned out to be, efficient 
neighborhood  watches  such  as  that  of 
El-Insha  street  were  not  an  uncommon 
occurrence in the older high-end residential 
districts  of Cairo during  the  disorder  that 
erupted on the night of January 28. Those 
districts were relatively the safest places in 
the city at the time due to the efforts of such 
vigilante groups.
be predicated solely on how safer it has been since trouble broke out on the night of the 28th. I was really surprised to hear 
him say that since I hadn’t yet told him about what I’ve learned in my phone calls to my mother and my friend who lived in 
the suburb of Shorouq City, nor about the emergent arguments that have since been rambling in mind. I took that as a cue 
to tell him about those things, and once I did, he went on to elaborate on his lighthearted remark in a more serious tone. 
He said that with what was going on at the time, the general consensus among Cairenes was that it’s a blessing, and even a 
privilege, to be a resident of any of the older high-end residential districts such as Nasr City and Masr Al-Gadeeda. He told 
me that tight and efficient neighborhood watches, like that of El-Insha street, were a very common occurrence on almost 
every street in those districts making them the safest in Cairo. He then added that the very grim and ominous situation on 
my other friend’s suburban street was actually the status quo not only in the rest of Shorouq City, but in all of the Cairene 
suburbs as well. He said that many of the suburban dwellers he knows were then realizing the value of their former homes 
in those older districts, and that those of them who had the option, opted to go back to such homes until the situation in 
the suburbs came to an end. He then concluded by stressing once again that it’s become clear to everyone in Cairo that 
suburbia can be a very unsafe place; and that he therefore believes that all those who were eager to live in the suburbs 
before will now think twice before establishing or relocating their households there.
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The account of my friend who lives in Moqattam City was everything I needed to hear to further pursue and validate my 
emergent arguments. And so after talking to him I set out to investigate the reasons why Nasr City was much safer than 
the Cairene suburbs during the rampant disorder that had befallen Cairo back then. My starting point was Nasr City’s 
neighborhood watches since all evidence suggested that such vigilante groups and their outstanding performance were the 
key factor that set Nasr City apart from the suburbs. I took El-Insha street’s neighborhood watch as an exemplary model and 
began to carefully reflect on its every aspect. I soon found it particularly interesting that despite the bleak circumstances 
that they had never experienced before, the residents of El-Insha street had almost automatically transformed their 
immediate urban environment into a safe communal setting. I also was quite intrigued by the effectiveness and efficiency 
of their impromptu neighborhood watch, especially since a “neighborhood watch” is a very foreign concept to Cairo. 
As I extrapolated what I worked out to be the reasons behind such unexpected yet impressive capacities, I came to the 
conclusion that the remarkable performance of the rest of Nasr City’s neighborhood watches, and in turn the general state 
of safety throughout the district, was the outcome of three interrelated factors. Those were: the urban characteristics of 
Nasr City’s streets; the architectural qualities of the buildings standing on those streets; and finally the attributes of the 
social structures housed within those buildings.
Owing to Nasr City’s orthogonal planning, all of its inner streets – which incidentally constitute the bulk of its street network 
– are linear, short in length, and have relatively narrow widths of either 12 or 16 meters. These features made securing and 
holding those streets a relatively easy task. In terms of scale, a Nasr City inner street was a small and rather manageable 
space, and its linear geometry provided whoever was on guard duty with a clear line of sight all the way down its length 
and facilitated coordination with those manning their stations elsewhere in the street. The same was also true even for the 
remainder of Nasr City’s street network – the longer, wider streets that mark the perimeters of its neighborhoods. Once again 
thanks to the orthogonal nature of that street network, any given long street in Nasr City has several junctions where inner 
streets feed into it. Posting guard details at those junctions helped break it down into shorter, more manageable segments.
Another very important factor that facilitated securing the streets of Nasr City is the manner in which buildings stand 
on those streets. The maximum permissible footprint for a residential building in Nasr City occupies a considerably large 
area of the lot it’s on, and lot sizes are not all that big to start with. Moreover, as it has been demonstrated earlier in this 
thesis, a great deal of Nasr City’s buildings exceeds the stipulated maximum footprint anyway. This resulted in a closely-
knit architectural canvas – on any given street in Nasr City, buildings stand quite close to each other and the relationship 
between the buildings and the street itself is rather intimate too. For those who had the task of securing a street in Nasr 
City, such an architectural canvas meant that they had little to worry about. The gaps between the buildings down the street 
where intruders might have come through were very small and therefore quite easy to defend, and securing the street 
automatically catered to securing the buildings on it as well.
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In my opinion however, the most important factor that helped keep Nasr City safe is that a fairly decent portion of the 
apartment buildings standing on its streets are extended family households. This opinion of mine stems mainly from 
observations regarding El-Insha street – a street which up until recently was made up entirely of such apartment building–
extended family households. Although I was initially a bit surprised that securing El-Insha street came almost naturally to 
its residents, I soon found myself thinking that it wasn’t all that strange after all. Living on El-Insha street for most of my life, 
I’ve always known it to be a rather safe environment. But I have to admit though that this doesn’t really show right away. 
The extended families of El-Insha street are very reserved to say the least, and they mostly keep to themselves. As a matter 
of fact, none of them actually knows any of the other extended families living down the street. Be that as it may however, 
they are still quite familiar with one another. The residents of each of El-Insha street’s extended family households know 
the faces of every single one of their neighbors on the street; and even though they may not be able to put names to those 
faces, they can tell to which of the street’s other extended family households do those faces belong. As a result, it has 
always been quite easy to pick out anyone or anything that doesn’t belong on El-Insha street; and whenever such a situation 
presented itself, there would almost immediately be one or more of the street’s residents looking into it.
This subdued sense of community that the extended families of El-Insha street have maintained over the years is what 
concerns me here. As I have discussed earlier in this thesis, the apartment building–extended family house typology of 
Nasr City features a very delicate balance between the traditional extended family house of rural Egypt and medieval Cairo, 
where the boundaries of privacy for the nuclear families living in it were rather permeable; and the conventional apartment 
building typology, where those boundaries are quite rigid. And now in light of my observations regarding El-Insha street, 
it seems that there is a similar kind of balance featured on those of Nasr City’s streets where the majority of the buildings 
follow this hybrid typology. On one hand there’s the traditional residential street of medieval Cairo, where the street was in 
essence one big extended family house – it had its own door and was made up of a number of extended family households 
that all belonged to the same kin. And on the other hand there are all the different models for the modern residential street, 
be it metropolitan or suburban, where the residents of the street are unrelated and tend to be rather withdrawn. And then, 
nestled perfectly in between both extremes, there’s the model for those particular streets in Nasr City. A model where the 
extended families living down the street are not close enough to be intimate with one another, and yet at the same time 
they aren’t too distant that they wouldn’t recognize and care for each other.
I believe that this finely balanced sense of community had a very significant effect when trouble broke out on the night of 
the 28th. On any given street in Nasr City where the apartment building–extended family house is the dominant typology, 
it was the main reason why the residents of the street were very quick to come together and set up neighborhood watches. 
And it was also because of it that they did so in a rather seamless manner. The fact that they were already familiar with 
each other made it quite easy for them to coordinate and work together when the situation called for it. Apart from that 
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fig.4.a.26    [bottom] El-Insha street as  it was  for almost  two decades;  the quintessential example of  the Nasr 
City  street model where  the majority,  if  not  all,  of  the buildings on  the  street  follow  the apartment  building-
extended family house typology. This particular Nasr City street model features the best of two worlds, and none 
of their shortcomings. It has the semblance of an ordained modern residential street, and a social structure that 
is  somewhat  similar  to  that of medieval Cairo’s  zuqaq considering  that each of  its apartment buildings  is an 
extended family household but none of those households are related. The extended families of that street model are 
therefore not as distant and detached from one another as the nuclear families of most modern residential street 
models; and at the same time they are not as overbearingly close and intimate with each other as the interrelated 
extended  families  of  the  zuqaq  street model.  Instead,  the mix  of modern urban & architectural  typology and 
traditional social structure helped the extended families of that particular Nasr City street model to nurture a very 
healthy, balanced relationship without encroaching on each other’s privacy. I believe that this kind of relationship 
was one of the main reasons why the residents of streets such as El-Insha street were arguably the safest people 
in Cairo during the trouble that began on the night of January 28.
fig.4.a.27   [top] The street hierarchy in medieval Cairo; the marked doorways are street entrances. In Fatimid 
Cairo, the city’s main spine and most public realm, the qasaba, gave way to a semi-public hara; a hara then led 
to a semi-private ‘atfa, and in some cases a zuqaq; and finally the ‘atfa led to a zuqaq, the most private tier of 
the hierarchy. The transition between the first two public street types and the latter two private street types was 
controlled by way of a door. In the zuqaq street model, all the extended family households that stood on the street 
were related by blood and the zuqaq itself resembled one big extended family house. Not only did it have its own 
door, but it also had its own courtyard, or darb, around which extended family houses of the street were arranged. 
The way a zuqaq was articulated was undoubtedly conducive to the solidarity of its extended family households. 
However, it also had a serious downside since it allowed for those extended family households to get too involved 
into each other’s affairs, which was certainly quite overbearing most, if not all, of the time.
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balanced sense of community however, there are other aspects to the social make-up of that street model which also 
helped a lot in dealing with those troublesome times. For Instance, the fact that every building on the street is an extended 
family household, and that every extended family household is its own social unit, was very beneficial to the management 
of the street’s neighborhood watch. It meant that there were always enough individuals to secure the street, but at the 
same time there were few social units to coordinate between. Settling on a plan of action for the neighborhood watch as 
whole required but only one or two representatives from each of the extended family households down the street, and 
those guaranteed that such a plan would be relayed without a hitch to the other members of their respective extended 
families. This reduced the chances of confusion or miscommunication within the neighborhood watch and enhanced its 
overall efficiency. And then there’s the very simple fact that, in such a street model, any one member of the neighborhood 
watch was protecting his own flesh and blood. Apart from his own nuclear family, it wasn’t all mere neighbors that he was 
watching over; it was his extended family – his grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Yes, Egyptians are an inherently 
protective people and they have a natural tendency to help out strangers in their time of need. But the simple fact of the 
matter is that people are naturally much more protective of their own immediate family. And this is why the neighborhood 
watches on those of Nasr City’s streets that followed such model were arguably the tightest and most alert vigilante groups 
in all of Cairo.
But then again, there aren’t that many streets in Nasr City where the apartment building–extended family house is the 
dominant building typology. Earlier in this thesis, it’s been demonstrated that the greater majority of residential buildings 
in Nasr City follow a condominium typology where the building towers past the maximum height limit stipulated in Nasr 
City’s bylaws, and houses a large number of unrelated nuclear families. On a street where that condominium typology is 
dominant, the nuclear families in any one building are hardly familiar with one another, let alone the scores of the other 
nuclear families living down the street. So when the events of the 28th started to unfold, putting together a neighborhood 
watch didn’t run as smoothly for the residents of that street model, nor was their neighborhood watch as efficient, in 
comparison to the residents of the apartment building–extended family house street model. Although in terms of sheer 
numbers the condominium street model has far more residents, the lack of a sense of community on the street hindered 
the management of such numbers. It meant that there was a lot more confusion, miscommunication, and coordination 
pitfalls within the neighborhood watch.
As I’ve explained in the beginning of this analysis, all streets in Nasr City share the same urban and architectural 
characteristics that turned out to be quite beneficial during the hard times that befell Cairo in the wake of the events of 
January 28th. It goes without saying then that the social make-up of a street is what made all the difference within the 
context of Nasr City; it is what made some streets safer than others. I believe that this serves to highlight yet another 
advantageous inherent quality to the core subject of this thesis – the apartment building–extended family house typology. 
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And at the same time, it also serves to further discredit the condominium typology that’s been with Nasr City since its boom 
in the late 80s, and which has been lately festering through its urban fabric at the expense of apartment building–extended 
family households. But then again, riding on their urban and architectural characteristics alone, the least safe of Nasr City’s 
condominium dominated streets were still way safer than any street in the suburbs of Cairo.
As I investigated the dire situation in the Cairene suburbs, I soon found that it is also a combination of their urban, 
architectural, and social characteristics that rendered them quite unsafe in comparison to Nasr City. Due to the curvilinear 
planning schemes of the Cairene suburbs, the streets there almost always have a meandering course; and on average, they are 
longer and wider than the streets of Nasr City. These features, which are an integral part of the suburban luxurious character, 
had a serious downside to them – they made securing a street in the suburbs a much harder task for its residents. In terms of 
scale, a street’s neighborhood watch there had a considerably larger area to manage on their hands, and the nonlinear street 
geometry created quite an obstacle for communication and coordination between its members. The bends on the street 
obstructed a clear line of sight down its length, which in turn meant that a guard detail wouldn’t be able to see the danger coming 
its way until it was too late, let alone signal a warning to the other vigilantes manning their stations elsewhere on the street.
There’s also the issue of how the architecture stands on the streets of the Cairene suburbs. In terms of the maximum 
permissible footprint and minimum setbacks for residential buildings, the Cairene suburbs’ building bylaws are not all that 
different from Nasr City’s. And so, much like Nasr city, the adjacent buildings on the typical residential street in the Cairene 
suburbs stand in close proximity to each other, and in close proximity to the street itself. However, in yet another aspect of 
the suburban luxurious character, the typical street in the Cairene suburbs features a lot more open spaces than a Nasr city 
street. And then there’s the fact that the suburbs of Cairo are still very far from being fully developed, which means that 
more often than not the typical residential street there will also feature a number of vacant lots and under construction 
buildings. Together, these two features resulted in an architectural canvas that’s full of gaping holes, which made matters 
even worse for the members of a street’s neighborhood watch in the Cairene suburbs. On top of the street’s overwhelming 
scale and curvilinear geometry, they also had to deal with all the building-free voids down the street where intruders might 
have come through; voids that are quite large, and were therefore rather difficult to barricade or defend. Not to mention 
that the unfinished, uninhabited structures on the street, where intruders could have lurked to stage an attack or used as 
strongholds during one, were another source of major concern that was equally as hard to address.
I however believe that the social characteristics of the Cairene suburbs are what sealed their fate. Obviously, the urban 
and architectural drawbacks of the typical residential street there would have been less of an issue if there were plenty 
of vigilantes to post all around its vast extents, blind spots, and big voids. But then again, having that many vigilantes on 
hand would have required a considerably large number of people living down the street in the first place – and that just 
isn’t a feature of the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street. Instead, the typical street there has a very small number 
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of residents, which – in light of its overwhelming physical disadvantages – wasn’t exactly the most favorable of features. 
It meant that the typical street in the Cairene suburbs didn’t have enough residents for assembling a neighborhood watch 
with the adequate manpower needed to properly secure the street, which in turn left everybody living down the street in 
a very vulnerable position. I’d like to make it clear here that such deficiency has little to do with the fact that the suburbs of 
Cairo are fairly new residential settlements that haven’t been fully populated yet. These suburbs are actually designed to 
have very low population densities. Allocating the greater majority of their residential land use to the villa typology; their 
strict building bylaws that limit such typology to a maximum of three, and sometimes even two, storeys; and the abundance 
of large open spaces on their streets – all of these things cater to having a minimal number of residents per street, which 
is by far the most essential feature of any suburban model. And so it wouldn’t have really made much of a difference if the 
Cairene suburbs were at their full population capacities during the trouble that erupted on the night of January 28th. The 
residents of the typical street there would have still been gravely short on the numbers needed to keep their street safe.
But then again, having a small number of residents wasn’t the only disadvantageous social feature of the Cairene suburbs’ 
typical residential street. I believe that the lack of a sense of community among its residents had quite an adverse effect as 
well. As I’ve established earlier in this thesis, any given villa in suburban Cairo is either a single nuclear family household 
or an extended family household. This in turn means that the social make-up of the Cairene suburbs’ typical street model, 
where all buildings follow the villa typology, is very similar to that of the Nasr City street model, where the apartment 
building–extended family house is the dominant typology. And while that similarity may imply that the households of the 
Cairene suburbs’ street model would also have the same balanced and healthy relationship featured on the Nasr City street 
model, the truth of the matter is that they don’t – and that’s mainly because of three reasons.
For one thing, there’s the fact that the suburbs of Cairo are very young residential settlements. It takes a good many 
years to build up a balanced sense of community like the one in question here. But as it is right now, none of the families 
living down a typical street in the Cairene suburbs have resided there long enough to develop a relationship that’s even 
remotely close to that special bond that their Nasr City counterparts have nurtured for over two decades. And then there 
are the urban qualities of the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street, which – regardless of the time factor – will always 
deter its households from cultivating a communal sense of any kind. In the Nasr City street model, the intimate scale of the 
street and the proximity of its apartment buildings literally brought its extended families close together, making it relatively 
easy for them to become familiar with each other. In the Cairene suburbs on the other hand, the vast scale of the street 
distances the villas standing on it, while its meandering geometry breaks its continuity and fragments those villas into 
disjointed architectural segments. This reduces the chances of the street’s residents running into each other, crossing paths, 
or interacting in any other way; which in turn makes it virtually impossible for the members of any one of its households to 
be acquainted with all of their neighbors down the street, let alone maintain a balanced relationship with them.
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fig.4.a.28    [opposite  page]  Samples 
of the urban fabric in Nasr City, New 
Cairo,  and  Shorouq  City.  Looking  at 
these  samples  side  by  side  makes  it 
very  clear  that  there  are  some major 
differences between Nasr City and the 
Cairene suburbs in terms of their urban 
and  architectural  characteristics.  In 
my  opinion,  these  differences  were 
the main  reason why  the  residents  of 
Nasr City were much more capable of 
coping with the troublesome times that 
ensued  from  the  night  of  January  28 
in comparison to their counterparts in 
suburban Cairo.
And finally there’s the architecture of the villas that stand on the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street. For purposes of 
privacy, the architecture of these villas hardly ever acknowledges the street, except for it being a front towards which the 
building’s main façade is oriented. And while the same is also true for the architecture of Nasr City’s apartment building–
extended family houses, there’s quite a fundamental difference between the two typologies. In an apartment building–
extended family house, the living spaces, where the inhabitants of the building spend the majority of their time, are almost 
always situated looking out on the street from behind a fairly closed off main façade. This provides the members of Nasr 
City’s extended family household with their due privacy, and at the same time allows them to have a healthy connection 
to the domain of their street. Not only did such connection make it even easier for them to become familiar with their 
neighbors down the street, but it’s also been the main reason why they are always aware of, and quick to deal with, any 
sort of trouble as soon as it materializes on the street or threatens any of their neighboring households. In the Cairene 
suburbs however, a villa usually features a certain design element, such as a pool or a terrace overlooking a big yard, which 
completely draws the focus of the building and its inhabitants away from the street. The members of the typical household 
in the Cairene suburbs are therefore far less involved with what happens on their street in comparison to the members 
of Nasr City’s extended family household. They would not be able to tell, let alone act, if and when a problem manifests 
itself on the street or befalls any of their neighboring households, not to mention that their minimal exposure to the street 
further reduces their chances of ever becoming familiar with the members of those neighboring households. Needless 
to say, none of this is conducive to either developing or maintaining a relationship with their neighbors on the street, nor 
is any of it likely to change over time. Much like the urban qualities of the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street, the 
architecture of the villas that stand on it will always isolate the families dwelling in them and obstruct their growth as a 
community no matter how long they may end up residing there.
My analysis and conclusions regarding why Nasr City had been much safer than the Cairene suburbs during the rampant 
disorder that erupted on the night of January 28th and threatened them for days to follow were gratifying to say the least. 
Upon completing them, I felt that they made it clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Cairene suburbs are at a severe 
disadvantage in comparison to Nasr City; and that they indeed provided some very strong points for arguing against middle 
class professionals abandoning their Nasr City apartment building–extended family houses and relocating to the Cairene 
suburbs. But most importantly, they also seemed to resonate with what had become of Nasr City and the Cairene suburbs 
in the wake of those unsettling times.
Over the first year or so after the disorder that took hold of Cairo’s residential districts had died out, I couldn’t help 
but notice that once again there was a glaring discrepancy between the sort of atmosphere that set over Nasr City on 
the one hand, and the Cairene suburbs on the other. In Nasr City, it looked as though such disorder had tapped into the 
latent social potential of the district’s street model where the apartment building–extended family house is the dominant 
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typology. This became quite evident as I turned my attention back to El-Insha street being the quintessential example 
for that street model. There, the hardships of dealing with the imminent threat to their street had brought the extended 
families of my street closer than ever and set in motion a communal momentum that proceeded to push the limits of their 
long-standing balanced relationship. It all began in late February when the younger members of El-Insha street’s extended 
family households came together to clear the aftermath of the street’s neighborhood watch. On the last Thursday of the 
month, the youth of 11 El-Insha street’s two extended families put up a sign on its front gate announcing that they will be 
performing a full-scale cleanup of the street starting Friday, and inviting whoever’s interested in helping out to join them. 
The next morning, almost every kid, teenager, and young adult living down the street showed up in front of 11 El-Insha 
street in response to the invitation, and over the course of the whole weekend, they all worked side by side with the 
blessings and supervision of their parents. First, they dismantled the remnants of the barricades that were still partially 
blocking the street’s entrances; they collected and disposed of the all clutter and debris that had been lying about the street 
from when the vigilantes stood sentry; and they swept out the all of street and its sidewalks. They then went on a quest to 
revamp El-Insha street as they took it upon themselves to wash the gates and entrances of every single one of its apartment 
buildings, and repaint the sidewalks down the its entire length. And on the last day of the weekend when all the work was 
done, they gathered in the entrance lobby of 11 El-Insha street where they shared a celebratory meal that the mothers of 
its two extended families had prepared for them.
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fig.4.a.29    [opposite  page,  left] Prepped  and  ready  to  begin 
the cleanup of El-Insha street. On  the right stands Noha, my 
cousin;  and on  the  left  stands Tony,  her neighbor across  the 
hall in 11 El-Insha street. Apparently, they were the ones who 
thought it would be a good idea to clear the aftermath of the 
street’s  neighborhood  watch,  and  extended  the  invitation  to 
the  younger  members  of  the  street’s  other  extended  family 
households to come out and help. Almost every kid,  teenager 
and young adult living down El-Insha street responded to that 
invitation.
fig.4.a.30 & fig.4.a.31   The youth of El-Insha street’s different 
extended family households hard at work cleaning their street. 
They disposed of all the litter that was left behind from when 
the street’s vigilantes stood sentry [opposite page, right], and 
swept the entire length of the street [left].
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fig.4.a.32    Working  together  to  straighten  a  street  sign 
that  was  knocked  askew  during  the  time  El-Insha  street’s 
neighborhood watch was in operation. After they were done 
with the cleanup, the youth of El-Insha went on to give their 
street a complete facelift. 
fig.4.a.33  to  fig.4.a.38    [opposite  page]  In  their  effort  to 
revamp their street,  the youth of El-Insha street washed the 
gates and entrances of every one of its apartment buildings, 
and painted the sidewalks down its entire length. They carried 
out both tasks in a very organized manner.
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fig.4.a.39   [left] The youth of El-Insha 
street posing for a picture to celebrate 
all  what  they  had  achieved  after  a 
whole  weedend  of  working  tirelessly 
side  by  side. A  lot  of  good memories 
and  new  friends  were  made  over  the 
course of that weekend.
fig.4.a.40    [right]  The  youth  of  El-
Insha  street  gathered  around  a  big 
tray  of  traditional  fava  beans  in 
the  entrance  lobby  of  11  El-Insha 
street.  After  all  the  work  was  done, 
and as part  of  their  celebration,  they 
shared a meal that the mothers of El-
Insha  street’s  two  extended  families 
had  prepared  for  them.  Much  like 
everything  else  about  the  communal 
effort  to  clean  and  revamp  El-Insha 
street,  this  very  friendly  and  inviting 
gesture was the first of its kind.
I found that communal effort, as well as the genuinely warm and friendly sentiments exhibited in carrying it out, to be 
quite a departure from the reserved relationship that the extended families of my street have maintained with one another 
over the years. And it was only a little over a year later before they took yet another major step beyond the boundaries of 
their subdued relationship. In July of 2012, several of the older members of El-Insha street’s extended family households 
organized themselves into what could be best described as a council aimed at addressing issues that affect the well-being of 
their street. The circumstance that prompted this initiative presented itself when the owner of the bakery that stands across 
form 11 El-Insha street started to appropriate the little garden adjacent to his bakery with the intention of turning it into an 
outdoor coffee shop. Concerned that this kind of coffee shop will disturb the calm of their street; invite a lot of strangers 
into its domain; and compromise the privacy of their households, a group of representatives from a number of the street’s 
extended families came together to discuss how best to deal with the emerging situation and prevent it from developing 
any further. They then set up a meeting with the owner of the bakery where they presented him with their grievances, and 
informed him that unless he forgoes his plans, they will have to lodge a formal complaint with the proper authorities on 
the account of his unlawful annexing of public property. This in turn triggered a lengthy series of negotiations with the man 
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fig.4.a.41   El-Insha street’s small market; 
a  dispute  over  the  little  garden  marked 
here  saw  El-Insha  street’s  different 
extended  family  households  join  forces 
for the first time to protect the interests of 
their community.
during which they also brought up the loudness and inappropriate habits of the bakery’s workers as nuisances that have 
long inconvenienced their households, and demanded that he puts an end to them as well. These negotiations eventually 
came to an end as the owner of the bakery insisted on moving forward with his plans, giving them his word that none of 
their concerns regarding the coffee shop will ever come to pass, and that he will personally see to it that their issues with 
his bakery’s workers will be sorted out immediately. And while they welcomed the latter half of his promise, which he did 
fulfill right away, the representatives of El-Insha street’s extended families weren’t the least bit satisfied with his assurances 
regarding the coffee shop. They therefore decided to push on with lodging a formal complaint, and divided among 
themselves the tasks of drafting it; collecting signatures for it from as many of the street’s other households that were not 
yet involved; and finding a suitable connection who will ensure that it will be quickly delivered to the highest authorities. By 
that point, the situation had caught the attention of the residents of some of the apartment buildings standing on the two 
other streets that mark the perimeter of the small market where the bakery is located, and they subsequently expressed 
their desire to sign that formal complaint as well. Seeing that the representatives of El-Insha street’s extended families were 
serious about their ultimatum, and that their complaint document was gaining the support of households other than those 
of El-Insha street itself, the owner of the bakery finally backed down and refrained from taking any further steps towards 
transforming the garden into a coffee shop. Shortly after that, a couple of families from 11 El-Insha street hired a landscaper 
to properly replant the little garden as a gesture of reclaiming it as part of the street’s public domain.
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I learned about those events from my mother who had been part of the group that spearheaded the entire effort to thwart 
the plans of the bakery’s owner. In her telling of the story, one thing was very obvious from the way she referred to those 
of her neighbors who had led that effort with her. They were clearly no longer just faces to her that might or might not 
have a name attached to them, but instead it sounded more like they were real individuals whom she had come to know 
and respect though working and sharing experiences together. This left me with the distinct impression that participating in 
that effort helped the members of El-Insha street’s different extended families, or at least some of them, to actually get to 
know each other; which was undoubtedly a big step forward considering that for more than two decades their relationship 
amounted to nothing more than a mere casual acquaintance. However, I believe that the real breakthrough of that effort, 
as well as the effort to clean up El-Insha street for that matter, was that they both saw the extended family households of 
my street actively and collectively engage in protecting the interests of their community. Although the members of those 
households have always been prompt to act whenever a dangerous situation manifested itself on El-Insha street, they’ve 
had a very different approach towards problems that did not present a clear and direct threat to the street’s security. They 
usually sat idly by until that sort of problem became a real bother and then all they did was moan and complain about it, 
but they wouldn’t take any meaningful action towards dealing with it. And in the few rare incidents when one of the street’s 
social units decided to do something about that sort of problem, they were pretty much on their own – an extended family 
household could never rally the support of the street’s other extended family households, and in some cases not even 
a nuclear family could muster support from the rest of its own extended family household. And so it was a truly radical 
development for the extended families of El-Insha street to shake off their passiveness and join forces to address the kind 
of issues they’ve let slide so many times in the past, which only seemed appropriate since it took an equally extreme set of 
circumstances to bring about such a development. In my opinion, the catalyst for the unprecedented behavior of my street’s 
extended families was the disorder that had befallen Cairo’s residential districts on the night of January 28th and prompted 
their successful neighborhood watch endeavor. I believe this made them realize how much they’re capable of achieving 
if they pulled together and worked as a group, which in turn encouraged them to make more use of their newly found 
potential. As unpleasant as it was, that disorder had done some good after all ushering the extended family households 
of El-Insha street, and the many other streets like it all over Nasr city, into a more mature phase of their evolution as a 
community.
During the same period these positive developments were taking place in Nasr City, things were looking pretty grim in the 
Cairene suburbs. There, the ominous and brooding atmosphere that came with the disorder that erupted in late January 
2011 didn’t seem to subside over the months that followed. I first became aware of this during a phone call with my friend 
who lived in Shorouq City some time after order had been restored to most of Cairo’s residential districts. In that phone call, 
she told me that in Shorouq City things never went back to the way they were before the night of January 28th. She said that 
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although her family and herself were no longer in direct danger, she was still constantly worried and anxious nonetheless 
because she felt that Shorouq City had become generally unsafe. My friend’s somber outlook was indeed justified. At 
around the same time I had that phone call with her, I also began to notice form all the news reports I was coming across 
that there was some serious criminal activity going on not only in Shorouq City, but in the suburbs of New Cairo as well. 
The Cairene suburbs in general were just plagued with incidents of armed robbery and kidnapping school children for 
ransom. And as late as February 2013, I was still coming across news of those incidents as the crime epidemic continued to 
haunt the Cairene suburbs for almost two years after the trouble that briefly overwhelmed Cairo’s residential districts had 
ended. This was disconcerting to say the least, but I also found it quite puzzling. Crimes such as those that befell the Cairene 
suburbs have never been an issue in Cairo’s high-end residential districts at any point in time. It was therefore very strange 
to witness those crimes fester with such intensity through out the suburbs of Cairo, and it was even stranger that that 
would be the case at a time of relative calm in all of Cairo’s other high-end residential districts. To me, it looked a though 
the disorder of late January 2011 had yielded a very different outcome in the Cairene suburbs than it did in Nasr City. As I’ve 
explained earlier, during such disorder all the urban, architectural, and social disadvantages of the Cairene suburbs were 
brought out for everyone to see, and it is my belief that this in turn encouraged many a criminal and wrongdoer to exploit 
those disadvantages – that and the obvious fact that the residents of suburban Cairo are generally well off.
By that point, between the promising atmosphere that was shaping up in Nasr City and the bleak air that hung over the 
Cairene suburbs, I had become quite hopeful. Judging by their behavior, the extended families of Nasr City’s middle class 
professionals appeared to have discovered the potential and advantages of their apartment building households. And from 
their remarks on the dreadful criminal activity in suburban Cairo, it also sounded like that they were aware and thankful for 
how safe Nasr City was in comparison. And so, for a little while there, I got to thinking that maybe, just maybe, the trend 
of middle class professionals relocating their extended family households to the Cairene suburbs might come to an end 
after all. But alas, every other aspect of their behavior ever since the outbreak of the January uprising seemed to indicate 
otherwise.
236
237
fig.4.b.1    [opposite  page]  Owing  to 
their  sustained  inaction,  continued 
criticism  of  the  younger,  and 
reluctance  to participate of effectuate 
real  change;  such  passive  members 
of  the  older  generation  came  to  be 
widely  known  as  the  ‘couch  party’ 
in  Egypt,  in  reference  to  their  sitting 
their  following  events  and  passing 
judgments  while  sitting  comfortably 
on couches in their homes.
4.B An Unanswered Wake-up Call
The failings of older middle class professionals
in a post-Uprising Egypt and the imminent demise
of Nasr City’s apartment building-extended family households
It’s now almost four years after the outbreak of the January Uprising and the unrest in Egypt is still nowhere near a definitive 
conclusion. Although the Uprising itself came to a close when Mubarak stepped down on the February 11, 2011, protests 
against the military council that was appointed to temporarily run the country in his stead erupted soon thereafter bringing 
about a whole new episode of violent strife which lasted until the council’s tenure in power ended in mid 2012. And not long 
after the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi took over from the outgoing military council as Egypt’s newly elected 
president, culminating the Brotherhood’s post-uprising ascension to power, protests against Morsi and the emerging Muslim 
Brotherhood regime flared up in yet another chapter of violent conflict, which came to a bloody end in the summer of 2013 
when the Army – in response to such popular discontent – stepped in and removed him from office and then went on to 
brutally cracked down on his supports. And now, after a mock democratic process in which he was glorified as Egypt’s savior 
in his capacity as the head of the Army that overthrew Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, Abd elFattah elSisi had been 
elected president, and ever since, Egypt has been under the rule of a regime that bears striking similarities to the Mubarak 
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regime that had been toppled four years earlier – a rule that has been marred by a consistent suppression and violation of 
civil and human rights. That is to say, Egypt is pretty much back to were it was before the outbreak of the January Uprising 
of 2011; not to mention that since then the county has also been, and still is, struggling through a rather turbulent process 
of political reform; a deteriorating economy; rising sectarian tensions; and the rapid ideological polarization of its people.
Be that as it may however, the events of those four years offered yet another very important, and rather conclusive, 
addition to my thesis. Granted, that addition has little to do with the immediate focus of this thesis on issues of architecture 
and urbanism. But it remains a pivotal addition nonetheless given that it relates directly to the overarching social concept 
upon which my arguments concerning those issues were predicated, and which – in essence – constitutes the answer to 
the “why bother?” question of this thesis. The concept I’m referring to here is the one suggesting that the well-being of any 
given society is closely tied to the integrity of its middle class and their active involvement in maintaining a sound social 
order. It’s my belief that the events and aftermath of the January Uprising provide ample clues that prove the failure of the 
professionals class – whom I perceive as the last remnants of a moral middle class in Egypt – to live up to their supposed 
social responsibility. A failure that I have argued would be an inevitable outcome of the professionals’ preoccupation with 
preserving their threatened socio-economic status, and their irrational pursuit of excessively consumeristic and ostentatious 
lifestyles in order to assert it.
The first and maybe the most obvious of those clues presented itself in who initiated and staged what is now referred 
to as the Revolution of 25 January – the Egyptian youth. It was young Egyptians who called for the initial day of protest on 
the 25th which practically sparked the “revolution”; it was young Egyptians who endured and stood their ground through 
the violent events in the months that followed; and it was young Egyptians who suffered, and are still suffering, the most 
devastating losses through it all. And among those young Egyptians, it seems that young professionals in particular have had 
a more, if not the most, central role in the Uprising. It is this issue that I find quite contradictory to simple logic.
It baffles me that the professionals of my generation were the instigators of that Uprising and not the professionals of our 
parents’ generation. It baffles me because the professionals of our parents’ generation were brought up during the 50s and 
60s, and – as students aspiring to be professionals – they were part of that era’s socio-economic system where professionals 
were revered as a higher tier of the social hierarchy; where they were guaranteed economic stability and comfortable 
lifestyles; and where personal excellence and sincere achievement were the standards for reaping such rewards. And it 
baffles me because it was also the professionals of that generation who, as fresh graduates, witnessed at first hand the 
drastic socio-economic shifts of the 70s, and since then have seen the demise of the principles they were brought up on; 
have been struggling economically to maintain the decent lifestyles they grew believing they were entitled to; and have 
watched as less worthy individuals ascended rapidly through social ranks while their own status hung by a thread. Logically, 
one would have expected the professionals of that generation to play a more central and active role in an uprising against 
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the regime whose ideologies helped subject them to such social and economic injustices as opposed to their children who 
were born in 80s and lacked their parents’ frame of reference. Yet, it seems to me that they hardly played any significant 
role in the January Uprising, and that instead they generally had a rather negative attitude towards it.
I found some of the aspects of this negative attitude of theirs to be somewhat justifiable. For the better part of their adult 
lives, older middle class professionals, along with the rest of the Egyptian population for that matter, have been living under 
an Emergency Law that has been perpetually kept in effect since 1981. They’ve witnessed the atrocities that the Mubarak 
regime committed in its name to quell any form of nonconformist political activity; and in turn came to associate engaging 
in such activity with suffering police brutality, arrests without warrants, indefinite imprisonment with no right for trial, 
torture, and even death. It goes without saying then that this conviction must have been of the greatest influence on their 
reaction regarding such a politically charged occurrence as the January Uprising, especially in its early and most turbulent 
days between its outbreak on January 25th and Mubarak stepping down on February 11th.
During that period, it seemed to me that the greater majority of older middle class professionals refrained from participating 
in the protests, and that they strongly objected to their children’s participation and desperately tried to dissuade them from 
following through with it. Considering the violent manner in which the authorities typically dealt with protesters, it was an 
understandable position to take – they simply feared for their children’s and their own lives and safety if they would have 
joined the protests. I also got the impression that they had very little faith that the protests would yield any substantial 
results; which was a rather reasonable reservation as well. At the time, it indeed seemed highly unlikely that the Mubarak 
regime, which has effectively kept political activism in check for 30 years, would give in to the protestors’ outrageous 
demands for dissolving the government, putting top officials on trial, disbanding the regime’s political apparatus, and for 
Mubarak himself to step down.
To be fair though, after the inconceivable happened and Mubarak stepped down, I’ve noticed that the older professionals’ 
generation had a change of heart. The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) had been placed in charge of the 
country for a transitional period, representing a revered and well-loved Egyptian Army that seemingly sided with the 
protestors and refused to act against them when called upon by Mubarak during his last days in power. In turn, older middle 
class professionals started to register an increased presence in Tahrir Square, and even allowed their younger children to 
take part in the then SCAF-tolerated, peaceful sit-ins – and they were not the only ones. It also seemed to me that members 
of the higher social classes, who originally wanted nothing to do with the Uprising, followed a similar trend. This spark of 
activism however was rather short-lived, and was soon revealed for what it truly was – just another fad among the many 
other fads of higher society.
Over the months after it assumed power, it became evident that the SCAF is no different from, if not worse than, the 
Mubarak regime in terms of dealing with nonconformist political activity. With escalating fresh protests demanding faster, 
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more effective and transparent reforms, the council’s initial tolerance ran out and not before long it was authorizing the 
same kind of atrocities that were committed during the early days of the Uprising. It also deployed the military police, and 
even troops, against civilian protestors – both of which proving to be more brutal than the regular security forces, and it 
brought civilian activists who openly criticized it to stand military tribunals. At the first signs of the council’s new attitude, 
the majority of older professionals, as well as everyone else who had jumped on the dissidence bandwagon after Mubarak 
stepped down, reverted to their original position regarding participating in protests. It was a disappointing relapse but an 
understandable one nonetheless given that their children’s and their own lives and safety were, once again, at risk.
Yes, older middle class professionals may have good reason for this passive and discouraging behavior. But then again, 
this doesn’t mean that they are entirely free of blame for behaving in such manner. The young people who went down to 
Tahrir Square in January 2011, and who have since kept going back, have an instinct for self-preservation and knew full well 
the dangers of political dissent the same as the older middle class professionals; and still they chose to make their stand 
regardless. As a part of it myself, I know for a fact that the younger professionals’ generation in particular was brought up 
by their parents to believe that discussing politics, let alone openly defying the political institution, is the stuff of taboo. 
And yet there they were at the forefront of the Uprising, while their parents – the older professionals – took a backseat and 
deemed their resort to protesting an uncalculated stunt of hotheaded youth.
This brings me to the single most significant aspect of those older middle class professionals’ negative attitude. It seems to 
me that, so far, their biggest “contribution” to the Uprising and the events that unfolded in its wake has been their incessant 
criticism of the younger generation’s reckless disregard for the dire consequences of their continuous protesting. At first, 
the only consequence that seemed to bother the older professionals was the authorities’ response to the protestors’ bold 
political dissent. During the earliest days of the uprising, the older professionals were critical of the young protestors for 
thinking lightly of such response. They were simply under the impression that despite their efforts to instill the younger 
generation with a sense of the atrocious manner in which the authorities handled political dissidents, the protesting youth 
were still unable to fully grasp that they were literally putting their lives and personal safety on the line by standing up to 
the Mubarak regime. It was rather difficult for them to acknowledge the fact that the protestors – who are just children 
in their eyes – were knowingly taking this risk out of a strong commitment to a valid cause. As fathers and mothers, it was 
much easier and almost natural for them to assume that, at their young age, those protestors were instead misguided by 
youth’s false notions of invincibility when they chose to defy the system; and therefore felt the need to berate them in 
order to bring them back to their senses. In other words the older professionals’ criticism during that time was just another 
one of their attempts to dissuade their children from carrying on with the protests. And like the rest of those attempts, it 
essentially stemmed from their fear for the lives and safety of those children. This is why I believe that, at first, their criticism 
was still well within the bounds of pardonable behavior. However, what it developed to next was most certainly not.
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fig.4.b.2  In Egypt, tradition dictates that one week 
after  a  child  is  born,  his  family  would  celebrate 
his birth with members of his  extended  family. As 
part of that celebration, the child is placed in a big 
sifter,  after which  relatives  from  both  sides  of  his 
extended families take turns instructing the child to 
heed  their advice and not  that of his other  family 
members  –  a  tradition  that  is  very  telling  of  the 
ageist nature of Egyptian society. In this caricature, 
the  Egyptian  revolutionary  youth  are  depicted  as 
the child in the sifter, and around him, his “elders”, 
each representing a form of authority in Egypt, are 
gathered telling him to heed their advice. From left 
to  right  those  instruct  him  to: “listen  to what  the 
Morshed [Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood] tells 
you”,  “listen  to  what  the  Pope  [of  the  Egyptian 
Coptic  Church]  tells  you”,  “listen  to  what  the 
SCAF  tells  you”,  “listen  to  what  the  [educated] 
Elite tells you”.
As time passed and the youth persisted with their protests, the older professionals’ criticisms took on a very different and 
far more antagonistic tone as they voiced their discontent with the adverse economic effects of the civil unrest wreaked 
by the protesting youth. This attitude first became obvious with the stalemate that developed during the 18-day run of the 
January Uprising as protestors refused to leave Tahrir Square after Mubarak’s failure to offer a satisfactory response to their 
demands; and became all the more intense as young protestors kept staging sit-ins and demonstrations after the SCAF’s 
ascension to power and its lackluster performance with regards to achieving the goals of the “revolution”. It just seemed 
to me that ever since that aforementioned stalemate, older professionals have never ceased complaining about how the 
perpetual protests staged by the younger generation, and in turn the authorities’ crackdown, are impeding the flow of 
everyday life and jeopardizing its safety; and are therefore posing serious threats to the country’s economy.
I found that particular recurring complaint to be, by far, the one aspect of the older middle class professionals’ negative 
attitude that is in no part excusable. Granted, it wouldn’t have been much of an issue for them to voice such a criticism 
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if older professionals were opposed to the purpose of the protests to begin with; but they weren’t. On the contrary, they 
clearly wanted an end to political, economic and social grievances all along – and therein lies the problem. For one thing, it 
is a rather selfish behavior for them to be that critical considering that they’ve hardly been participating in the protests. It is 
as if they wanted to reap the fruits of socio-political upheaval without having to endure even the least of its inherent trials. 
After all, putting up with the economic repercussions of civil unrest seems rather mild in comparison to being subjected to 
physical brutality or losing one’s life while protesting.
But what’s even more frustrating is that despite being so adamant about the economic drawbacks of the youth’s 
continuous protesting, the older professionals are yet to come up with a viable alternative for it. After four years since the 
outbreak of the Uprising, all they’ve had to offer was harsh and unconstructive criticism of the rash younger generation and 
the error of their ways, which often sank to the level of petty faultfinding. Or at best, they’ve engaged in endless rhetorical 
debates about the ”less damaging“ methods for bringing about the desired reforms, which have so far yielded nothing but 
impractical options and unacceptable compromises. I believe that this takes their failure to meet their social obligation to a 
whole new level; because if there were anybody who could – and should – have brought forth such an alternative, it would 
have been the older middle class professionals. They are the legislators, political scientists, economists, and the countless 
other experts who, by way of their fields of expertise and age, possess both the adequate knowledge and experience 
needed to bring the country out of its turmoil and into a new era of genuine reform. But it’s not just about them being 
tailored for the job. After they’ve stood idly by while the younger generation took the daring first step, one would have 
expected them to step in and do their part if not for anything but to redeem themselves.
In time, the older middle class professionals’ repeated failure to rise to the occasion led me to the conclusion that their 
incessant complaining about the continuous state of civil unrest in Egypt didn’t really stem from a genuine concern for the 
country’s economy as they claimed, but it was rather because such unrest has been interfering with their “leisure dreams”. 
It just seemed to me that they perceived the recurring protests which called for a wholehearted, and therefore lengthy, 
reform effort as a hindrance to their pursuit of comfortable life styles, and particularly their aspiration to relocate their 
homes to the suburbs. I also got the distinct impression that they would have rather had matters return to a status quo as 
soon as possible so that they can get back to wallowing in such “leisure dreams”, which they felt that they were entitled to 
after they had struggled to maintain their social and economic status all throughout their adult lives.
I believe that this is precisely why every single regime that’s been in power since the outbreak of the January Uprising, 
including the Mubarak regime itself, have resorted to playing what came to be known as the “Production Cycle” card 
whenever public dissatisfaction manifested itself into widespread protests. Almost every time protestors took to the streets, 
the head of the regime in power would address the “good citizens” of Egypt urging them to practice restraint and to return 
to their homes so as not to impede the “Production Cycle” and in turn hurt the country’s economy. Rather than being 
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fig.4.b.3   The sustained economic woes in Egypt since the outbreak 
of  the January Uprising has been the boogeyman of older middle 
class  professionals,  among  many  other  members  of  the  older 
generations  in  Egypt.  In  the  four  years  since  the  Uprising,  they 
seemed more willing  to accept  the quickest,  rather  than  the most 
sustainable, fix to that problem.
strictly directed towards protestors, that kind of address was more of a veiled message to older middle class professionals 
– one that played on their fears of a sustained state of civil unrest and economic uncertainty that would undermine their 
pursuit of “leisure dreams”. And surely enough, every time a regime came out with that kind of address, older middle class 
professionals, without fail, responded by advocating settling for whatever half-measures that that regime had to offer 
instead of standing up to it and assuming their supposed social responsibility to affect structured and informed reforms.
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fig.4.b.4  [opposite  page]  possible  scenarios  for 
either result of the March 19 referendum of 2011
This brings me to the one event which, I believe, was the most striking example of the older middle class professionals’ 
failure to take on their supposed social role in the wake of the January Uprising, and which I also believe sent Egypt down 
the turbulent road that it’s been on since. That event is the constitutional referendum of March 19, 2011. A little over 
a month after Mubarak had stepped down, a seemingly simple question was put to the Egyptian electorate: Should the 
standing Egyptian Constitution be retained and amended, or should it be scraped and a new one be drafted? Despite its 
seeming simplicity, there was quite a lot riding on that question as evident by all the extensive projections of what either 
votes might entail on the long run which quickly became the centre of a heated public debate at the time. But the short 
version was this: A Yes vote would allow for quicker parliamentary and presidential elections, and thus worked to the 
advantage of already established and well organized Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafi Noor Party which, naturally, were at the forefront of the Yes campaign. A No vote on the other hand entailed delayed 
parliamentary and presidential elections, which would give the younger revolutionary currents that staged the Uprising 
enough time to organize themselves into proper parties that could take part in those elections. Accordingly, the supporters 
of the No campaign were the Egyptian youth, many political and social reform advocates, and all those who saw that, by 
rights, the young Egyptians who staged the revolution should have a central role in shaping the country’s future.
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fig.4.b.5  Referendum results in Cairo and Egypt
fig.4.b.6  [opposite  page]  Voters  against  passing 
the  constitutional  amendments  vs.  professional 
popilation in Cairo’s districts 
CairoEgypt
38.5
%
22.7
%
61.5%77.3%
Voters Against passing
the Constitutional Amendments
On the eve of the referendum, an electronic sample poll on the Information & Decision Support Center web site projected 
that 60% of Egyptians will vote against the amendments versus 39% for. However as one of my best friends remarked at the 
time, the sample that was used to make such a projection was clearly skewed towards middle and upper classes with access 
to the Internet. And he couldn’t have been more right. The actual results of the referendum which were announced a few 
days later were the complete opposite of that projection. 77% of Egyptians voted Yes for the passing the amendments, while 
only about 23% voted No. And in Cairo specifically, 61.5% of its inhabitants voted Yes for the passing the amendments, while 
38.5% of them voted No. Needless to say, that was a major letdown, but a breakdown of the referendum results in Cairo told 
a very interesting story. When I cross-referenced the percentage of those who voted No and the percentage of professional 
residents in each of Cairo managerial district, I found a rather clear correlation between both percentages. Apart from a 
consistent difference that could be attributed to the younger electorate that had no occupation because they were still 
students, the trend of those who voted No was almost identical to that of the professional residents in each managerial district, 
with a few understandable anomalies. And while this, at first, might seem as a good sign that middle class professionals had 
assumed some of their supposed social responsibilities, a more encompassing look at the vote as a whole proves otherwise.
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As I considered Cairene districts where real estate values are quite high, it was safe to assume that the remaining percentage 
of those districts’ residents who were not professionals were members of the new middle class since they could afford living 
there. That, by association, meant that the new middle class residents in those districts accounted for the Yes votes there. 
I also noticed that, collectively, the Yes and No votes in those high real estate value districts were almost split around the 
50% mark. And so, when I took a step back and considered the overwhelming majority of the Yes vote in both Cairo and 
Egypt as a whole, it dawned on me that, given such an even split, it was obviously the members of the new middle class 
who were, by far, the more proactive of the two factions of the Egyptian middle class; and that they were indeed as they 
fervently promoted their agendas to the more impressionable members of society and in turn tipped the scales towards 
a Yes vote. By the same token, I also came to the realization that older middle class professionals on the other hand did 
nothing beyond casting their own No votes. Those numbers strongly suggested a gross incompetence on their part when 
it came to carrying out what I believed to be their responsibility as a moral middle class to objectively inform the general 
public about what either vote entailed. But then again, none of those realizations were much of a surprise to me. Rather, 
they illustrated, in quantifiable terms, my vivid memories of the older middle class professionals’ lackluster and passive 
attitude during the buildup leading to the referendum, at a time when the Islamist proponents of the Yes vote falsely 
preached to the inherently religious Egyptian masses that a No vote would bring in a new constitution that would scrap the 
articles that proclaim Egypt as a “Muslim” state; and that casting a No vote basically amounted to saying No to God himself.
It wasn’t long though before older middle class professionals, and most of the Egyptian society, had to face the 
consequences of the former groups’ failure to live up to their social responsibility during the March 19 referendum. About 
ten months after the referendum, a parliament, with an overwhelming Islamist majority headed by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
was voted in; and about six months after that, the Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected president of 
Egypt. Needless to say, in both elections, the Muslim Brotherhood – as expected – utilized its ample resources and already 
well-established networks, as well as employed the same type of proactive campaigning it had used during the buildup to 
the March 19 referendum, to secure the majority of the votes. And all the while, older middle class professionals stood idly 
by still, and did nothing but cast their own votes and complain about the almost certain repercussion of the Brotherhood’s 
uncontested ascension to power. And surely enough, in the months following its rise to power, all of the older middle class 
professionals’ fears came true as the Brotherhood regime’s performance quickly became a cause of major concern to 
everyone save for its own supporters.
During both election campaigns, the Brotherhood, through its candidates, promised to effectuate all the political, 
economic, and social reforms that the Uprising had called for; it promised to restore the declining Egyptian economy and 
usher the country into an age of prosperity; it promised allowing a healthy and diverse political and social rhetoric; and in 
the particular case of Morsi’s candidacy for the presidency, it promised to fix almost all of the problems that beset Egypt 
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fig.4.b.7   The makeup of the post-Uprising Egyptian 
Parliament  of  2012;  the  Muslim  Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice party seccured the most seats.
Egyptian Parliament | 2012
Islamist Liberal/Leftist
The Democratic Alliance (235 seats; 46%). Led by the Muslim Brotherhood's 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) [solid green], this bloc was intended to be Egypt's 
pre-eminent post-revolution political force, a broad coalition of Islamist and secular parties 
who could dominate across the country. However, the FJP won by far the largest number of 
seats within the bloc, taking 218 of the Alliance’s 235, plus another eight FJP-aliated 
independents, accounting for a 44.5% of the Parliament’s 508 seats on its own.
The Islamist Alliance (124 seats; 24.5%). The Islamist Alliance was founded by 
the fundamentalist Sala Nour Party, which withdrew from the Brotherhood's Democratic 
Alliance, and which is the most popular of the hardline Sala groups. The Sala Authenticity 
Party and the Building and Development Party – the political wing of the once-militant and 
banned Islamic Group – also joined the Islamist Alliance. Within the bloc, the Nour party won 
108 seats, Building and Development secured 13, and the Asala party took three.
The Revolution Continues Alliance (7 seats; 1%). The Revolution Continues 
Alliance essentially represents those parties that broke o¢ from the liberal Egyptian Bloc. It 
includes Egypt Freedom Party, the Muslim Brotherhood youth’s Egyptian Current Party, the 
Socialist Popular Alliance Party and an assortment of lesser groups. The alliance can be 
described as leftist, though it includes Islamists and economic liberals. The one constant 
among its most notable members is that they declined to compromise in order to remain in 
more-powerful groups – the Egypt Bloc and the Muslim Brotherhood.Wasat Party (10 seats; 2%)
Wafd Party (38 seats; 7.5%)
The Egyptian Bloc (34 seats; 6.5%)
Reform and Development Party (8 seats; 1.5%)
National Democratic Party O¢shoots 
Remnants of the Mubarak Regime (16 seats; 3%)
Independents (26 seats; 5%) Appointees (10 seats; 2%)
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fig.4.b.8    The  Muslim  Brotherhood,  and  its 
Freedom and Justice Party, became the subjects of 
public discontent in Egypt after they have failed to 
deliver on their campaign promises.
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fig.4.b.9      Graffiti  of  Morsi  on  the  outer  wall  of 
the  Presidential  Palace  in  Heliopolis.  His  move 
to consolidate his, and  the Muslim Brotherhood’s, 
position  in  power  not  long  after  he  was  elected 
president was a major cause of  concern  for  large 
portions of Egyptian society, which soon thereafter 
developed into a full out public uproar demanding 
his removal from power.
in the wake of the Uprising  and impeded the flow of everyday life in his first 100 days in office. By the summer of 2013 
though, a little under a year after Morsi had taken office, the Brotherhood regime had hardly fulfilled any of its campaign 
promises. The economy was in a much worse shape than before the Brotherhood had come into power; public amenities 
were in shambles as power outages, water shortages, and traffic jams became a staple of everyday like across all of Cairo 
much to the dismay of its residents; the regime took a number of power grab measures that were clearly aimed at securing 
their position in power indefinitely; and in many instances, the Muslim Brotherhood supporters cracked down violently on 
anyone who voiced their opposition to or protested against its regime’s policies. All in all, the Egyptian people in general, 
and older middle class professionals in particular, found themselves under the yoke of yet another authoritarian regime, 
which seemed poised to excise even more liberties than any other regime they had lived under given its hard-line Islamist 
ideological platform. And so, when young protestors, once again, took to the streets in the summer of 2013 in an attempt 
to depose Morsi and the Brotherhood, older middle class professionals hardly voiced any complaints, and even took part 
in the protests towards the end when the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime seemed imminent. When that 
happened however, I was under no illusion that older middle class professionals had come around and were finally living 
up to their supposed social responsibility, simply because their track-record over the previous 4 years strongly suggested 
otherwise. As a matter of fact, the way the events of that summer unfolded put an end to all my prior hopes that Nasr 
City’s middle class professionals might be reconsidering abandoning their apartment building–extended family houses and 
relocating their homes to the suburbs of Cairo.
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fig.4.b.10  Rab’a  Mosque  and  square  relative  to 
11  El-Insha  Street.  After  the  brutal  dispersal  of 
the Rab’a sit-in sin the summer of 2013, the Rab’a 
logo  [top]  became  synonymous with  the  incident, 
and  served  a  reminder  of  what  happened  what 
happened  then  and  there,  as  well  as  a  symbol  of 
defiance to the current Egyptian authorities which 
banned the any public display of that logo.
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fig.4.b.11  The Rab’a sit in
In the standoff that developed between the anti and pro Morsi protestors during that summer, the latter group staged its 
biggest sit-in at Rab’a Square – a fairly large traffic node at the northwest corner of Nasr City’s residential neighborhoods, on 
which the Rab’a mosque, one of the Nasr City’s oldest and most iconic landmarks, stands. And with nothing but the suburbs 
of New Cairo and Shorouq City to the east of Nasr City, Rab’a Square has always served as the primary entry point to Nasr 
City for the rest of Cairo’s population. That is to say, Rab’a Square carries a lot of symbolic weight as a gateway and an urban 
façade for Nasr City as a whole. And so when the pro Muslim Brotherhood protestors claimed Rab’a Square as their turf, 
they essentially claimed the whole of Nasr City as such. It came as a shock for Nasr City’s middle class professionals, and for 
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fig.4.b.12  [bottom, right]  and 
fig.4.b.13  [bottom,  left]  As  Egyptian 
security  forces  moved  in  to  clear 
the  Rab’a  sit-in  after  months  of  not 
addressing  the  issue,  the  situation 
quickly developed  to  the worst as  the 
pro-Morsi  supporters  and  security 
forces clashed violently.
me for that matter, to realize that so many of the neighborhood’s new middle class residents were avid supporters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. They were obviously taken aback by the realization that their new middle class neighbors in Nasr City 
were fundamentally different from them at a very deep ideological level. And given the clear majority of Nasr City’s new 
middle class inhabitants, it also seemed to me that middle class professionals came to realize that Nasr City was not the 
habitat that they had once thought of as their own.
The middle class professionals’ perception of Nasr City was further tarnished in the aftermath of Morsi’s ouster. After the 
Army had deposed Morsi, pro Brotherhood protestors refused to leave Rab’a square and continued to occupy it, making life 
that much difficult for all of Nasr City’s inhabitants. But when they Army finally moved in to disperse the Rab’a sit-in almost 
two months after Morsi’s ouster, it was a rather ugly affair. In its effort to remove the protestors from the square, the Army 
exercised excessive, and at times deadly, force, and amid allegations from both the Army and the Brotherhood as to who 
instigated the violence and killed protestors, the death toll of what was quickly dubbed as the “Rab’a Massacre” piled up. In 
the wake of that unfortunate event, I got the distinct impression that the image of Nasr City was forever marred in collective 
consciousness of its middle class professionals inhabitants. It seemed to me that the prevalent sentiment among them was 
that of alienation, and more than ever before, it looked as though they had more reasons to leave Nasr City than they had 
reasons to stay.
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fig.4.b.14  [top,  left],  fig.4.b.15  [top,  right]  and  fig.4.b.16  [bottom] As  security  forces 
stepped-up  the  force  by  which  they  went  about  dispersing  the  sit-in  and  clearing  its 
camps; the Rab’a square, and its typically quiet residential context, quickly developed 
the semblance of a scorched war-zone.
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fig.4.b.17  What follows is a series of maps tracking urban changes in 
the First Zone Four years after the urban survey I conducted in 2010, 
and three years after the outbreak of the January Uprising. And while 
the trends tracked in the aforementioned survey have slowed down a bit 
during those three years, they most definitely have not lost their vigor. 
The apartment building¬–extended family house typology is still sharp 
decline and  the condominium tower  typology  is still on  the rise. The 
following maps aim to demonstrate the continuation of those trends.
During my most recent visit to Cairo in early 2014, I conducted an additional layer of urban survey on Nasr City’s First 
Zone. Sadly enough, my findings were in clear correlation with my observations regarding the middle class professionals’ 
stronger than ever resolve to leave Nasr City and relocate to the suburbs. All of the trends that I have tracked in previous 
surveys persisted. Granted, in comparison to the two-year stretch between 2008 and 2010, some of those trends might 
have slowed down a bit during the following 4 years, but they most certainly did not completely abate. By-law abiding 
apartment buildings were still being demolished and replaced by gaudy neo-classical condominium towers at very high 
rates that suggest that the middle class professionals’ exodus is still in full swing. As a matter of fact, the data seemed to also 
suggest that there was hardly a time following the January uprising when middle class professionals seriously considered 
staying in Nasr City.
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fig.4.b.18   
First Zone | 2010 – 2014
New Residential Buildings
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fig.4.b.19   
First Zone | 2010 – 2014
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fig.4.b.20   
First Zone | 2010 – 2014
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fig.4.b.21   
First Zone | 2010 – 2014
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1994
2007
2010 First Zone | 2014
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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fig.4.b.22   
1994
2007
2010 First Zone | 2014
Residential Building Heightsup to 5 storeys[up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]6 or 7 storeys[7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets]10 storeys and above[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] 8 or 9 storeys[9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets]
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fig.4.b.23  In 2011, another of El-Insha 
Street’s  extended  family  households 
was demolished; this time it was 2 El-
Insha Street.
This brings me back to El-Insha Street and my extended family house there – the microcosm that gauges Nasr City as a whole. 
In 2012, before the Rab’a sit-in and subsequent massacre, 2 El-Insha street was demolished, and shortly afterwards an eight-
storey condominium stood in its place, which quickly put out the glimmer of hope I had with regards to the residents of 
El-Insha Street might be electing to keep residing in their extended family homes down my street. That particular incident 
was a very early indication that the reversal of the extinction of Nasr City’s apartment building–extended family house 
typology which I though might be possible hoped for was in fact never going to happen. And during my most recent visit to 
Cairo in 2014, I learned some things that only served to confirm what I had already suspected. Most of the nuclear families 
of 13 El-Insha Street household have moved out and were renting their apartments until they got a good offer on selling the 
whole property. Similarly, many of the nuclear families of 1 and 8 El-Insha Street households have sold their apartments and 
moved out to the suburbs. My uncle is now in the final phases of completing his Shorouq City residence. And my mother is 
seriously considering selling her apartment in 11 El-Insha Street and moving to a single apartment in New Cairo, and is now 
seeing my sister’s and my own apartments merely as future assets for us later in life rather than apartments that we would 
actually occupy with our own prospective nuclear families.
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fig.4.b.24    [top]  and  fig.4.b.25 
[bottom]  Lot  no.2  on  El-Insha  Street 
lies vacant after the demolition of the 
extended  family  house  that  used  to 
occupy it. The sign boasts the now legal 
construction of an 8-storey apartment 
building, with two apartments on each 
level, in its place.
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fig.4.b.26   
1050 20m
El-Insha Street | 2014
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fig.4.b.27   
El-Insha Street | 2014
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fig.4.b.28  [opposite page] 11 El-Insha Street, and 
by  association  Nasr  City’s  apartment  building–
extended  family  house  typology,  are  fading  into 
extinction.
In other words, the life of 11 El-Insha Street as an extended family household is at an end, and so is that of Nasr City 
as a hub for middle class professionals and the apartment building–extended family house typology. The social pull of 
Cairo’s suburbs and the middle class professionals’ socially driven pursuit of “leisure dreams” is clearly poised to prevail 
here, and with it, the last remnants of a characteristic architectural typology are most likely going to fade into extinction. 
Nevertheless, Nasr City itself will live on, albeit in a very different urban, architectural, and social form – there’s yet another 
chapter in its story. But as this thesis comes to a close, my hope is that, in years to come, it would serve as a record of Nasr 
City’s apartment building–extended family house typology with its unassuming character and the latent potential of its 
architecture and social structure, for anyone who might wonder what small role it could have played in the grander scheme 
of things had it endured.
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countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm; in “Employment”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/81.htm; and in “Remittances” http://
countrystudies.us/egypt/100.htm.
9. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened 
to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 28.
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10. These figures were calculated using the “Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)” indicator values for each of the 
years in both the specified periods for the Arab Republic of Egypt. Those values were obtained from the World DataBank 
website. The World Bank, “World DataBank,” worldbank.org, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
11. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever 
Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 
2001), 29; 115; and 136. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 
2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 159-160. Metz gives an example that “in the early 1980s . . . a free-lance tile-setter 
could earn about as much in one week as a government minister could earn in a month.” See Helen Chapin Metz, ed., 
Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/
egypt/61.htm. Also see Metz, in “Wages”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/82.htm.
12. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever 
Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 
2001), 36; and 135-136. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 
2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 127; 131; and 159.
13. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever 
Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 
2001), 74.
14. Ibid, 23. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. 
(Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 45-46; and 127.
15. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever 
Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 
2001), 76-77; and 136.
16. The statements made here about middle class professionals are implicit throughout the narratives of Amin’s two 
books, and draw primarily on my deductions from his more explicit statements about those who quickly rose through the 
social hierarchy in Egypt during the 70s and 80s. See Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry 
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fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-
1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 75-76. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of 
the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 127-128.
17. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever 
Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 
2001), 19-20. Amin points out that there is a strong consensus regarding the parasitic nature of the rising social classes 
during 70s and 80s in Egypt among prominent Egyptian social scientists. And while Amin himself, who is a renowned and 
widely published Egyptian scholar who was contemporary to that specific period of socioeconomic change, does not 
challenge that such classes are indeed of that nature, he is more concerned with investigating why they had developed it. 
What I’m trying to convey here is that, in most social sciences, more often than not there are contrasting academic biases 
on any given issue. The views presented here regarding the rising entrepreneurial class in Egypt during the 70s and 80s are 
the most widely accepted in the Egyptian academic circles of social sciences. That is not to say though that these views are 
absolute, but rather they are more of a general picture of the societal dynamics during that particular period. As matter 
of fact, later in the same book, in the chapter entitled “Government Jobs”, Amin states that since the beginning of the 90s 
the reputation of the entrepreneurial class in Egypt, or rather the private sector in general, has gotten considerably better 
than it was throughout the 70s and most of the 80s. And that’s not to mention that throughout the book, Amin identifies 
earnest, small and medium scale tradesmen and businessmen as a longstanding and integral portion of the Egyptian middle 
class that dates back to before any of the socioeconomic changes of the 70s and 80s, or even the 50s and 60s, took place. 
It is just that, in terms of relative size, they constituted a miniscule portion of the Egyptian middle class in comparison to 
professionals and bureaucrats. That is the primary reason why they are not discussed in the main socioeconomic discourse 
of this thesis.
18. Ibid, 72; and 77.
19. The corruption of the bureaucracy is a staple of everyday life in Egypt. The account given here draws upon the 
widely known drives behind the prevalence of that corruption, and following sources helped substantiate it: Galal Amin, 
Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? 
The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 42-43; and Helen Chapin 
Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “The Bureaucracy”, http://
countrystudies.us/egypt/112.htm.
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20. In the chapter entitled “Culture” in his book ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera [The Age of the Masses], Amin discusses, 
at some length, how the types and sources of income of middle class individuals, as well as the time it took them and the 
manner in which they came to attain their social status, can make all the difference between the values, the moral qualities, 
and the characteristics of one middle class versus the other. He also points out that the zeitgeist of any given society at any 
given time is generally of a far better quality when its middle class individuals depend primarily on productive and useful 
economic activities for their income and had attained their status after long periods of time that involved hard work and 
genuine achievement, as opposed to when its middle class individuals depend primarily on less productive and unethical 
economic activities for their income and had attained their status over short periods of time that involved unscrupulous or 
unethical practices aimed at accumulating large monetary gains. He essentially argues that the well-being of society as a 
whole is closely tied to the moral quality of its middle class, and highlights the important social role and responsibilities of 
that stratum. Those concepts, which he deems to be rather obvious constructs, are of the utmost importance in this thesis 
as they are the underlying themes throughout its discourse. See Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The 
Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 116-118.
21. In the section entitled “Social Mobility and Patterns of Consumption” in the first chapter of his book Maza Hadath 
lelMasreyeen? [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians], Amin briefly discusses the phenomenon that I refer to here as social 
emulation. However, I had come to identify and formulate my own understanding of that phenomenon before encountering 
his mention of it. In that sense, his brief discussion of that phenomenon served to verify what I had already learned about it. 
The discourse presented here regarding social emulation is my own and draws on other academic sources. See Galal Amin, 
Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? 
The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 31-32.
22. Ibid, 23. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. 
(Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 46.
23. Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El 
Shorouk, 2005), 160. Also see Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-
1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: 
Dar El Hilal, 2001), 115. Also see P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 431-432. Also see Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study 
(Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Remittances” http://countrystudies.us/egypt/100.htm.
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24. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Mubarak”, 
http://countrystudies.us/egypt/76.htm.
25. I came to learn about the real estate values in Nasr City during that period in my conversations with members of 
my family and my neighbors in 11 El-Insha Street. Nahed Fahim, in discussion with the author, February 2010; and Maher 
Farag, in discussion with the author, February 2010. The increase rates presented here were calculated using the land prices 
relayed to me in those conversations. These inflation figures presented here were calculated using the “Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual %)” indicator values for each of the years in the specified periods for the Arab Republic of Egypt. Those values 
were obtained from the World DataBank website. The World Bank, “World DataBank,” worldbank.org, http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
26. In my conversation with Maher Farag, my mother’s cousin who is a dentist and a faculty member at alAzhar 
University, I came to learn about the various methods of profit-seeking bylaw violation in Nasr City during the late 80s 
and early 90s. Dr. Farag became very well versed in the workings of residential construction in the settlement at that time 
after his father delegated him with the responsibility for constructing an apartment building–extended family house for 
himself and his siblings in Nasr City. According to Dr. Farag, an individual who constructed a residential building that far 
exceeded Nasr City’s maximum height bylaws would approach the Nasr City District Administration Authority and report 
that height violation. Accordingly, the Authority’s engineer would “estimate” the cost of one square meter of built area of 
the building in question, and in turn a fine of double that estimate for every square meter built in violation of the bylaw 
would be issued to the building’s owner. However, it was a very common practice for the owner of the building in question 
to bribe the engineer in order to lower his “estimate” and considerably bring down the overall sum of the fine. But if the 
engineer was unwilling to cooperate, or if the violation was too gross to overlook, and the Authority issued a demolition 
order for the storeys in violation of the bylaw or the building as a whole, the owner could still circumvent that order and 
keep his building standing since the administrative bodies that issued such orders were separate entities from those who 
carried them out. A common practice in that case involved the owner of the building that was to be demolished bribing 
the officials in the administrative body vested with carrying out the demolition order to stall acting on it, since, by Egyptian 
law, those kinds of orders became void three years after they’ve been issued if they were not carried out within that 
time frame. But then again, if that did not work either, the owner of the building in violation still had one last resort to 
avoiding the building’s demolition. In that case, the common practice involved the owner of the building quickly selling the 
apartments on the higher, bylaw-violating, floors and filling them with occupants before doing so with the lower floors of 
the building, since the loopholes in the Egyptian law made it illicit to evict, let alone demolish, bylaw violating structures 
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once they had been occupied. Those practices also came up in my conversations with Nahed Fahim, my neighbor in 11 El-
Insha Street, and with Bassem alBorolossy, an acquaintance of my father, who owns a real estate and construction company. 
Maher Farag, in discussion with the author, February 2010; Nahed Fahim, in discussion with the author, February 2010; and 
Bassem alBorolossy (engineer, owner, and general manager of Masr alAseela Company for Real Estate Investment, and Fajr 
Company for Construction) in discussion with the author, February 2010.
27. Ahmed Kh. Allam, Yhya O. Shedid, and Maged M. El Mahdi, Tagdid alAhya’ [Urban Renewal] (Cairo: The Anglo-
Egyptian Bookshop, 1997), 264-265. The date for amending Nasr City’s building bylaws was obtained from the blueprints 
of the First and Seventh Zones’ detailed planning, which were provided by The Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban 
Development. On those blueprints the new maximum height values for residential buildings are annotated and dated to 
1985. According to the index of legal decrees pertaining to Nasr City, which was compiled by and obtained from Ahmed 
AbdelMaqsoud Muhammad, a lawyer in the company, the boundaries of the settlement were extended and more areas 
were added to its jurisdictions in 1971, 1982, and again in 1984. The index also lists the approval of the detailed planning of 
five new residential zones between 1974 and 1993.
3.1  An Urban Exodus
1. “New Cairo,” New Urban Communities Authority, http://www.newcities.gov.eg/english/New_Communities/Cairo/
default.aspx.
2. Bassem alBorolossy (engineer, owner, and general manager of Masr alAseela Company for Real Estate Investment, 
and Fajr Company for Construction) in discussion with the author, February 2010.
3. Those values were obtained from a photocopy of the official bylaw booklet for the villa zones in New Cairo.
4. Bassem alBorolossy (engineer, owner, and general manager of Masr alAseela Company for Real Estate Investment, 
and Fajr Company for Construction) in discussion with the author, February 2010. 
5. To give an example: Given that the average real estate value in Nasr City’s first zone was about 10,000 Egyptian 
pounds in 2010, a middle class family living in an apartment building–extended family house that stands on a 500 square 
meter lot in the first zone would get about 5 million pounds for their property. Assuming that said extended family household 
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is made up of the nuclear families of tow siblings, the share of each would be 2.5 million Egyptian pounds. On the other 
hand, the real estate value in New Cairo’s highly sought after Fifth Settlement was about 2,250 pounds in 2010. It would 
therefore cost either of the siblings of the aforementioned extended family household about 1,575,000 pounds to acquire 
a comparable 700 square meter land lot there to construct a villa their own nuclear family and the possible nuclear families 
of their children. And given that the cost of construction and finishing of one built square meter in 2010 was about 1,200 
pounds, constructing a bylaw abiding 3-storey villa that stands on 50% of the land of the 700 square meter land lot would 
amount to 1,260,000 pounds. That is a total cost of 2,835,000 Egyptian pounds for land and construction costs, and that’s 
not counting design cost and building permit fees. At best, those hypothetical siblings would have to pay about 300,000 
pounds out of pocket if they sold their Nasr City apartment building–extended family house and each used their share of its 
price to finance building their separate extended family homes in New Cairo. Not to mention that, in reality, they’d have to 
come up with the entire cost for constructing their New Cairo homes before taking any steps towards selling their Nasr City 
dwelling, since they’d have no where to stay during the construction of the former. Surely, there are smaller lots to be had in 
New Cairo, and cheaper suburban real estate to relocate to. For instance, because it is relatively newer and less developed, 
as well as further away from the city than New Cairo, the real estate values in Shorouq City averaged at about 1,100 pounds 
per square meter in 2010. However, there are lower real estate values in Nasr City too, and smaller lots as well; and many 
situations where there are more than two siblings in any one apartment building–extended family household. In any light, 
relocating to suburbs is ultimately a rather cumbersome financial undertaking. (The real estate values and building costs 
used here were obtained during my afore mentioned conversation with Bassem alBorolossy)
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